An Onomastic History: What Can Philo Provide?

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Prefatory Note

This paper is very much a work in progress. It represents one mainly complete chapter (Ch. 2) and one partial chapter (Ch. 3) from a book on the history of the onomastica. I have decided not to include here the first chapter as I do not wish to have it available on the internet. Unfortunately, that decision has its drawbacks for Philo Seminar readers of this submission, and I apologize in advance for that. However, this paper is long enough already—it would be even longer to read had I included Ch. 1.

The research presented here springs from my work on the divine name (The Earliest Non-mystical Jewish Use of Iαω, Peeters, 2014), henceforth ENJU. There I document that the use of this Greek form of the name, mostly known today from (later) magical and gnostic sources, had a history prior to its move into the mystical sphere. The impetus for my investigation was the appearance of Iαω in 4Q120, a LXX MS of Leviticus. In the course of my studying this matter, I discovered the importance of the biblical onomastica, a significant primary source that has been highly neglected by modern scholarship. A person familiar with Philonic studies will know about these name lists, largely from the debate over whether Philo had any substantial knowledge of Hebrew or not. I wish to move beyond that now rather old controversy, as well as my original interest in these lists for what they can tell us about the divine name, and investigate the onomastica for their own sake. Only a few scholars have touched on the issue of the origin and development of these documents, namely David Rokeah, Lester Grabbe, and Nick de Lange. A somewhat larger number of other active scholars have mentioned them within the context of Philonic and/or patristic studies (Runia, Kamesar, Royse, Winston, Goulet, Siegert, Instone-Brewer, Buchinger, Rajak, Wilkinson), some of whom will be reading this submission.

Unfortunately, I was not able to get as far in my research as I had hoped, as anyone reading this presentation below and comparing it with the abstract submitted last March will see. Surely most of the attendees will have experienced such a phenomenon and understand the dynamics at work. Still, there is considerable content offered here that should pique the interests of many, and help further Philonic studies.

Chapter Two

Early Writers and Testimony: Establishing Pre-Philonic Use

The Earliest Witness: Aristobulus
As was mentioned in Chapter One in the discussion of Grabbe, our sole instance (outside of the Philonic corpus) of what appears to be a pre-Philonic use of the onomastica is from Aristobulus the Exegete, a second-century BCE philosopher/interpreter probably from Alexandria. His works are preserved in only five fragments, mainly from Eusebius’ Ecclesiastical History and Preparation for the Gospel, with secondary testimony from Clement of Alexandria’s Stromateis. Fragment 5 contains his exposition of the Sabbath; here he etymologizes the word’s meaning as follows:

τὸ δὲ σάββατον αὐτῆς προαγορεύωσθαι διερμενεύεται ἀνάπαυσις όυσα.2

Since the Greek is clearly problematic, it needs to be handled. First, it appears overall that we have some sort of textual transmission, or possibly even an original copying problem. This may be partially indicated by the fact that the editor of our critical text Karl Mras adopts the emendation of previous scholars, that is, changing the MSS’s τὸ [sic in Mras’ critical apparatus] to τῷ at the beginning of the sentence. Just how this helps the other grammatical/language issues is not readily apparent. Whether we have a dative or accusative article, it must be construed with the infinitive προαγορεύωσθαι to form an articular infinitive construction. The αὐτῆς is difficult due to the matter of its antecedent. It must refer to some ἡμέρα understood due to its having been mentioned in earlier material; the closest reference is to another αὐτῆς with the same meaning “day” 35 words earlier, and this then to the expression ἐξ ἡμέρας another 34 words before the prior αὐτῆς. The passage’s overall context is the sabbath day, so that may be why ἡμέρα has not been specifically mentioned for a while: it is taken for granted. Thus the antecedent can be found, but it is quite a way removed.

In the remainder of the line the σάββατον must be the subject of διερμενεύεται with ἀνάπαυσις as predicate or complement, even though σάββατον is embedded within the articular infinitive construction. Perhaps one would not expect this unless, of course, another is simply to be understood as the subject of διερμενεύεται. The όυσα is certainly problematic. One might expect a neuter to agree with σάββατον, but it may be that the participle is attracted to the gender of the nearby feminine ἀνάπαυσις. On the other hand, in the next line we find a somewhat similar ending (fem. predicate + a form of εἰράν), with ἤφαν εἶναι, 3 and this certainly seems to be referring to an understood (ἐβδομή) ἡμέρα. Thus if one wishes to push this analogy, possibly our main clause διερμενεύεται ἀνάπαυσις όυσα should be understood as “[sabbath] is translated as being (a) rest.” One problem with this understanding is that in our extant onomastica such non-substantivized participles rarely occur within the interpretations. Such is never found among Philo’s etymologies. Thus όυσα being a participle at all is quite odd. It may be a corruption since one of the formulae for introducing etymologies in Philo is the paraphrastic (δι)ερμενευθεὶς/-θέν ἐστιν. Therefore, the όυσα may be an alteration from ἐστιν. But if that

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1 His date and provenance seem to be accepted by all: C. R. Holladay, ABD 1.383-384; A. Y. Collins, OTP 2.831-833; DJBP 59; HJPACJ 3.579-587.
2 PE 13.12.13; GCS 43.2;196.10, ed. Mras.
3 The entire sentence reads: διασαφεὶ δὲ καὶ ὁμηρος καὶ Ἡσίοδος, μετειληφότες ἐκ τῶν ἡμετέρων βιβλίων ἤφαν εἶναι.
is the case, then we also have a change from a form of the passive participle διερμενευθέν to the finite verb διερμενεύεται. This would make the οὖσα otiose.

Mention should be made of the possibility of some kind of anacoluthon here, for in the eyes of some there may be nothing to connect the articular infinitive phrase to the main clause. This may be the reason for the emendation of the MSS’s τό to τῷ. That is, perhaps those proposing the dative construction of the articular infinitive want it to be some sort of a dative of reference or respect, “now as regards it [the seventh day] being called [the] sabbath, it [the sabbath] is translated ‘rest’,” for this would take care of any supposed lack of grammatical connection between the articular infinitive phrase and the main clause. If the notion of an original copying problem has any substance behind it, then it might have taken place when Aristobulus transferred the entry for σύββατον from his onomasticon to the prose context of his essay. Or, again, it could have occurred by scribes in the transmission process. Perhaps more likely, we may have multiple errors that occurred, possibly an initial copying one that generated further problems in the textual tradition. In the end, the best way to understand our locus is either to accept the articular infinitive understanding as above, or just something simpler like this: “the day is called sabbath, and sabbath is translated rest.”

For our purposes it seems clear enough that Aristobulus knew the meaning of σύββατον, and since we know he was dependent upon the LXX for his biblical text, he in all likelihood employed an onomasticon here. Of course, one could argue that this meaning is transparent, but Aristobulus’ language here fits a pattern that we see in multiple later users of our name lists: a technical use of the verb ἑρμηνεύω and its compounds, διερμενεύω and μεθερμενεύω. While this verb can, of course, have a wide variety of meanings and applications, in the context of explaining what a Hebrew name means in Greek, it is indeed a technical term. This issue is developed later in the present volume, but it needs to be mentioned now. For these reasons then it appears that Aristobulus is our

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4 One can only wonder about this dat. emendation, for the accusative of respect (what the MSS read) would work fine (Smyth §§ 1600 ff.). The only use of the dat. art. inf. without a preposition in the NT is causal, BDF § 401. Perhaps the editors have adopted the dat. in order to make clear that τό is not nom.

5 The English translations available in Collins (1985, 842) and Gifford (1903, 721) provide no substantial clues as to the Greek’s syntax. The strange rendering in Holladay (1995, 187-189) where he apparently takes the art. inf. as equivalent to a δτι clause, and understands the odd ἀντὶν ... οὖσα as some kind of oratio obliqua (?) offers no help either. Furthermore, his note (not on anything grammatical), that Nikolaus Walter believes that our line is a gloss partly because “it interrupts the train of thought” (ibid. 234 n. 150) fails to take into consideration that such etymologies often do just that. This phenomenon is addressed more fully later. I thank Adam Kamesar of Hebrew Union College for his opinions on this linguistic crux. Another colleague, retired classicist Michael Lennon, offered the remote possibility that οὖσα is perhaps adverbial, and drew my attention to the next line with its ἱερὰ ναι. He too deserves my thanks.


7 The “technical term” ἑρμηνευθέν ἐστιν, Runia, 2004a, 104.
first attested user of a biblical onomasticon. Interestingly for our investigation, this employment of an onomasticon by Aristobulus fits a time frame that would corroborate Rokeah’s date for our name lists’ origins, as well as de Lange’s attractive comment.

Philonic Predecessors *apud* Philo

When one begins to study the topic of Philo’s references to other Jewish allegorists, the situation can be tricky for two reasons. First, Philo never names any of them, nor does he usually give much substantial information about them, often just two or three words such as “some say...”; hence Maren Niehoff’s calling them his “anonymous colleagues and predecessors.” Secondly, even when one can establish that, at least occasionally, Philo clearly refers to other Jewish allegorists, it is not always certain whether these individuals are his contemporaries or lived at some time prior to him.

A person looking into the matter today can hardly do better than start with the work of the late David Hay. He had intended to produce a monograph with comprehensive coverage of all possible references in the Philonic corpus to other Jewish allegorists, but shortly after his retirement Hay’s life was cut short in 2006 and his goal was never realized. In his *Studia Philonica* article of 1979-1980 Hay tabulated 74 references to other allegorical exegetes in the Philonic corpus. Hay himself admits that this list is somewhat problematic since it does not account for Philo’s use of what Hay calls “imaginary conversation partners Philo introduces to enliven his commentary.” Hay further notes that it is not always clear (1) whether these allegorists hold a specific interpretation or might just be inclined to do so, and (2) when they do subscribe to some view, “exactly where their interpretation ends and [Philo’s] begins.” Furthermore, he marks a substantial number of these 74 as “indefinite.” In 1991 Hay published another article that expanded his interests in other exegetes to be found in Philo. This new list of those just in the *Quaestiones* brings his total to well over 100. However, a critical analysis of his lists reveals that Hay may have been a bit overly optimistic in his judgment of just where genuine reference to other Jewish allegorists may be found. Nevertheless, there are a sufficient number of clear passages in our ancient author to establish that Philo was aware of his standing in a well-established allegorical tradition of Jews. I have trimmed down Hay’s list to, say, 40-45 loci where it seems reasonable that Philo is referring to contemporary or prior Jewish allegorists.

Of these, a small number stand out as exemplary instances of contemporaries and predecessors who held to some sort of allegorical interpretation of the Torah. I have chosen five, although this number could be larger. First, in his exposition of the account in Gen. 12.8-20, that of Abram and Sarai going to Egypt, *Abr.* 99, he speaks of φυσικοί ἄνδρες ... ἀλληγοροῦντες, the technical term for natural philosophers who allegorize. Secondly, in his interpretation of Deut. 25.11-12, where the Mosaic Law stipulates that a woman’s hand should be amputated for intervening in a physical fight involving her hus-

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8 Grabbe asks whether a Jewish name list was “already in existence by the time of Aristobulus?” He then answers, “If so, we have no indications from the surviving fragments,” 1988, 108-109. The above citation and reasoning argue otherwise.
9 2011, 77-79.
band and grabbing the private parts of her husband’s opponent, Philo calls certain ones θεσπόσιοι ἄνδρες, divine men “who suppose that most of the things in the Law are manifest symbols of words hidden and unspoken” (Spec. 3.178). Thirdly, in what may well be his longest continuous description of another group’s allegorical interpretation of a single passage from the Pentateuch, at Joseph 151-156, Philo states that he heard, or has heard (ἡκούσα), a different, quite allegorical, interpretation from those who expound thoroughly (τῶν ἄκρηβούντων) parts of Gen. 37-41, that is, the Egyptian king, the chief baker, the chief butler/cupbearer, and the chief cook/butcher. Fourthly, at Mut. 74-75, in the context of the changing of Abram’s name, Philo speaks of τῶν πάλαι τινες who said that physical and logical research should be used ethically to better one’s character and acquire virtue. Finally, in his description of the Therapeutae Philo mentions παλαιοὶ ἄνδρες, men of old, “who have left behind many memorials of the treatment used in allegorical interpretation” (Contemp. 29). All this, of course, is in harmony with the few extant sources we have outside of Philo for Jewish allegory, namely, Aristobulus and Ps.-Aristeas.

A word is in order here on the problem mentioned above regarding the time frame of these other Jewish allegorists whom Philo mentions. I have generally taken them to have more likely been his predecessors than his contemporaries for four reasons: 1. because of the testimony of Aristobulus and Ps.-Aristeas; 2. because of the unreasonableness of taking the majority of them as his contemporaries; 3. because of David Runia’s sensible statement that many who study Philo have concluded that “it is very likely that his work continues a long tradition of allegorical exegesis in the Jewish community of Alexandria”; 4. because of Philo’s referring to some of them—at least occasionally—as τῶν πάλαι τινες or παλαιοὶ ἄνδρες, “certain ones/men of old.”

Once one accepts—what is by far the current majority view—that Philo was a user of the onomastica, or what Siegert calls “manuals of Hebrew etymology” (composed in Greek, of course), then one must wonder: “Was Philo the first user of these manuals?” Or if we count Aristobulus as the first, was Philo the second? After all, either Philo was or he was not. This is not a question for which there is any middle ground. Siegert’s choice of vocabulary above is interesting, for the word “manuals” means “handbooks” and would seem to carry the notion of some well-circulating, regularly used written tools, perhaps like we would use the words “lexica” or “dictionaries” today. So then, was Philo simply one in a chain of users who stretched back to the origins of the onomastica, the late third to early second centuries BCE, according to Rokeah, and who included the second century BCE exegete Aristobulus? Is this philosopher the only evidence prior to Philo for our handbook usage?

Philo himself provides further testimony for the answer. In one of the loci just mentioned, Abr. 99, “the φυσικοὶ ἄνδρες allege that the husband [Abram] was symbolically a σπουδαῖον νοῦν,” an excellent mind, with these φυσικοὶ ἄνδρες “calculating from the translated meaning concerning the name” that it meant a civilized character/disposition in the soul. The reference here to τῆς περὶ τοῦνμα ἐρμηνευθείσης δυνάμεως, and that these interpreters were relying on Abram’s name’s meaning to support their allegorical interpretation provide evidence for these allegorists’ use of the aforesaid handbooks of He-

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11 1990, 13. When one considers the lengthy description of the allegorical interpretation of the “tree of life” (Gen. 2.9) that Philo provides at QG 1.10 with his five instances of “some say,” it seems highly unlikely that he was only describing his contemporaries.
brew etymology composed in Greek. While David Runia states “there is a single text [the one just discussed] in Philo which unambiguously affirms he derived etymological material from exegetical predecessors,” there appears to be more than just this Abr. 99 locus. At least one other passage similarly shows that the onomastica were being used by Philo’s forerunners. In De posteritate Caini 40–42 Philo takes up the meaning of Enoch, Methuselah, and Lamech’s names. He tackles Enoch first and provides the import χάρις σου, “your gift,” an interpretation also found in one of our ecclesiastical onomastica. Philo then takes to task ἑνιοί, “certain ones,” who agree that this is the meaning of Enoch and also apply this gift, like Philo, to the mind within us, but they exalt human intellect without acknowledging that all the things in creation are a gift from God. This last fact is Philo’s beef with these earlier allegorists. For our purposes, since these predecessors too depended on the meaning of Enoch’s name for their interpretation, one that agrees with Philo’s and is also found in a later name list, it is the reasonable course to see them as other users of the onomastica prior to Philo.

These two passages take us to a more complex third one, a fragment of Philo in the Quaestiones on Exodus (2.62), and hopefully a bit of a new understanding on it. Perhaps surprisingly, or, after one considers the mushrooming of academic interest in Philo for the last few decades, perhaps not so surprisingly, this previously overlooked fragment has received a considerable amount of recent attention. As already implied, this locus is difficult and its problems include those of textual transmission. Fortunately, as one would naturally expect given that last fact, the passage has drawn the attention of the discerning mind of James Royse who just three years ago came out with a critical edition of the cluster of QE fragments that includes our locus in the 2012 Studia Philonica Annual. Eight years before this definitive edition David Runia had turned his attention to the same set of passages which at the time he termed “neglected” in an article in the Festschrift für Michael Stone. Our set had already been presented yet earlier by Abraham Terian in the final volume of the Cerf edition of Philo (PAPM 34C, 1992). In the midst of all this attention, Fred Strickert, now emeritus from Wartburg College in Iowa, had also discussed the single passage of our focus in an article in the 1996 SPhA. Given all this activity in the last 20 plus years, is there anything left to say on this formerly neglected locus? Indeed there is.

A word on the QE 2.62–68 set is in order. While most of the extant Quaestiones are preserved in Armenian, with some in Latin, others have also survived in their original Greek language, and our set is fortunately among them. They have been preserved in the MS Vaticanus graecus 379 of the 14th century. Royse summarizes that this MS “preserves

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12 2004a, 114.
13 Onom. Coisl. 164.57 (the second of three entries); by far the most common entry in the onomastica for Enoch is εὐκαιρίας σου, “consecration (LSJ, 469), inauguration (GELS, 186).” So 174.2, 176.42, 177.70, 191.43–44 (Lex.); 202.72.
14 2004b.
15 Françoise Petit did not include QE 2.62–68 in vol. 33 of PAPM, the one that contains the fragments of Philo’s QG and QE. To her it was not technically fragmentary but has been preserved directly in a Greek MS; see her statements on 13 and 273, and Royse, 2012, 5.
a highly accurate, although not quite uncorrupted, text.”

He reminds us that the theme here, found several times in Philo’s other works, is “divine powers ... presented as reflections on the significance of the Cherubim.” Thus the set begins at QE 2.62 with the question, “Who are the Cherubim?” We are interested in the initial sentence after Philo identifies the question. The text in Vat. gr. 379 reads as follows:

τὰ Χερουβὶμ ἐρμηνεύεται μὲν ἐπίγνωσις πολλῆ, ἐν ἑτέρως ὁνόμα ἐπιστήμη πλούσια καὶ κεχυμένη.

Modern text critical history of this passage begins with the edition of Grossmann in 1856, that was followed by Tischendorf twelve years later (1868) and Harris in 1886. The reading in these three editors then was reproduced by Marcus in the Loeb version, suppl. 2.253, but his English translation (found on p. 108) follows the Armenian, not the Greek.

As one can see, the first clause is fine, “The Cherubim are interpreted ‘much knowledge’,” but there is a commonly perceived problem with the reading in the next clause. Grossmann, followed by Tischendorf, Harris, and Marcus, felt that some connection was needed between the first and second clause, and their emendation was the dative singular feminine relative pronoun ᾧ (after πολλῇ) with ἐπίγνωσις as its evident antecedent. In his lengthy textual discussion of our locus Royse also inserts a word in the same place, but now the conjunction, or more properly, the disjunction ὡ̣, so that there is something joining the two definitions. A further problem in this second clause is that the Greek text does not agree with the Armenian here; for the ὁνόμα in the Vat. MS, the Armenian version reads the equivalent of ὁνόμασιν. This then can be seen to agree with the Greek ἐν ἑτέροις. Indeed, Royse suggests that the Armenian got corrupted from the singular ὁνόμα to the Armenian equivalent in the plural because the translator(s) (or copyist[s]) did so due to ἑτέροις being plural: “the translators were somehow misled by the awkward ἐν ἑτέροις ὁνόμα (assuming that their text in fact had that Greek), and took the words as

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16 2012, 4.
17 Ibid. 3-4.
18 The text is available in Terian, 1992, 283, and Royse, 2012, 20. Unfortunately, the discussion in Grabbe is deficient (1988, 219, no. 160); he only provides coverage of the passage in the other locus where Philo etymologizes the Cherubim with but a single meaning (Mos. 2.97), and although Grabbe lists our QE locus, there is no attention given to it.
19 For the earlier ed. by Angelo Mai, see Royse, 2012, 6-7.
20 “I hesitantly suggest that, as an easy error, η̣ was omitted (by haplography after πολλῇ),” Royse, 2012, 42. He may be following Runia’s lead here, for the latter had, without providing a Greek text for our locus, given a somewhat similar meaning in his 2004b article: “The Cherubim are interpreted as ‘much knowledge’ (but) elsewhere the word is interpreted as ‘rich and diffused science’,” 202. However, it is possible that Runia has been influenced due to Royse’s suggestion (years before Royse himself published the definitive edition of 2012) since the former scholar thanks the latter “for making valuable comments on the draft of this article,” 200 n. 4. Apparently the only one who does not feel compelled to emend the text is Terian.
one phrase.” It is of interest that so many who have dealt with this passage have felt the need to emend it.

One reason various ones have wanted to revise the text has to do with the expression ἐν ἑτέροις. Speaking specifically of the relationship between the clauses τὰ Χερουβὶμ ἐρμηνεύεται μὲν ἐπήγγειος πολλῇ and ἐν ἑτέροις ὄνομα ἐπιστήμη πλουσίω καὶ κεχυμένη, Runia states, “The syntax is awkward here” (cf. Royse’s words above and his “The second clause awkwardly follows the first.”). Runia goes on that the ἐν ἑτέροις “may have been followed by a ἥς which has fallen out, contrasting the two alternative etymologies.” This suggestion is doubtless made because of the presence of μέν in the first clause. He explains that the prepositional phrase ἐν ἑτέροις “is very common and simply means ‘elsewhere.’” The most extensive treatment of this matter is found in Royse. He reports a total of 39 instances of ἐν ἑτέροις in the Philonic corpus, including our locus. Of these he feels only one passage does not connote simply “elsewhere”: Somn. 1.132. Here Philo uses the phrase to refer to other contests since the context indicates he is referring to the just mentioned τῶν ἄθλων. Noteworthy is the comment by Fred Strickert on our phrase’s occurrence in at QE 2.62:

Maurus’ translation may be misleading. He translates the words ἐν ἑτέροις as ‘in other words’ suggesting that Philo is simply expanding on his previous statement. Rather it is also possible to read this as ‘the name [is translated] among others…’ which suggests that what follows is an already proposed alternative interpretation.

Royse relegates Strickert’s thoughts to a footnote and dismisses the idea with “[Strickert] does not give any parallels.” The former colleague also states: “It is tempting to interpret the phrase [ἐν ἑτέροις] as meaning ‘by others,’ or ‘in other interpretations,’ but Philonic usage seems to provide no support for such renderings.” It is clear from his comments that Strickert believes that “in other words” and “among others” share no (Greek) semantic domain.

All the above calls to mind several issues. First, just what does “elsewhere” mean here? More pointedly, how does an adjective in the masculine or neuter plural, used as the object of the preposition ἐν, come to have the adverbial meaning “elsewhere”? Clearly some noun (or nouns) must be understood here. That is, at least in the phrase’s origin, and perhaps in its later role as well, this is an elliptical usage. What is that noun (those nouns)? How did our phrase develop into this adverbial meaning “elsewhere”? Can grammatical parallels of other forms of ἑτέρος used adverbially offer us any insight? How does this bear on our locus? Secondly, what is the history of this phrase before

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21 2012, 45.
22 Ibid. 42.
24 2012, 44.
25 1996, 43. For more on the notion of “in other words” for ἐν ἑτέροις, see infra.
26 2012, 45 and n. 69.
27 Cf. the fact that Marcus feels he must supply “words” (admittedly under the influence of the Armenian version). Strickert seems to understand “other people.”
Philo? How it is used in earlier and roughly contemporary authors? Thirdly, is an emendation really necessary at *QE* 2.62, or can an understanding of the text be obtained without resorting to such minor surgery? Since a primary stated reason for the proposed emendations is that ἐν ἐτέρως or ἐν ἐτέρως δόξοια is awkward, if the previous two points can shed light on the use of the prepositional phrase, then what should that reveal about proposed textual adjustments? Finally, if we can come to a new understanding of our phrase here, can that provide any input to the larger question of Philo’s predecessors and the investigation of their use of the onomastic handbooks that is the subject of this chapter?

Although the LSJ compliers do not specifically discuss the absolute use of our phrase ἐν ἐτέρως, when they list other elliptical and adverbal uses of ἐτέρως, they sometimes provide the understood nouns. In fact, they list three such usages: (τῶν) ἐτέρως for which one is to understand/supply χειρί, a use that goes back to Homer and is found in Plato. A second instance is also in the dative singular feminine, where ἴππερια is understood. For this LSJ give examples from Sophocles, (Ps.-)Euripides, Plato, and Xenophon. The last of the trio is to supply yet another dative singular feminine noun, ὅδεφ. This may be found in Hesiod, Sophocles, Aristophanes, and Lucian. From these examples it is not difficult to see how other uses of ἐτέρως with prepositions were created and moved along in meaning. Thus as the object of the prepositions ἐπί, ἐις, and κατά the grammatically appropriate forms of ἐτέρως mean “to/on one or the other side, one or the other way.”

The simple (τῶν) ἐτέρως [χειρί] (above) becomes ἐκ ἐτέρως [χειρός], “on the left side [of a river bank],” in Apollonius of Rhodes. That such usage could continue to evolve over time is shown by Thucydides’ use of καθ’ ἐτέρως to connote “against either entity (the Athenian army or navy)” or just “either way.”

All this gives us a pattern for examining ἐν ἐτέρως. Obviously some masculine or neuter noun must figure in this phrase’s early history. Since it comes to mean “elsewhere,” the two most likely candidates are τόπος and λόγος: ἐν ἐτέρως τόπος and/or ἐν ἐτέρως λόγος. Thus “in other places/passages/essays” would appear to be the probable linguistic ancestors for “elsewhere.” The first choice seems perhaps the most patent since τόπος signifies “place” in a variety of settings, including the sense of “passage in literature.” Indeed, the phrase ἐν ἐτέρως, as we shall shortly see, often connotes “in another passage.” The second possibility of λόγος should also be kept in mind, especially given the vast semantic domain of this word. Since there does not appear to be any previous study on the matter, among classicists, biblical scholars, or Philonic specialists, a survey of our expression in the TLG database has served as the basis for the data collected be-

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28 Terian sees no need to emend the text; see n. 20 supra. What is his understanding of it?
29 Here and below I employ the grammatical term “absolute” to connote “standing alone without a substantive.” One could also call it a substantivized use.
30 702. Of course, these exx. include the alternative stems θάτερ- and ἀτερ-.
31 *Il.* 22.80; *Od.* 3.441; *Soph.* 226a.
32 *OT* 782; *Rh.* 449; *Cri.* 44a; *Cyr.* 4.6.10.
33 *Op.* 216; *OC* 1444; *Tr.* 272; *Eq.* 35, *Nu.* 812; *Tim.* 5, this last in the acc. sing.
34 LSJ 702, meanings IV.2.a-b.
35 1.1115.
36 Thuc. 7.42.6. The second rendering is that of Paul Woodruff, 1993, 131.
low. I have excluded the following instances: 1. where the authorship of the work is in doubt; 2. loci of questionable textual status; 3. fragments. Of course, not all passages that employ ἐτέρος have been studied and are presented below. Rather the focus has been primarily on the absolute use of the word in the dative masculine or neuter plural as the object of ἐν, with regular attention to any other instances that would help provide clues to the “understood” noun(s) involved, even if these occasionally occur in the singular.

The earliest use of our expression is found in Herodotus, and he supplies the “missing” noun. He employs the phrase but once, when he promises to relate how the Medes recaptured a city they had lost to the Scythians (Ninus); parenthetically he states ὡς δὲ εἴλον ἐν ἐτέροις λόγοις δηλώσω, “how they took it I will show elsewhere/in other words/in another passage.” The Loeb translator Godley renders the phrase as “in a later part of my history.” The reference is “an unfulfilled promise.” That this initial instance in Greek literature of a passage containing our prepositional phrase has a stated λόγοις with it makes one think of Marcus’ rendering of our QE locus, “in other words.” Marcus was influenced by the equivalent of ὄνωμασιν in the Armenian version of our QE locus, but was our earlier Philonic colleague aware, consciously or unconsciously, of the use of ἐν ἐτέροις λόγοις to mean “elsewhere” in other Greek literature as well, or is his rendering being so close to this Herodotean based solely on the Armenian reading?

The next use of the phrase is also the first time ἐν ἐτέροις appears absolutely; it is found among the Attic orators who straddle the 5th to 4th centuries. Isocrates uses it twice, the first in his Address to Demonicus. He exhorts that his friend rejoice over the good things (τῶν ἄγαθῶν) that befall him, but moderately lament the evils (τῶν κακῶν). He then warns: γὰρ οὖν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις μηδὲ ἐν ἐτέροις ἄν κατάθλουσ, “do not become one visible to others in either case.” This use of ἐν ἐτέροις is obviously related in thought to (τῇ) ἐτέρᾳ

37 While one or more of these criteria apply to numerous works that have come down to us, doubtless the most important here is the Hippocratic corpus. In it are found several instances of ἐν ἐτέροις, but since we cannot know what, if any, works within this corpus were really penned by Hippocrates of Cos, or even when such material was written, this body of literature has of necessity been ignored in the present survey.

38 1.106.2.

39 A. D. Godley, 1926, 139.

40 How and Wells, 1912, 1.15, 107 (quotation from the latter).

41 At Post. 89 Colson renders καὶ ἐν ἐτέροις as “again in other words,” a translation that Royse feels is less accurate than “‘an anderer Stelle’ and ‘ailleurs’,” 2012, 44 n. 66. One thinks too of Strickert’s similar comment on Marcus’ translation in our QE locus (supra). However, given the history of ἐν ἐτέροις presented here, and especially given the context of Post. 89, where Philo calls on two loci from Deuteronomy to buttress his notion that boundaries are determined by divine principles, Colson’s rendering of καὶ ἐν ἐτέροις as “again in other words” does not necessarily convey the notion of the normal expegeetical English meaning of “in other words,” viz., “expressed in other words/otherwise stated/to put it another way,” but one must wonder whether Colson too had some knowledge of the history of ἐν ἐτέροις in Greek. Colson nowhere else in PLCL so renders our phrase. To me, this is not some careless slip or poor translation at Post. 89. “Again in other λόγοις” and “elsewhere” need not be mutually exclusive here.

42 Dem. 1.42.
"ὅδω" or the καθ’ ἔτερα mentioned above. It is plural because its referents, the good and bad things, are. Thus here it must be neuter plural. The second utilization of our expression by Isocrates is in his discourse to Nicocles, the young king of Cyprus, possibly one of his past students. Here the orator states: "καὶ ταύτ’ ἐν ἔτεροῖς μὲν ἵκος ἀν ὄκνουν εἶπεν, “perhaps I should hesitate to say these things among others.” Clearly “men/people” must be understood with the masculine ἐν ἔτεροῖς here. A passage in Isaeus is worth mentioning, at least for showing how the singular ἔτερος became associated with a noun related to writing other than λόγος. The context is a probate matter, a contested will. In typical Attic legalese Isaeus uses conditional arguments to make his case. In one of these he asks: ἔτι δὲ καὶ εῇ τι προσγράμμα τούτος ἔβουλετο, διὰ τί οὐκ ἐν ἔτέρῳ γράφεις αὐτά γραμματεῖω κατέλημεν. “Moreover, if he [the deceased] wanted to write any addition to these things, why did he not write them in another document and leave them behind?” The Loeb translator renders the neuter γραμματεῖον as “a codicil.” One possibility here is that γραμματεῖον is an attempt at linguistic variatio, something that would be entirely appropriate for an orator in Attica. For our purposes of ascertaining Philo’s employment of ἐν ἔτεροῖς, one could picture Isaeus just having said “having written something elsewhere” instead of what he did here.

We witness what may well be a continuation of Herodotus’ use of ἐν ἔτεροῖς λόγοις, but with a change to the singular in Xenophon. In the last line of his work on horsemanship, he writes: ἀ δὲ ἵππαρχῳ προσήκεν εἰδέναι τε καὶ πράττεν, ἐν ἔτέρῳ λόγῳ διδήλωσαν, “but the things that are fitting for a cavalry commander both to know and to do have been shown in another book,” namely, his Hipparchus. Like Herodotus, he uses this phrase both with the (later) understood noun supplied and to refer to another of his own works. This is the only occurrence in Xenophon of a form of ἔτερος that is pertinent to the present investigation.

Plato employs ἐν ἔτεροῖς without a stated agreeing noun thrice. At Plt. 278D the Eleatic Stranger, in speaking of τὰ τῶν πάτων στοιχεῖα, uses the phrase in parallel with the indefinite pronoun τις: ἐν τις . . . ἐν ἔτεροῖς; the context indicates “in some cases/situations/things,” the soul is grounded in truth, but “in others” it is adrift. The second instance (307D) occurs when the Stranger is speaking about various qualities in men who at variance with each other, “in all the points just discussed . . . and in many others (ἐν ἔτεροῖς πολλαῖσι).” The final example, Leg. 795A5, is similar. The Athenian Stranger is discussing the use of two hands and limbs in activities like playing an instrument, shooting arrows, horse/chariot riding, and ἐν ἔτεροῖς, “in other activities/things.” In these three passages ἐν ἔτεροῖς must be neuter plurals. If we place this usage temporally, it is roughly parallel with that seen above in Isocrates’ Ad Demonicum. This neuter plural use of our phrase may be understood by noting a related utilization by the orator Andocides. He begins and ends his De reeditu with a singular ἐν ἔτερῳ that means “in another matter,” but

43 Nic. 3.46.
44 In an abundance of caution, I am including this instance, lest I be criticized for leaving it out. Given some developments reported later, it might be important.
45 Cleomym. 25.
46 Forster, 19. LSJ provide the meaning of “memorandum” (among others) for this word (358, meaning 6) and cite Isaeus’ fellow orator Demosthenes, 22.23.
47 De re eq. 12.14.
in the first instance he states the τῷ πρᾶγματι, while in the second he does not (i.e., it just reads ἐν ἐτέρῳ). Given the time frame here, with Andocides giving his speech in 409/408 and Isocrates and Plato writing somewhat later, it is easy to visualize the ἐν ἐτέρῳ τῷ πρᾶγματι becoming simply ἐν ἐτέρῳ, and this then appearing as well in the plural: ἐν ἐτέροις with the meaning of “in other things/matters.” Plato’s own usage of the singular neuter ἐν ἐτέρῳ elsewhere seems to confirm the idea of ἐν ἐτέρῳ [τῷ πρᾶγματι] and ἐν ἐτέροις [πρᾶγματα] existing simultaneously. Of course, the regular practice of substantivizing Greek adjectives in the neuter singular and plural to convey “thing, things” must assuredly play a role here, but even that has a linguistic prehistory, doubtlessly long lost in Greek’s unattested development from proto-Indo-European, that must go back to a stated noun for “thing,” again, most likely πρᾶγμα.

The common use of ἐν ἐτέροις for “elsewhere” appears suddenly and quite frequently in Aristotle. There are 34 instances in the Aristotelian corpus of the construction with this meaning. In all of these Aristotle refers to other writings, nearly always his own. In a substantial number of them scholars have determined the referenced works. Thus it is clear why a number of the Loeb translators of Aristotle render our phrase as “in other works,” “in another work,” “in another/earlier treatise,” and “in

48 1.1, 28.6.
49 Maidment, 1941, 456-458.
50 At Polit. 278C Plato uses ἐν ἐτέρῳ to refer to a second differing thing that, when compared to a first thing, forms μέν ὁληθῇ δόξαι. At Parmen. 145D-146C he is discussing “the whole” (τὸ ἐν ἄλοχον); in this context he five times states “in itself [the whole] and in [something] other,” employing ἐν ἐτέρῳ as the last prepositional phrase. At 151A he again uses our phrase, though here not in the context of the whole, to refer to a thing. Late in Socrates’ speech in the Symposium he reaches the climax of Diotima’s view of love, and his listeners learn that to the enlightened one τὸ καλὸν is revealed. It is not found in the physical universe, οὔτ' τις λογος οὔτ' τις ἐπιστήμη, οὔτ' ποι ὡν ἐν ἐτέρῳ τινὶ (211A). This too seems neuter. At Phaedrus 247D-E Socrates verbalizes the common idiomatic ἐτέρᾳ ἐν ἐτέρῳ for “one or the other things.”
51 Surprisingly the absolutely phrase with this connotation does not occur before Aristotle. Perhaps its use as “elsewhere” seems to have been popular just among certain authors. Quite a number seldom or, more often, never so use it.
52 The 34: Top. 153a25; Soph. elench. 165b7; Gen. corr. 316b18, 320b28, 337a18; Mete. 381b13; De an. 417a17, 420b21; Resp. 473a27; Juv. sen. 467b13, 469a23; Somn. vig. 454a12, 456a2; Hist. an. 618a8; Part. an. 640a8, 646a15, 647a26, 648b9, 649a33, 650b10, 672a12; Met. an. 689a4; Inc. an. 706b2; Gen. an. 731a29, 732b14, 743a6, 765b8, 779a7, 784b8; Metaph. 986a12, 1021a20, 1025a34; Eth. nic. 1174b2.
53 Indeed, he often uses the verb tense and/or certain adverbs to indicate this: e.g., διώνυσσαν ἀκριβεστέρον, Top. 153a25; εἰρήνη πρότερον, PA 672a12.
54 E.g., at Soph. elench. 165b7 Aristotle refers to Top. 159a25 ff.; at De an. 417a17 the ref. is to Ph. 201b31. There are probably around two dozen known such references.
56 Rackham, 1934, 593; Peck, 1961, 61, 123, 129.
an earlier work.” Once, however, at Metaph. 1009b19 he means a now lost work of Empedocles. Aristotle introduces his quotation with καὶ ἐν ἕτεροις δὲ λέγει ὁ τί, translated by Tredennick, “And in another passage he says…” We can see here then, not just the solidification of ἐν ἕτεροις for “elsewhere/in another passage,” but also the first instance of a Greek author citing someone else with this phrase.

As we move along in time, the phrase occurs next in Polybius, but only twice, both times connoting “elsewhere.” Again, their contexts show these passages mean “at other points in my writing.” At 2.37.5.1 the historian employs it with a future verb σαφεῖστερον … δηλώσωμεν, as we have seen above with Herodotus. At 9.1.6.3 he uses ἐν ἕτεροις with the past tense verb ἐφησάμεν, as we have seen in Aristotle (n. 53 supra). Our construction is absent in Diodorus Sicilus and the Hellenistic poets. In Strabo there appears to be only one example of a (double) use of our phrase to reference writings, an instance perhaps easily missed unless one looks carefully at the passage’s context, but one which is revealing for our interests. The background of the locus is a bit complicated.

Strabo is analyzing the trustworthiness of earlier literary sources. Four authors are involved: the polymath Eratosthenes of Cyrene (late 3rd cent. BCE), his critic the astronomer and geographer Hipparchus of Bithynia and Rhodes (2nd half of 2nd cent. BCE), the early Hellenistic explorer-general Patrocles (late 4th–early 3rd cent. BCE), and the diplomat Megasthenes (late 4th–early 3rd cent. BCE), who had penned the first Greek history of India. Hipparchus criticized Eratosthenes regarding the size of India; since Patrocles and Megasthenes disagreed on its size and Eratosthenes rejected them both in favor of yet another source, Hipparchus therefore distrusted Patrocles. Strabo finds Hipparchus’ criticism invalid, and brings in the concept of degrees of trustworthiness, in effect, not “throwing the baby out with the bathwater.” Here he states the principle:

οὐ θαυμαστὸν δὲ, εἰ πιστὸν γίνεται τι πιστότερον, καὶ εἰ τῷ αὐτῷ ἐν ἕτεροις μὲν πιστεύουμεν, ἐν ἕτεροις δ᾽ ἀπιστούμεν, ὅταν παρὰ τυνὸς πεθῇ τι βεβαιότερον (2.1.8).

The Loeb translator Horace Leonard Jones renders these words as follows:

Yet we should not be surprised if one thing proves to be more trustworthy than another trustworthy thing, and if we trust the same man in some things, but distrust him in others, whenever greater certainty has been established from some other source. Of course, Jones’ translation of our phrase ἐν ἕτεροις … ἐν ἕτεροις as “in some things … in others” is possible; we could just assume that here the two instances are both neuter plural as we have seen above in Plato and Isocrates (with the probable grammatical singular precedent in Andocides). However, that is not the only possibility. We could also understand it in light of the use of our phrase in Herodotus, Aristotle, and Polybius (and

59 1933, 187. Aristotle had just made a quotation from Empedocles and follows it up with another.
60 These are listed here the order in which Strabo brings them up.
61 281.
Xenophon in the singular). Certainly this expression by Strabo’s time had established itself as usually meaning “in other literary passages.” As documented above, it is by far the most common usage. Given this fact, and especially given the fact that the context here shows that Strabo is discussing data from the writings of his predecessors, the more likely meaning here is literally “in some passages … in other passages.” If this is accepted, then it is a second instance (after Aristotle’s example of referring to Empedocles’ work) of the use of ἐν ἑτέροις to reference writings other than those of the author who uses the expression. It would also be the first employment of the phrase to refer to other authors’ works generically.

When one examines the usage of our phrase in the next author, Josephus, again one finds the same “literary” results seen in Herodotus, Aristotle, Polybius, and in all likelihood, Strabo. First, he employs ἐν ἑτέροις to refer to his own writings: at BJ 1.182, AJ 3.143, and AJ 10.30 one finds the historian relating his fairly familiar ἐν ἑτέροις ἐρωμεν, “I will speak [of X] elsewhere/in other places/books,” as we have already encountered in Polybius. At AJ 1.160 he relates his intention to recount the history of Abram’s descendants, but he uses our prepositional phrase in the singular and with the noun expressed: ἐν ἑτέρῳ λόγῳ, “in another account.” This was seen above in Xenophon. Then, at last, we see what we may have initially expected at the outset, a use of ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἐν ἑτέροις not with a stated λόγος/λόγοις but with τόπος. Josephus has the first surviving instance (here in the singular) in literature where a writer does not use an ellipse but provides the understood noun τόπος to connote “elsewhere in literature.” At AJ 14.114 he states, μαρτυρεὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ τόπῳ ὁ αὐτὸς Στράβων, “but Strabo himself bears witness also in another passage.” Shortly after this Josephus goes back to the standard plural elliptic use when he states that Strabo says something else ἐν ἑτέροις, “in another passage/elsewhere”62 (AJ 14.139). This then can be seen as providing confirmation that the understood noun in ἐν ἑτέρῳ, at least once, is a form of τόπος. However, it is telling that it does not occur earlier in Greek literature. One has to wonder then whether the expectation stated at the beginning of our survey, that the ellipse in the expression ἐν ἑτέροις represents ἐν ἑτέροις τόποις for “elsewhere,” is correct. The evidence presented above argues that the original understood noun was λόγος rather than τόπος, and that the latter word was a latecomer in the expression. The fact that Josephus provides yet another noun joined with ἐν + a form of ἑτέρος to mean “elsewhere” argues that the use of our construction originated with an understood λόγος/λόγοις and developed from that standard. At AJ 4.302 our historian promises to go into further details on the constitution of Moses, ἐν ἑτέρῳ γραφή, “in another writing/work.” Likely this last is an attempt at linguistic variatio, as may be the case above with Isaeus’ use of γραμματεῖον.63 This then supports the idea that ἐν ἑτέρῳ [λόγῳ] or, more often, ἐν ἑτέροις [λόγοις] was the normal original expression for “elsewhere/in another passage,” or “in other passages/works/books.” In summary then, going back to the notion of Josephus’ use of ἐν + a form of ἑτέρος for “elsewhere,” we find that five times he uses a ἑτέρος designation to refer to other passages in his own writings, and twice to refer to loci in Strabo.

62 Several MSS read ἐν ἑτέρῳ here, but that reading seems secondary (assimilation to the earlier use at 14.114) and does not substantially affect the main point of our discussion. 63 Indeed, the ἐν ἑτέρῳ τόπος at AJ 14.114 may be such an attempt at linguistic variation too. Cf. Justin Martyr’s similar usage infra.
When we get to the early second century, specifically in Plutarch, the set of three basic meanings documented above for our prepositional phrase seems established. The first of these is the standard (seen in Aristotle, Polybius, and Josephus): “in other passages/works” written by Plutarch himself. He does this twice in his Lives: at the end of Alc. 13.9 his ἐν ἑτέροις … εἴρηται refers to Nicias 11; at Brut. 25.6.3 ἐν ἑτέροις … ἴππόρησα references Mor. 693E–694C (= Quaest. conv. 6.7-8).\(^{64}\) Secondly, we find the related use seen in Aristotle and Josephus, that of employing ἐν ἑτέροις to refer to the specific writings of someone else. In Def. orac. Plutarch quotes from the fourth book of Chrysippus’ Περὶ Δυνατῶν on a point and then states that ἐν ἑτέροις, “elsewhere/in other works,” Chrysippus offers a different opinion.\(^{65}\) Thrice Plutarch does the same regarding Chrysippus in Stoic. rep.\(^{66}\)

A variation of this is seen in a more generic usage, one which means “among other authors” without stating just who they are. It occurs but once, and like the similar use in the Strabo locus above, it is a bit involved. The passage is in the Life of Demosthenes and Plutarch is discussing what is needed to compose a history of high quality. He states:

τῷ μέντοι σύνταξι υποβεβημένῳ καὶ ιστορίαν ἐξ οὗ προχείρων οὔθ᾽ οἰκείων, ἀλλὰ ξένων τε τῶν πολλῶν καὶ διεσπαρμένων ἐν ἑτέροις συνεξούσαν ἀναγνωσμάτων, τῷ ὅντι χρῆ … [to have a city with a good library and people with good memories], 1.2.1.

The Loeb translator renders our locus:

However, when one has undertaken to compose a history based upon readings which are not readily accessible or even found at home, but in foreign countries, for the most part, and scattered about among different owners, for him it is really necessary…\(^{67}\)

The key phrase διεσπαρμένων ἐν ἑτέροις … ἀναγνωσμάτων is more literally, “from writings scattered among different ones/sources.” Given the context, there can be no doubt that our prepositional phrase here refers to different, unspecified authors.

This leads into the third usage found somewhat commonly in Plutarch, that of ἐν ἑτέροις referring to not to authors specifically or unspecifically but to any people in general, a use seen supra in Isocrates’ discourse to Nicocles, but perhaps surprisingly not attested between Isocrates and Plutarch.\(^{68}\) In Plutarch’s treatise on providing advice to those engaged to be married, the philosopher warns the groom Pollianus that if he expects his wife to refrain from immodest extravagance, he must show his displeasure of such ἐν ἑτέροις, “in/among others.”\(^{69}\) At Cohib. iva 455E6 Plutarch, in relating how he dealt with

\(^{64}\) According to Jean-Marie Pailler, 2001, 1805; Anne-Marie Ozanam translates ἐν ἑτέροις here as “un autre ouvrage,” ibid.

\(^{65}\) 425E5.

\(^{66}\) 1042B3, 1046C7, 1048A9.

\(^{67}\) Perrin, 1919, 5.

\(^{68}\) Unless, of course, one wishes to see the one (double) use of ἐν ἑτέροις in Strabo as such.

\(^{69}\) Con. Praec. 145B1; LCL Mor. II.336.
his own anger, states that he “began to observe anger in others,” ἐν ἑτέροις. In Frat. amor. Plutarch takes to task those who adorn a brother’s effigy and honor the name “brother” ἐν ἑτέροις, “among others,” but then hate and shun the man himself (479D9). In his work on statecraft Plutarch admonishes that it would be wrong, in a time of crisis, for a leader to be “rejoicing in the insensibilities among others,” ἐν ἑτέροις ἐπιτερήπομενον ἀγνωμονοῦσαν. In Plutarch then we find him utilizing our phrase twice to refer to his own writings, five times to writings of others (four times specifically and once unspecifically), and four times to connote “among other people.”

The mid-second century Christian apologist Justin Martyr employs ἐν ἑτέροις both absolutely and with stated nouns that refer to writings and/or authors, all in his Dialogue with Trypho. Justin uses the phrase solely to refer to the writings of others, not his own. Twice we find ἐν ἑτέροις used absolutely. At 58.8.1 he utilizes the expression to refer to Moses/the Torah; just prior to this at 58.6.1 Justin had used ἐν ἄλλοις λόγοις to do the same. At 63.4.1 he employs our prepositional phrase to introduce a Psalm (again shortly before, at 63.3.1, “the things spoken by David”). At 76.6.1 and 133.4.1 Justin uses ἐν ἑτέροις λόγοις to present quotations from Luke and Isaiah, respectively; this reminds one of Herodotus, Xenophon, and Josephus’ similar uses of λόγος. That he once employs ἐν ἑτέροις προφητείᾳ at 87.6.4 to introduce another quotation, here from Joel, may well indicate that he too, like Isaeus and Josephus, is attempting some simple variatio from the normal ἐν ἑτέροις [λόγοις].

It is noteworthy that a number of other early-to-mid second-century authors do not employ ἐν ἑτέροις absolutely. These include Lucian, Pausanius, Appian, and Arrian, even though these writers sometimes quote and cite earlier composers. In fact, one has to go down to Galen (late second century) to find someone who uses ἐν ἑτέροις heavily to mean “elsewhere/in my own [or other authors’] works.” This probably indicates that our phrase was just one option available to Greek authors who wanted to express “elsewhere/in other passages/in other authors” (cf. its skimpy use by Polybius and Strabo and its absence in Diodorus of Sicily). In other words, choosing to utilize our phrase appears to have been highly individualistic. The survey here stops with Justin Martyr. To go on with authors significantly later than Philo may well open up a charge of anachronism: drawing upon authors who date a century or more after Philo in order to shed light on Philo’s usage could be dicey.

It is fitting to review the results of this investigation. As for the understood noun in the absolute expression ἐν ἑτέροις to connote “elsewhere,” while the option of τότοις might seem initially more probable, the evidence points rather to λόγοις, as seen in He-

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70 Praec. ger. rei publ. 824B5.
71 He quotes Gen. 35.6-10.
72 Gen. 32.22-28.
73 Ps. 45.6-11.
74 Luke 10.19, Is. 5.18-25 (cf. Dial. 133.2.1).
75 2.28-29.
76 Indeed, the sequence of these variations, that Justin starts out with simply ἐν ἑτέροις, and then adds the various nouns, likely indicates that he was intentionally working toward some linguistic variation in his repeated employment of our expression.
77 The same may be said for the third-century Diogenes Laertius.
rodotes and Justin, and in the singular in Xenophon and Josephus. This does not, of course, rule out τόπος, but we have to admit that it does not show up until Josephus, and there only in the singular. \textsuperscript{78} For the meaning “elsewhere” the references are always to literature/written works. \textsuperscript{79} Furthermore, within that rubric we find two distinct uses: the author referring to his own works and/or to the works of others. Within this last subcategory, those “others” may be generic or specific, but the more common use is the latter. Occasionally the phrase is encountered expressing “in other things/matters.” Finally, there is some utilization of the absolute ἐν ἔτερος to mean “among others/other people”; this seems to occur less often than the “elsewhere-in-literature” connotation but it must be kept in mind since it is found from Isocrates to Plutarch.

Now that we have a historical-linguistic context, it is appropriate to return to our Alexandrian philosopher and apply our findings to Philo’s absolute use of ἐν ἔτερος. As mentioned above, Royse reports that Philo employs 39 instances of this. My research agrees with this total. Of these, 30 times Philo refers to Moses/the Pentateuch, \textsuperscript{80} once to a Psalm, \textsuperscript{81} and six times to his own writings; \textsuperscript{82} once is the passage discussed above (Somn. 1.132) for which a reader, based on the context, must understand ᾧθλος, \textsuperscript{83} and then there is the QE 2.62 locus. If we exclude, for the moment, these last two as exceptions, all of these instances can easily be read as ellipses for ἐν ἔτερος λόγος, as in the first occurrence of ἐν ἔτερος with the “understood” plural noun expressed (Herodotus; then later in Justin; the singular noun stated in Xenophon and Josephus). Given that Philo is basically expounding the Torah, the results of him quoting the writings of Moses (and once David) as ἐν ἔτερος should not be surprising. \textsuperscript{84} Nor should his using the expression six times to

\textsuperscript{78} Of course, the fact that he employs ἐν ἔτερος soon after ἐν ἔτερος τόπος in the same context and in quoting the same author might well argue that τόπος is to be understood here. That is, in the literary Greek from Homer to Justin Martyr we do not find any instances of someone looking for a person or an object and reporting something like, “I looked here, there, and elsewhere,” and employing ἐν ἔτερος or ἐν ἔτερος τόπος for the last adverb. This too would add support to the notion that the understood noun in ἐν ἔτερος when it means “elsewhere” is λόγος rather than τόπος.

\textsuperscript{79} Of course, this use is somewhat flexible. Philo will sometimes mean God himself (e.g., Leg. 3.65, Decal. 38) or just employ the passive voice (e.g., Spec. 1.104, Somn. 2.222), but reference is to the Torah. The 30: Leg. 1.51, 2.27, 2.35, 2.48, 3.4, 3.42, 3.65, 3.142, 3.186; Sacr. 67; Det. 103; Post. 26, 89, 142; Gig. 48 (49 TLG); Migr. 131; Her. 117, 123; Fug. 58, 186; Somn. 1.74, 1.230, 2.222; Decal. 38; Spec. 1.25, 1.104, 4.123; Praem. 113; OG 2.5; QE 2.10.

\textsuperscript{80} Deus 77.

\textsuperscript{81} Conf. 135; Her. 50, 215; Mut. 98; Somn. 1.168; Decal. 101 (102 TLG).

\textsuperscript{82} Somn. 1.132.

\textsuperscript{83} Royse notes that Philo “frequently uses ἐν ἔτερος to mean ‘elsewhere,’ meaning either in Scripture or in Philo’s own writings,” 2012, 44. He also mentions three passages from the Quaestiones where the Armenian has the equivalent to ἐν ἔτερος, and in all three passages scripture is being referenced (QG 1.100; QE 2.14, 2.108 [this last is a correction to the accidental repeating of QE 2.14 in the article; I thank Royse for the clarification via personal correspondence]); he states, “It is likely that Philo wrote ἐν ἔτερος in each place, ibid. n. 68. I have not included these in the analysis here.
refer to his own essays be unexpected. Indeed, in this vein he is standing in a well-established tradition begun in earnest by Aristotle and found at least occasionally in Polybius, Josephus, and Plutarch. 85

Now what about QE 2.62? We can safely rule out the “in other things/matters” meaning. Doubtless we can also exclude that Philo is quoting scripture here, for the LXX never explains the meaning of the Cherubim. Is he referring to his own works? Not from anything that we have, 86 and the context here argues otherwise. There remain only the possibilities that he is referring to “among others” and “in other passages” of non-biblical writers. Royse mentions these possibilities but then rejects them a priori because “Philonic use seems to provide no such renderings.” He likewise rejects Strickert’s proposal of “among others” for the same reason. 87 However, the standard uses of ἐν ἑτέροις found in Philo, as we have just seen, will not work here. Therefore, we must recognize that the employment of this prepositional phrase by Philo at QE 2.62 is, like Somn. 1.132 and by the reasoning delineated above, exceptional in his writings. We cannot use Philo’s use of our expression elsewhere in his own writings to judge its usage in our locus, and thus we need the larger context provided above. Strickert goes on to explain what he means by “among others,” namely, “that what follows is an already proposed alternative interpretation.” 88 As we have seen, his suggestion certainly has linguistic precedent in ancient Greek. If we now apply the remaining established import of ἐν ἑτέροις, “in other literary writings,” to our QE locus, we find an understanding that can incorporate Strickert’s suggestion, and, furthermore, we see that ἐν ἑτέροις is not awkward at all. “Among others” can in fact be synonymous with “in other writings/sources.”

Do we really need to emend the QE 2.62 passage? Perhaps, but a minor change in punctuation is all that is required. A semi-colon rather than a comma will suffice:

85 At this point one cannot help but note this perhaps conscious imitation by Philo of Aristotle’s preference (English instructors today would well call it a mannerism) for our prepositional phrase to express “elsewhere in literature.” No one else in the time frame surveyed above uses this expression with this meaning like Aristotle and then Philo. Indeed, in all the extant Greek authors between these two figures, not one comes anywhere close to Aristotle’s frequent usage of ἐν ἑτέροις to designate “in another passage/work” as does Philo. This may be viewed all the more surprising in light of Niehoff’s thesis that it was Philo’s antithetical colleagues who followed Aristotle (2011, 103-110), while Philo himself “leaves the Aristotelian tradition and relies on a Classical Platonic motif” (ibid. 141). Of course, this could just be coincidence, or it may be a difference between the big picture and the details, but nevertheless it does make one wonder.

86 At Mos. 2.97 Philo provides an expansion of basically the first etymology given at QE 2.62, ἐπίγνωσις καὶ ἐπιστήμη πολλῆ. Admittedly, this seems to take one word over (ἐπιστήμη), along with an additional καὶ, of course, from the second etymology at QE 2.62, but neither here nor anywhere else do we find any statement incorporating the πλουσία καὶ κεφαλήν of the second etymology. Most likely Philo was dealing with either divergent etymologies among his predecessors and/or multiple entries for this name in his own onomasticon/-a. See below and in the next chapter.

87 2012, 45 and n. 69.

88 Royse nowhere includes these latter words, just placing an ellipse after “among others,” ibid.
“The Cherubim” is interpreted as “much knowledge”; among others/in another work [or other works] the name is interpreted as “abundant and engaged scientific knowledge.”

Indeed, a Greek semi-colon is frequently employed when an editor wants to convey that a verb in a first clause is to be used again (“understood”) in a second one, the situation we have here.

A possible problem with this take on our passage is the fact that μέν might appear to have no corresponding δέ. Two potential solutions exist. First, the next sentence, not the next clause, contains the correlative δέ: σύμβολα δέ ἐστι δυνατα… “The meanings/etymologies on the one hand, the symbols on the other.” After all, this is what our received text reads. Furthermore, such an understanding adheres to Philo’s use of etymologies and then their interpretation established elsewhere in his works. The second conceivable explanation is that Philo is employing μέν solitarium here. In his commentary on Xenophon’s Oeconomicus Hubert Holden notes, “μέν solitarium is used to emphasize assertions made by a person concerning himself, as opposed to others.” This fits well here, for not only does Philo refer to others or another work after his μέν phrase, providing their/its alternative etymology, but in the only other passage where he etymologizes the Cherubim, he seems to come down more on the side of the first etymology presented in QE 2.62 than the second (see n. 86 above). His thinking (or source) is “much knowledge”; others (or another source) have (has) a different, more complex understanding. A further supplementary thought here is that the writer of the NT “letter” to the Hebrews employs μέν solitarium fairly frequently, and any Philonic scholar knows how often Philo and Hebrews are compared. Of course, to judge the real feasibility of this second idea, one would have to undertake a study of μέν solitarium in the Philonic corpus, a likely onerous task.

Now that all the technicalities have been dealt with, it is time to return to the reason for the lengthy background provided above: what can this passage reveal about usage of the onomastica by Philo’s predecessors? Given the context, that two etymologies of a Hebrew name are being offered, would not a likely scenario for ἐν ἐτέρως here be a refer-

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89 Does this understanding lie behind Terian seeing no need to emend the text?
90 Holden, 1889, 80*. Cf. Smyth § 2896. Xen. uses μέν solitarium numerous times in the Oec.: 3.8; 4.17; 5.11; 12.11; 16.6; 17.3, 7; 18.1, 3, 4, 5, 8.
91 Heb. 7.11, 18; 8.4; 9.1; 12.9.
92 One final minor note on the text critical issue of ὄνομα–ὀνόμασιν above: one potentially fruitful avenue to pursue would be the idea that the original translator of QE into Armenian was, like perhaps Colson and Marcus much later, aware of the ἐν ἐτέρως expression being a shortened form of ἐν ἐτέρως λόγος, and any role that factor may have played in the Armenian reading. Of course, the shared semantic domain of ὄνομα and λόγος would have to be considered (as well as the possibility that the translator’s choice of the Armenian equivalent to ὄνομα might have been influenced due to his own use of, and/or because he expected Philo to have used, the onomastica?).
ence to earlier allegorical Jewish writers who expounded the meaning of Cherubim and who used an exposition of that Hebrew name which differed from Philo’s? If this is the case, then from where did these previous allegorists get their etymology of Cherubim? Would it not have been, just like Philo, from the onomastica? In order to understand what is going on with ἐν ἑτέροις at QE 2.62, we need to return to our name lists. Our prepositional phrase takes us back to the onomasticon. The fact that we find evidence for Philo’s predecessors having employed these name lists at Abr. 99 and Post. 40-42, and the fact that Aristobulus used one, both support the notion that at QE 2.62 we have yet another instance in Philo to his forerunners having used these “manuals of Hebrew etymology” in Greek. Thus we can find at least three instances of Philonic predecessors having utilized the onomastica apud Philo.

The alternative explanation of the ἐν ἑτέροις at QE 2.62 is that Philo himself had an onomasticon which had two entries for Χερουβιμ in it, or that Philo knew of/used two onomastica, each of which had different entries for the Cherubim. These possibilities lead us to a subsequent subject that needs discussion; it is found as the first part of the next chapter.

**Chapter Three**

**What Can We Learn about the History of the Onomastica from Philo’s Own Use of Them?**

Introduction to Differing Etymologies

Initially it is easy to look at the frequent multiple etymological entries for a single Hebrew proper name (or transliteration) in the ecclesiastical onomastica found in Lagarde’s edition and write these off as the accumulating product of scribes and/or commentators within the church. In certain cases, this is no doubt true. Furthermore, some of these various etymological entries could easily have been ascertained merely from reading the LXX, and these too may be seen in a similar light. However, it is good to recall how almost no one within the church had any substantial knowledge of Hebrew until Jerome, and a considerable number of the etymologies in our ecclesiastical name lists could only have come about at the hands of those who indeed were familiar with Hebrew. How then could those within the church be largely responsible for the many etymologies that indicate such knowledge? The answer is, of course, that they could not. Consequently, there has to be an at least somewhat complex history of these onomastica within Judaism, long before the time of our extant ecclesiastical copies. 93 When Jerome speaks of the

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93 As mentioned in Chapter One, Grabbe states that the presence of corruptions in Philo’s onomasticon indicates that it “had been through several stages of copying by the time it came to Philo,” 1988, 108. Rokeah can speak of “the first redaction” of an onomasticon in the late third to early second centuries BCE, implying later Jewish editing, 1968, 81. In the Addendum to Chapter Two of ENJU I point out how several factors, especially the
complexity of the name lists of his day, we must remember that this state of offering differing etymologies, as well as other factors that led him to classify the Greek onomastica available to him as *tam dissona inter se ... et sic confusum ordinem*, arose centuries before his own time. How can an investigator today gain insight into this pre-Christian stage of the onomastica? Again one may turn to Philo, specifically to his use of multiple etymologies, as one line of evidence.

There is no need to do initial, major research in order to ascertain the many passages where Philo provides etymologies and thus where, in the eyes of most scholars, he employed his handbook(s) of Hebrew etymology in Greek, because thankfully Lester Grabbe has largely performed this arduous task. Rather what is needed at this stage is to draw attention to the numerous times where Philo, as mentioned above, provides more than a single etymology for a name or word he elects to expound. These instances should be a focus for someone who wants to investigate these ancient name lists, because they can provide data useful for helping fill in something of a pre-Christian history of the biblical onomastica.

The Data

In a number of cases when Philo provides multiple etymologies, he offers simply two in the same passage. Since this is his most straightforward method, it is handled first.

94 There are, however, some issues with Grabbe: there are two interpretations at *QG* 4.241 for Hittite, both of which differ from the etymology at *Somn.* 2.89, the only one which Grabbe discusses, even though he lists the former locus (1988, 219); his other entry for Hittite is incomplete (*ibid.* 158-159); in his long inventory of instances of Philo etymologizing Isaac, *QG* 3.53 is absent (*ibid.* 171); as mentioned in Ch. Two n. 18 above, the important *QE* 2.62 locus is never handled; for Rebecca Grabbe provides only ὑπομονή (found twice) while two other times Philo gives ἐπιμονή and these loci are not even listed (*ibid.* 197), and the complex situation with the form(s) of this etymology in *QG* is ignored. Of course, his work was too early to benefit from Seigert’s edition (and later translation) of *De Deo* which contains a dual etymology for the Seraphim (§ 6); the same is true of Jacobson’s 2003 article on *QG* 3.36. Cf. Runia, 2004a, 102 n. 4. For more pointed criticisms of Rokeah’s research, see the review by Goulet, 1990, esp. 189-191. A major problem for one using Grabbe’s work, at least if that one is interested in employing it for the purposes of the present study, is the regular inconcinnity present (1) when Grabbe makes the point of postulating that Philo was ignorant of Hebrew, unable to ascertain his own etymologies, and thus dependent on already extant onomastica, but (2) then dozens of times in the volume’s second half states things like, “Philo seems to see the name as derived from gwr . . .”; “Philo connects the name with ἐλά . . .; Philo analyzes the name as ‘am . . . plus ἱqq’; 1988, 128, 131, 132, et freq. Such repetitious deviation from a major thesis of the book can be wearying for the one aware of it, subtly misleading to those who are only partially attuned to emend it, or most dangerously, unintentionally deceptive to one using part two of the book merely for reference. One in that last camp would come away thinking that Grabbe believes the opposite of what he has postulated.
Under this rubric one finds that most frequently Philo does so, as Royse has noted, with the disjunction ἢ (or the Armenian kam, ew kam, or the Latin sive, all of which indicate an original ἢ). Instances where Philo employs ἢ but also presents the same name’s variant etymologies in other manners are handled later. His simple employment of ἢ where he clearly offers two etymologies occurs a total of eleven times. The names, etymologies, and passages where this usage is found are the following (sometimes with a retroversion into Greek):

1. Βεηρ (Beeri, Gen. 26.34); ἐκλογή ἢ φρέαρ, QG 4.195 onom. Greek scholion for Latin frag. 10; Grabbe, 1988, 142 (no. 33).
2. Γηων (River Gihon, Gen. 2.13); στῆθος ἢ κερατίζων, Leg. 1.68; Grabbe, 1988, 146 (no. 41).
3. Δεινα (Dinah, Gen. 34.1-5); κρίσις ἢ δίκη, Mut. 194. At Migr. 223 only κρίσις is given; Grabbe, 1988, 150 (no. 46).
4. Εδωμ (Edom, Gen. 25.30); πυρρὸν ἢ γήινον, onom. frag. QG 4.171. At Deus 144 only γήινον is given; Grabbe, 1988, 152-153 (no. 50).

95 2012, 43.
96 Since I am ignorant of Armenian, for all Armenian examples discussed I am dependent on the help of others, here, Royse, 2012, 43.
97 Two important points must be noted here regarding retroversion in our context. First, Marcus is known for having attempted such with some regularity, and these appear in the notes to his PLCL supp. vols. He frequently, though not always, draws upon Philo’s parallel use of etymological vocabulary elsewhere to accomplish his retroversions. More importantly, however, it is good to keep in mind that in providing such reconstructions, the value of looking elsewhere in Philo for his own use of Greek vocabulary is limited, for the Hebrew etymologies under discussion are not Philo’s but those of the unknown compliers, editors, and/or copyists of his name list(s). This point is made by Amir, but with only partial validity for his purposes (see ENJU 17 and n. 21, 34). Below I sometimes attempt such retroversions, and indeed note Philo’s use of certain vocabulary elsewhere, but these are often simply guesses and are only provided to avoid the criticism that this has not been investigated. They may well be not merely tentative, but useless for the purposes of calculating what were in his onomastica.
98 “About one quarter of the Quaestiones in Genesim is extant in a Latin translation” (Grabbe, 1988, 9), the critical edition of which is provided by Françoise Petit, 1973. Since she only published this after Marcus’ work, it could not have been used for the PLCL supp. vols. A scholion in the Leningrad catena MS for fragment 10 of QG 4.195 is what contains the etymology; see Petit, 1973, 2.92-93 (lines 13-27 comm.). I have corrected the scholiast’s error in accentuation (ἐκλογὴ for the scholiast’s ἐκλογή); furthermore, the scholiast has Βεηλ for the LXX’s Βεηρ; Brooke and McLean provide a number of alternative spellings for this name, 1906, I.69. As Petit explains elsewhere, this is in book 6 of the Latin version proper of QG which is equivalent to book 4 of the Armenian one, 1984, 516, 540-545. Thus Mercier reckons it as book 6, PAPM 34B, 1984. See also Royse, 2009, 36-37. I have retained the system in Marcus and Grabbe.
99 The Greek exists via two catenae (Basel and Leningrad MSS), both indicating a fragment of an onomasticon, Petit, 1978, 188. Royse gives ew kam for the Armenian disjunc-
5. Εὐαλοῦ (Hittite, Gen. 26.34); θηριόδους ἤ ὀφεῦδους, QG 4.195 onom. Greek scholion for Latin frag. 10; Grabbe’s discussion, 1988, 158-159 (no. 60) is incomplete (as above n. 2).

6. Νεφθαλείμ (Naphtali, Gen. 35.25 in the context of 37.7); πλατυσμός ἢ διανεφημένον, Sonn. 2.36; Grabbe, 1988, 191-192 (no. 113).

7. Ναοθ (Noah, Gen. 6.8); ἀνάπαυσις ἢ διανεφημένον, Leg. 3.77 and Abr. 27. At Det. 121 only διέκεισθαι is given; Grabbe, 1988, 192-193 (no. 115).

8. Σεραφιμ (Seraphim, Is. 6.2); τύποι ἢ ἐμπρησις, De Deo 6; 102 not in Grabbe (as above n. 2).

9. Νωε (Noah, Gen. 6.8); ἀνάπαυσις ἢ δίκαιος, Leg. 3.77 and Abr. 27. At Det. 121 only δίκαιος is given; Grabbe, 1988, 209 (no. 115).

10. Χαμ (Ham, Gen. 9.18); θέρμη ἢ θερμός, QG 2.65, 2.77. 103 At Sobr. 44 only θέρμη is given; Grabbe, 1988, 216 (no. 155).

The case of our number 11 is more involved than the above ten instances. It is Philo’s offering two etymologies, at QG 3.36, for one of the place names at Gen. 16.14. There Hagar labels the well where the angel of Yahweh appeared to her, and this is located, according to our received LXX text, “between Kades and Barad.” 104 The QG passage

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100 The reason for Εὐαλοῦ as “Hittite” is textual. Grabbe explains: “Philo depended on the LXX text of Gen. 26:34 which itself was evidently translated from a Heb text with the reading ‘Hivite’ rather than ‘Hittite’ (cf. the Samaritan reading),” 1988, 159 (no. 60).

101 Etymologically our received text reads solely serpentes (Petit, 1973, 1.73 line 22), but Petit implies that Philo may have had an onomasticon that read Εὐαλοῦ θηριόδους ἠ ὀφεῦδους, for that is the onomastic reading in the Basel and Leningrad catenae. She notes that it is not by chance that in the immediate context one reads bestiarum twice (1973, 2.94, line 22 comm.). It seems to me then most likely that Philo’s onomasticon (-a) here contained the two entries in the catenae above; whatever has happened in the course of the Latin textual transmission of his text is currently unknowable. Furthermore, that Philo understood that Εὐαλοῦ was parallel to Χετταιοῦς is clear from his next words—see the discussion of no. 22, as well as the one for Hittite in the next subheading, below. The reading of ὀφεῦδους here well illustrates the point in n. 5 above. ὀφεῦδους was used 62 times by Philo according to TPI, 263; ἐφεστών, 25 times (ibid. 148), and δράκων, 12 (ibid. 96); ἐχθρίαν, “viper,” is absent, as is the onomastic entry ὀφεῦδους.

102 Retroversion by Siegert, 1988, 27. He also accepts the emendation of Adler, Viz., Σεραφιμ for the Armenian reading of Χερουβιμ, the view embraced by Royse, 2012, 43 n. 58. The context makes this clear. In his English translation Siegert provides “<Ser-ra>phim” and explains that there is only a one-letter change necessary in Armenian here, 1998, 6.

103 My retroversion; Royse notes that the disjunction here is kam, 2012, 43. For the view that these two obviously related words do (or do not) really represent two separate etymologies, see the following subheading infra.

104 Hiebert, trans. NETS, 15.
commenting on this locus is preserved only in Armenian, and the context of the *quaestio*
and its response is sparse indeed. Philo interprets Καδῆς as “holy,” but offers two etymologies, joined by *kam* (thus representing ἃ), for Φαραδ (retroversion from the Armenian by 
Aucher, Marcus, Mercier, and Grabbe, in spite of our received LXX text’s reading
Βαραδ): χάλαζα ἃ τεθρύμενα/τρύφη μικρά]θρύψεις. This is my reconstruction of the Armenian *karkowt kam korkoti*. Marcus renders “‘hail’ or ‘dots’.” For the first word the χάλαζα seems straightforward. For the last word *korkoti* Marcus offers the alternative rendering “minute pieces.” While *korkoti* is singular, in my reconstruction I have followed Marcus and Grabbe in using the plural (cf. Jacobson *infra*). They may be thinking of the plural notion in χάλαζα. The Greek could have been singular. This second lexeme *korkoti* Mercier renders “crushed wheat” (*Froment broyé*), very likely following the Latin *Far* of Aucher’s translation of the Armenian. The various options offered in my retroversion reflect the three most likely possibilities in Greek. Jacobson has argued that Philo himself did not use Φαραδ but Βαραδ, again, what our received LXX text so reads. He notes that at Fug. 213, where Philo also is discussing Gen. 16.14, the philosopher employs Βαραδ; there our Alexandrian etymologizes the word as ἐν κακοίσ (the etymology is not mentioned by Jacobson). Our University of Illinois colleague explains the “spot” (his rendering of *korkoti*) connotation as from “the rare use of the root *brd* to mean exactly that, ‘[bearing] spots’ (Gen. 31:10; Zech. 6:3).”

105 I thank Abraham Terian for help in understanding the Armenian here. He clarifies, “The second word, a noun with the ‘agent’ suffix –č, is not found elsewhere in the Armenian Philo” (personal correspondence). James Royse has also been helpful to me in grasping some of the elements of the Armenian here and in multiple cases below. For Grabbe’s discussion, see 1988, 212 (no. 147).

106 PLCL supp. 1.224; he does not attempt a Greek retroversion here.

107 PAPM 34 B, 1984, 83.

108 1826, 205. Aucher’s Latin translation is available apud Mercier as well as in its original format on the website of the HathiTrust Digital Library, used throughout the present work.

109 I have placed the pf. pass. participle of θρύπτω first only because the two nouns occur less frequently in Greek literature in general, and in Philo as well, especially with the literal, physical meanings of “break into small pieces” for the verb, and “something broken into small pieces” for the nouns. Rather the secondary meanings “enfeeble, corrupt” and “softness, luxury, debauchery” are far more common. Representatively, in Philo the noun θρύψις is only found with the extended meaning “luxury” (all 12 entries in *TPI*, 174); *korkoti* may be a translation of the noun τὸ τρύφος; this word is found but once in the Philonic corpus (*Opif*. 131) where the earth does not become τρύφη μικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα, “small or large bits.” The verb has both the original, literal connotation as well as the metaphorical “weaken, corrupt.” Again, the second meaning is more common in Philo, but at Migr. 111 the verb conveys “battering to pieces” (θρύπτοντες) the ears; at *Opif*. 131 the earth is not allowed to wither from dryness and “be broken up” (θρύπτεσθαι); and at *Aet*. 125 the strongest stones are “broken to pieces” (θρυπτόμενοι) and flow into a stream of dust. Furthermore, the pf. pass. partic. of θρύπτω is found at Sacr. 21, *Ebr*. 219, *Mut*. 84, and *Somn*. 2.202, so precedent for the above retroverted form is well attested elsewhere. All this needs to seen in light of n. 5 *supra*. 
As for the reading Φαραν, he further opines, “Most probably, at some point in the transmission of Philo’s Greek text of QG, βαραδ was simply corrupted to φαραν, and that reading was perpetuated in the Armenian translation.” Jacobson states that for the Φαραν reading “there is absolutely no evidence outside our Armenian Philo passage.” Actually, that is not entirely correct, though the textual evidence is certainly not strong. At Gen. 16.14 for the Φαραν reading Brooke and McLean list not only Armenian Philo but also marginal testimonium in the Armenian Gen. For our purposes now, whether one prefers to see Philo expounding Φαραν or βαραδ, the fact is that he offered two etymologies for this place name in QG, and he separated them originally with ή. However, if one accepts Jacobson’s thesis, then we have three etymologies for βαραδ rather than two for Φαραν and one for βαραδ. For the present, I am siding with Aucher, Marcus, Mercier, and Grabbe on this matter rather than Jacobson and will explain my reasons for doing so later in this chapter, after the data have been fully presented.

Twice Philo presents alternative etymologies for the same name with the use of καί and ή, that is, in one locus he employs καί to join his two offerings and elsewhere, ή:

12. Σοδομα (Sodom, Gen. 18.20, 19.1; Deut. 32.32); στείρωσις καί τόφλωσις, Ebr. 222; τόφλωσις δέ ή στείρωσις, Somn. 2.192; the two instances at QG 4.23 and 31 both read kam so reflect a use of ή, and their order follows the Somn. passage; Grabbe, 1988, 208 (no. 141).

13. Χεβρων (Hebron, Gen. 23.2, 19; 37.14); συζυγὴ δέ καί συνεταιρίς, Det. 15; συζυγὴ ή συνεταιρίς, QG 4.72 and 83. At Post. 60 only συζυγή is given; Grabbe, 1988, 218-219 (no. 159).

The fact that for Sodom we find both καί and ή in Greek argues against the idea that with Hebron the Armenian translator(s) is (are) responsible for a disjunctive for the Greek conjunction καί. Also the contexts of Ebr. 222-223 and Det. 15 show that Philo was not using adversative καί. Once Philo, when providing alternative etymologies, utilizes the stronger adversative construction τοτὲ μὲν … τοτὲ δὲ …, while employing the simple ή in another passage for the same name:

14. Ησαυ (Esau, Gen. 25.25, 36.12); τοτὲ μὲν πούτμα, τοτὲ δὲ δρῦς, Cong. 61; πούτμα ή δρῦς, QG 4.161; Grabbe, 1988, 162-163 (no. 67).

In a single locus Philo employs this same more complex way to show contrast, but this time without any other provision of alternative etymologies (such as ή) elsewhere:

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110 2003, 158-159.
111 1906, I.38. It is of interest that the only testimony for Φαραν comes from Armenian sources.
112 Restored from the Det. passage; Armenian disjunction is kam, Royse, 2012, 43.
113 Smyth § 2871.
114 My retroversion from the Cong. locus; the disjunction is kam, Royse, 2012, 43.
The special significance of τοτέ μὲν … τοτέ δὲ … for the matter of onomastic use is taken up below. Here is a good place to classify the passage discussed in the previous chapter, where we saw Philo provide the two etymologies in QE 2.62 for the Cherubim. One might well view the ἐν ἑτέροις there as something at least somewhat analogous to his use of τοτέ μὲν … τοτέ δὲ … in the two loci above. This QE passage then counts as our number 16.115

If we stay with those instances for which Philo offers just two differing etymologies for the same name, a further subcategory is when he gives one etymology in one place and another in a different locus. Those passages which show most clearly differing etymologies are the following:

17. Ἀβελ (Abel, Gen. 4.2); ἀναφέρων ἐπὶ θεόν, Sacr. 2; τὰ θνητὰ πενθοῦτος καὶ τὰ ἀθάνατα εἰδαμιονίζοντος, Migr. 74. At QE 1.78 the etymology of Sacr. 2 is found again but with ἀναφέρων doubly translated;116 Grabbe, 1988, 124-125 (no. 2).
18. Γεραρα (Gerar, Gen. 20.1, 26.1, 6, 19); φραγμός, QE 176, 185,117 παρουσία, QE 4.195 (cf. 4.59);118 Grabbe, 1988, 146 (no. 40).
19. Μωυσῆς (Moses, Ex. 2.10); εἶτα [ἡ θυγάτηρ Φαραώ] διδωσιν ὅνομα θεμένη Μωυσήν ἔτυμος διὰ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ὕδατος αὐτοῦ ἀνελέαθαι· τὸ γὰρ ὕδωρ μεῦ ὀνομάζοσιν Ἀιγύπτιοι, Mos. 1.17; λήμμα, Mut. 126; Grabbe, 1988, 188-189 (no. 108).119

115 While noting the single etymology for the Cherubim at Mos. 2.97. For discussion of this set, see Grabbe, 1988, 219 (no. 160).
117 Marcus’ retroversion as φραγμός (PLCL supp. 1.469 n. a) is confirmed by the etymology found in three onomastic catenae; see Petit, 1978, 163 n. a on QE 4.59.
118 Marcus’ retroversion, PLCL supp. 1.483 n. a.
119 This name has multiple complexities in Philo. First, that Philo intends an etymology in Mos. 1.17 is clear from his use of ἕτυμος, since, as Colson observes, this is a regular reference he uses to denote an etymology, PLCL 6.285 n. a. Secondly, it does not appear that Philo is directly relying on the LXX here (Grabbe, 1988, 189). Furthermore, Philo goes on in the Mut. passage to say that Moses’ name δύναται δὲ καὶ ψηλάφημαι, a “handling,” but since this is not clearly another etymology, and the tidy division we would like to see between an etymology and its application is not always easy to ascertain in Philo, I have not counted it as a separate etymology. Indeed, as we shall see later, the “usual epithet for Isaac” (Earp, PLCL 10.325), τὸ αὐτομαθές, “the self-taught,” becomes an etymology in Clement of Alexandria. To me this δύναται δὲ καὶ ψηλάφημαι seems more handily epexegetical than etymological (though I could be wrong here). Colson must have felt something akin since he places quotation marks around “receiving” but not around “handling” (PLCL 5.207). Nevertheless, Runia sees ψηλάφημα as a second etymology (2004a, 108), as does Arnaldez who puts quotation marks around «palpations» as well as the earlier «acquisition» (1964, PAPM 18, 89). Grabbe seems somewhat unsure. If one wishes to take the Runia-Arnaldez view, then the δὲ καί can easily be
20. Νεβρωδ (Nimrod, Gen. 10.8); αὐτομόλησις, Gig. 66; Αἴδωψ, QG 2.83;¹²⁰ Grabbe, 1988, 191 (no. 112).

21. Ῥεβέκκα (Rebecca, Gen. 24), ὑπομονή, Plant. 169 and Congr. 37; ἐπιμονή, Cher. 41, Fug. 45, QG 4.97 and 188; at several other places in QG 4 Marcus reconstructs instances of διαμονή for Rebecca’s name’s meaning; Grabbe, 1988, 197 (no. 121).¹²¹

There are further instances where it seems sure that Philo provides more than two etymologies for the same proper name. One set of Philo’s etymologies for “Hittite” has been handled above (Εὕαλος, no. 5). His second (no. 22) appears with the alternative spellings Χετ and Χετταῖος (Gen. 23.3ff.). At Somn. 2.89 Philo etymologizes τοῦ υἱὸς τοῦ Χετ as ἐξιστάντες.¹²² At QG 4.241 the Latin translator of Philo provides two etymo-

viewed as equivalent to the more commonly seen η. Finally, there might be some criticism here that I am including the first Egyptian etymology in a study of Hebrew names brought into Greek and available to Philo via onomastica; however, for the sake of completeness as well as the issues earlier in this footnote, I am counting it here. The matter of the onomastica which Philo used already containing some entries that come from outside purely Hebrew etymology is taken up below. As a noteworthy aside, this Egyptian etymology of Moses is also found, in an expanded version, in Josephus, AJ 2.228.

¹²⁰ My reconstruction. Marcus believes that “Philo confuses the etymology of ‘Nimrod’ with that of his father Cush, elsewhere interpreted as ‘Ethiopian,’” PLCL supp. 1.174. However, Grabbe does not accept such confusion, though he thinks that in the QG passage Philo “may actually be referring to the etymology of Cush rather than Nimrod,” 191. This seems unlikely since Philo states immediately after “Ethiopian”: “and his skill is that of the hunter.” How can that be a reference to Cush? Nimrod is the hunter, not Cush. Furthermore, for what it is worth, in the previous quaestio (2.81) Philo etymologizes Cush as from the Greek χοῦς, not “Ethiopian”; see Marcus, PLCL supp. 1.172. Mercier offers no comment at QG 2.83.

¹²¹ The situation here is complicated. First, Grabbe nowhere discusses the multiple times Marcus restores/suggests διαμονή. As for Marcus’ rendering of “constancy” for Rebecca’s etymology/meaning, he is hardly consistent in his opinion of the original Greek. At QG 4.97 he notes the ὑπομονή and ἐπιμονή elsewhere in Philo (PLCL supp. 1.381 n. c), but then in the instances where the same English translation appears in the context (stated or implied) of Rebecca’s etymology, he sporadically offers “ἀνάστασις or ἔγερσις” at 4.117 (ibid. 399 n. i); at 4.127 and 128, ὑπομονή (ibid. 410 n. l, 411 n. d), at 4.133, “ὑπομονή or διαμονή” (ibid. 415 n. j), but then at 4.135, 136, and 145, just διαμονή (ibid. 416 n. h, 417 n. e, 427 n. h). In the case of the last locus, the Greek fragment ends before the text comes to our word. Royse notes that in other loci the Armenian is not consistent in its conveying διαμονή, but several different Arm. words appear for it (1989, 141-143). Since this retroversion of Marcus cannot be established, I here count two etymologies for Rebecca rather than three, though recognizing that there may have originally been three. As Royse has conveyed to me in personal correspondence, further research is needed to illuminate the matter.

¹²² It is unsure whether Philo’s name list(s) had an entry for the sons of Chet in the plural; one entry in the OV reads Χετταῖοι ἐξιστώντες ἀνώμων (174.95-96) and Jerome has one as
ologies for Χέτ: excessus sive deliracionis. There is a variant here for deliracionis: dolorationis, what the codices read, but Petit conjectures deliracionis on the basis of the Armenian. There is a Latin gloss three lines later where the Latin reads deliracionis aut excessus. Marcus offers ἐκστασις for the original that became excessus, and the likely candidates for deliracionis are ἄφροσύνης and ἄμαθας, though this lexeme is difficult to restore since Greek had such a rich vocabulary for the concept of foolishness, as is the case in Philo. At QG 4.79 Philo evidently used the spelling Χέταλως and the etymology ἐκστασις. For a précis, see Grabbe, 1988, 219-220 (no. 161). Thus we have three different etymologies associated with Χέτ/Χέταλως in the Philonic corpus: ἐκστασις, (probably) ἄφροσύνης/ἀμαθας, and ἐξεισταντες (perhaps from an onomastic entry ἐξίστας).

The situation with Isaac’s name is similar, our number 23. Philo etymologizes this appellation at least eight times. Once he gives three meanings: γέλως γάρ ψυχής καὶ χαρὰ καὶ ἐν φροσύνη (Leg. 3.87). Twice he offers two of these nouns: γέλως καὶ χαρὰ (Leg. 3.218; QG 3.53—evidently; the locus is difficult). The remaining five instances are just γέλως (Plant. 169; Det. 124; QG 3.38, 4.17, 147). Grabbe’s discussion lacks QG 3.53 (1988, 171, no. 82), perhaps due at least in part to the passage’s complexity.

For Canaan (Χανααν, no. 24) Philo offers four or five etymologies, and the issues are again somewhat knotty. First and simplest, at Sopr. 44 we find σάλως. At QG 2.65 he reports two: ‘‘merchant’ or ‘mediator’.’’ No retroversion is offered here, for, as Marcus notes, “What word[s] Philo used it is hard to say,” though he offers some possibilities.

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**Chethi insanientes vel metuentes (35.7).** Onomastica in both languages, however, contain entries in the singular as well: Χέτ, 180.50; Chettaeus, 4.18. It is possible that Philo took a singular entry for Χέτ, e.g., ἐξίστας, and made it plural for his own purposes.

123 Petit, 1973, 2.97. It is worth noting here that the Armenian has ἐν, “and,” rather than the two ways Latin has for “or” joining the two etymologies here. Cf. nos. 12 and 13 above.

124 PLCL supp. 1.543 n. c, accepted by Petit, 1972, 2.94 lines 22-24.

125 ἄφροσύνη occurs 94 times in Philo (TPI, 61); ἄμαθα is found 45 times (ibid. 20); ἄνωκα and ἐνθήθεω, 15 times each (ibid. 32, 153); ἧλθωτῆς, 8 (ibid. 165); μαθία, only 3 (ibid. 230); ἄθουλα, just twice (ibid. 1), all given with the above proviso (n. 5).

126 Reconstruction by Marcus, PLCL supp. 1.358 nn. l and m.

127 Marcus renders the Armenian “a more perfect happiness and joy,” PLCL 1.255; Mercier, “une joie très parfaite,” PAPM 34B, 1984, 127. Royse informs me that the Armenian has a construction without any conjunction and is not as straightforward as one might gather from reading Marcus. Aucher reads “propter futuram nativitatem laetitia cunctis gaudii perfectionis,” 228-229. There nothing in the Armenian to correspond to cunctis, but the other three italicized words correspond to the three Armenian words in question. Perhaps Marcus is relying on Leg. 3.218 for his rendering; there is also the possibility that the original Greek contained a καὶ that was lost textually or in translation. I thank Royse for help with, and his ideas (some of which are present here) on, this locus.

128 Namely, μεσίτης, πρόξενος, ἄφορμῆ, and ὑπόθεσις, PLCL supp. 1.156-157. The disjunction is kam (Royse, pers. corr.). Mercier has the similar “marchands” ou “intermédiaires,” 1979, 309. Aucher’s rendering uses parallel vocabulary and his parenthetical in-text expansions are simply epexegetical, alternative Latin translations for the Armenian, 1826, 151.
Slightly later Philo repeats the same two etymologies \((QG\ 2.77)\). At \(QG\ 4.72\) the Armenian reads \textit{inbrew erewowmn noc’a}, which Marcus translates “as it were, ‘their appearance’.”\(^{129}\) Grabbe believes the \textit{inbrew} is part of the etymology,\(^{130}\) but Mercier has “comme «leur apparition»,” and Aucher, \textit{sicut apparitio eorum}.\(^{131}\) Thus it appears that only Grabbe takes this view. Finally, at \(QG\ 4.88\) we have \textit{ap’šealk’}, which Marcus renders “those out of their mind,” and sees it as translating an original \(οι\ ἓξωστάντες\). He further states that Philo “here equates Hittites and Canaanites” (cf. the discussion two paragraphs back).\(^{132}\) Grabbe calls this a “transferred etymology.”\(^{133}\) Whether this was an accident or done intentionally is unknown. Thus our number 24 is a name for which the details are impossible to disentangle.

Some might find the next set of etymologies offered here questionable, for they are synonyms, near synonyms, or represent just a change in parts of speech from a similar stem. To a degree this has already been encountered (cf. some of the entries above, e.g., nos. 10 and 21). The reasons for including these will become manifest soon. Four further names, etymologized in different loci, appear to have had some variation in their etymological presentation in Philo:

25. \textit{Λαβαν} (Laban, Gen. 24.29; 30.42); \textit{λευκός} at \textit{Fug}. 44; \textit{λευκασμός} at \textit{Agr}. 42; at \(QG\ 4.117\) and 239 Philo apparently expounded Laban’s name with a noun, perhaps \textit{λευκασμός} again (or \textit{λευκότης}).\(^{134}\) Grabbe does not address these synonyms or variants in parts of speech, 1988, 176 (no. 90).

26. \textit{Λωτ} (Lot, Gen. 13.9); within the same work Philo gives \textit{κλινόμενον} and \textit{ἀπόκλισις}, \textit{Migr}. 13 and 148; there is the possibility that \textit{κλινόμενον} may not be a real etymology, but given that Grabbe so takes it, as well as the passage’s context, I am counting it here. Grabbe, 1988, 179-180 (no. 94).

27. \textit{Σικιμα}/\textit{Συχεμ} (Shechem, Gen. 34.2-3, 35.4, 37.13, 49.15); \textit{ὁμίασις} at \textit{Leg}. 3.25 and \textit{Migr}. 221, but \textit{ὁμός} at \textit{Det}. 9 and \textit{Mut}. 193. Grabbe, 1988, 206 (no. 139).

28. \textit{Συμεων} (Simeon, Gen. 48.5); \textit{εἰσακή} at \textit{Mut}. 99 and \textit{Somn}. 2.34, but simply \textit{ἀκοή} at \textit{Ebr}. 94; Grabbe, 1988, 209 (no. 143).

For the possibility of Philo’s onomastica containing any mixed etymologies, some with Hebrew roots, others with Greek ones, see below. While I recognize that this is certainly possible, because of issues inherent in the material already presented, I have not counted such in the presentation of the data portion here. If one may slightly adjust the number of etymologies from Grabbe’s total of 166 to include the Seraphim at \textit{De deo} 6,

\(^{129}\) PLCL supp. 1.350.

\(^{130}\) 1988, 217.

\(^{131}\) Mercier, \textit{PAPM} 34\textsuperscript{A}, 1979, 263 (as V.72); Aucher, 1826, 301.

\(^{132}\) PLCL supp. 1.369. Mercier has «ceux qui sont dans la stupeur» (1979, 287, as V.88) whereas Aucher renders simply as \textit{stupidi}, 1826, 314.

\(^{133}\) 1988, 218.

\(^{134}\) The noun \textit{λευκασμός} is found in this \textit{Agr.} locus only in the Philonic corpus; \textit{λευκότης} is has no entry in \textit{TPI}.
the number is really 167. Of these 28 are multiple, or 16.76%, which I henceforth round off to 17%.

Interpretation of the Data

The most obvious of conclusions to draw from the above information is that different composers of the original entries in the onomastica that were available to Philo had come up with different Hebrew words when they put their hands to explaining what individual names meant, at least at times. Space will not usually be taken here to reproduce these varying Hebrew roots because this information is available in Grabbe’s book. One may wish to supplement his findings with suggestions found in Goulet, 1990. Of the 28 listings above, at least eight of them fall into this category. They are nos. 1, 2, 5, 9, 14, 17, 18, and 24. This figure is only tentative, for others may be added to it after the fuller discussion below.

Some of the aforementioned issues that were promised attention should now be addressed. First among these is the concept that many Philonic scholars might have, one that has perhaps been representatively expressed by David Runia. In his 2004 article on etymology as an allegorical technique in Philo he makes the following statements: “For some seven names [Philo] gives alternative etymologies.” “The text seems to imply two separate etymologies, but in actual fact there is only one.” These reflect the principle voiced near the article’s beginning: “My primary perspective will be on Philo himself.” Such a declaration reiterates the notion expressed in Chapter One of the present volume, viz., that it has been a century since anyone has studied the onomastica for their own sake, and that by far the majority of scholarship published on these name lists has had Philo (and secondarily Patristics) as the focus. While no offense toward Philonic scholars is intended, when it comes to trying to understand a history of the onomastica, it must be admitted that this “primary perspective” is narrow.

If we have a written tradition that began three hundred (or more) years before our first substantial testimony to it, and especially if it proliferated and was widely employed and modified (as I argue here and elsewhere in this volume), then focusing merely on that later sole witness will unquestionably provide a limited picture. Rather I am attempting to furnish a considerably wider portrait. One might compare the difference between Runia’s perspective (and likely that of other Philonic scholars) and mine to that of a few snapshots versus a running video. Of course, the video will still be partial; perhaps visualizing it as a documentary with many gaps in it would be the most accurate thing to do. But it is still a video, not merely a few snapshots.

Now to bring this home to the matter at hand: there are obviously more numbered instances of varying etymologies delineated above than Runia’s perspective can allow. If he feels that there are really only seven names for which Philo provides divergent etym-

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135 If one accepts that for no. 19 ψηλάφημα is a genuine etymology, then the number eight above should be increased to nine.
136 2004a, 107, 108. In the latter instance, “The text” is referring to Somn. 1.41; the etymology is for Haran, no. 15 above, where τοτὲ μὲν ὀρωκτή, τοτὲ δὲ τράγλων are offered. His reference to seven may be to the 8-9 words in the preceding paragraph.
137 Ibid. 102.
mologies, or that τοτὲ μὲν ὄρυκτή, τοτὲ δὲ τρόφυλαι is “in actual fact … only one” etymology, then we have some fundamentally different methodological issues here. They may be illustrated by several of the entries supra, but simply one will do. In no. 10 Χαμ we find both θέρμη and θερμός. In fact, we witness Philo giving the entry θέρμη ἤ θερμός. Why this use of a disjunctive? One could just write it off as reflecting slight variants of the same Hebrew root, likely what Runia has in mind. That does not, however, answer the above question. To expound on that: why would Philo use two different (but obviously related) parts of speech here, especially when he does not do so for the same proper name elsewhere? Why would he offer both parts of speech together in one passage? Why this disjunction ἤ, particularly in light of his other uses of it in similar etymological contexts where he provides two divergent name meanings that in no way can be viewed as related? Such questions indicate that one should not dismiss these details as insignificant. Philo is not a sloppy or careless writer. Thus this “variant-from-the-same-root” phenomenon should not be ignored or treated lightly. It is best seen not as sloppiness, indifference, or inconcinuity, but as variations in his source material. That is, in the textual history of the onomastica before Philo’s time (very likely a long, complex tradition), one now unknown contributor used θέρμη to explain Χαμ as from the noun חמה (“heat”), while another employed θερμός, thinking more of the adjective חם (“hot”). Possibly there were two entries, reflecting two parts of speech, that were separate early in onomastic history but then were mixed in the process of redaction and copying, and by Philo’s time he had to deal with what was before him in his available name lists, or what his allegorizing predecessors, in all probability also dependent on their own onomastica, had used.

Then too those composing the onomastica were likely not always so tidy themselves. One could certainly view some of the early onomastic composers being more like today’s better quality undergraduates in our classrooms (i.e., eager to make a contribution) than our colleagues refereeing articles submitted for publication (well trained and responsibly meticulous). Indeed, all one has to do today is put certain religious terms in an internet search and one will quite frequently get many hits reflecting a plethora of sometimes uneducated opinions, often on what the Greek and/or Hebrew supposedly means. Would it have been so dissimilar in the late centuries BCE when it came to Jewish persons of different bi- or trilingual abilities who felt compelled, for varying motives, to put stylus to papyrus and comment on what they thought the Hebrew (or Aramaic) behind proper nouns and transliterations that appeared in their Greek scriptures meant? Once we recognize that different people (of fluctuating abilities) were likely responsible for offering their hands in the birth and development of the onomastica, then synonyms, other words of overlapping semantic domains, and/or different parts of speech that have the same basic stem were all bound to show up in them—hence the inclusion of a substantial number of the etymologies above.

It is not as though we are aware of any controlling authority in the development of these name lists. In fact, the lack of it is why they are such a mess by Jerome’s day and why those we see in Lagarde’s edition vary so widely and have so many multiple entries in them. Once the aforementioned dynamics are realized, this opens up further possibilities for a wider tabulation of differing/multiple etymologies in Philo than Runia’s paradigm will allow, and this has been the procedure followed here. If (so far) 17% of the names that Philo etymologizes have multiple entries, then this should be a substantial resource into which to tap for one researching onomastic history.
We may, therefore, assign 11 (or 12) of the 28 names *supra* as simply due to diverse contributors in the onomastic tradition coming up either with different Greek lemmas that share semantic domains with the same Hebrew root (= synonyms) or variant parts of speech in Greek that represented what the Hebrew name involved meant:

no. 3, κρίσις ἡ δίκη for Dinah.
no. 6, πλατυσμός ἡ διανεφμένον for Naphtali.
no. 10, θέρμη ἡ θερμός for Ham.
no. 13, συζυγὴ δὲ καὶ συνεταρίς for Hebron.
no. 15, τοτὲ μὲν ὤρυκτή, τοτὲ δὲ τρώγλαι for Haran.
no. 21, ὑπομονή, ἐπιμονή for Rebecca.
no. 23, γέλως ψυχῆς καὶ χαρὰ καὶ εὐφροσύνη for Isaac.
no. 25, λευκός, λευκασμός for Laban.
no. 26, κλινόμενον, ἀπόκλισις for Lot.
no. 27, ὀμίπάσις, ὀμός for Shechem.
no. 28, εἰσακοή, ἀκοή for Simeon.

The case with no. 22, the second set of etymologies for “Hittite,” includes the principle in the 11 etymologies above, but is more involved. Two of the three given etymologies fall under the same rubric, *viz.*, ἐκστασις ἢ ἐξιστάντες/ἐξίστας; however, the other etymology of ἀφροσύνης/ἀμαθίας does not fit this paradigm.

As for gaining further insight into how our name lists likely evolved at the hands of different Second Temple Period Jews, more can be gleaned from these and other instances of multiple etymologies in the onomastic tradition. A rather straightforward case from the examples above, that of Ῥεβεκκᾶ (no. 21), can serve to indicate our name lists’ course of development, at least beyond the choice of slightly different surface manifestations of a name’s core meaning (the phenomenon of ὑπομονή vs. ἐπιμονή). Grabbe observes that Philo’s etymology ὑπομονή is, understandably, derived simply from πρό, “await.” Likely this was the first etymology for Rebecca to be offered in biblical onomastic history. It is easy then to visualize someone with a knowledge of Hebrew coming along and perfecting this etymology by next including the first part of the name as being from רָב, “great, much.” This then left its trace in the expositions found in OV 179.26 and Lex. 197.29, πολλὴ ὑπομονή, as well as Jerome’s *multa patientia* (74.29) but not in Philo. Given that this second etymology reflects a real knowledge of Hebrew, it is unlikely that its source was within the church, even though it is only attested in documents which date later than Philo. It must have been added by someone who was literate in Hebrew and felt moved to explain to his fellow readers of the LXX what Ῥεβεκκᾶ fully meant. This notion that already extant etymologies were tweaked by anonymous Second Temple Period Jews who knew Hebrew and were writing within an established onomastic tradition is a desideratum for the future project of a comprehensive history of the biblical onomastica that was called for in the first chapter.

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138 At *Congr.* 37 and *Plant.* 169.
139 1988, 197 (no. 121).
A promise made *supra* should now be addressed. At *QG* 3.36 we find the exposition of Φαραν in the Armenian text of Philo (no. 11). Above I offered the likely original reading of χίλαζα ἦ τεθρομένα/τρόφη/[μικρά]/θρόφεις for its etymologies. Whatever the earliest etymological text was there, Jacobson has contended that Philo’s offering of etymologies should be understood as for Βαραδ rather than for Φαραν. Initially, Jacobson’s presentation may appear convincing. After all, Βαραδ is what our received LXX text reads at Gen. 16.14. Furthermore, at *Fug.* 213 Βαραδ is etymologized where Philo is discussing the same Gen. locus, and for our *QG* passage a Hebrew root can be found (榱, “[bearing] spots” according to Jacobson) for Βαραδ that shares a semantic domain with *korkotici*. Finally, the LXX textual evidence for Φαραν at Gen. 16.14 is extremely weak.

However, on closer inspection there are some problems here. A critical examination of Jacobson’s brief treatment of how Βαραδ supposedly became Φαραν in this single locus, specifically how an initial ι turned into φ, and how a final λ developed into ι, exposes some serious weaknesses. In a short footnote he provides merely three examples where, as he puts it, the two letters “are occasionally confused.” They are all from texts of fifth-century Athenian tragedians. As for the first letter, Jacobson cites Aeschylus’ *Suppliants* 457. Here the sole MS, the 10th-century Mediceus Laurentianus 32.9 (siglum M) reads στρόβους for the corrected στρόφους in the Teubner and OCT editions. This represents, not a change from a correct β to an incorrect φ, but a correct φ becoming an erroneous β, the opposite of what Jacobson proposed happened at *QG* 3.36. Furthermore, this example involves a medial letter corruption, not an initial one, and although this may be less significant in uncials than cursive, parallels should be drawn from MSS that date to Jacobson’s, unspecified, time frame for this *QG* corruption. His second cited support is more on-topic. This is from Euripides’ *Helen* 673. Here the textual tradition is divided: Codex Laurentianus 32.2 of the early 14th century (L) reads φλέφαφον whereas the corrector of L and the Codex Laurentianus conv. soppr. 172 also of the 14th century (siglum P) have the proper βλέφαφον. In this instance we indeed have a correct initial β becoming corrupted to a φ.

As for a final δ being morphed into a ν, Jacobson cites only *Suppliants* 181. This “support” is non-existent. The entire line in the Teub. ed. of West reads σφρίγγης ου σγάσαν ἀξόνηλατοι. The editor has only the following in the ap. crit.: “σγάσια. δ’ ἂν’.” Enger [397.] This refers to an 1854 article by Robert Enger, an extended review of Godfrey Hermann’s at-the-time new ed. of Aeschylus’ tragedies (1852). In it Enger wants to emend the text to σφρίγγης ου σγάσια δ’ ἂξόνηλατοι, not due to any textual evidence, but because he perceives asyndeton here and thinks the text needs help. West lists no var-

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141 Runia seems to accept it, 2004a 107 and n. 14.
144 “The wheel sockets are not silent as the axles turn.” The context in the play is that the character Danaus sees the dust cloud of an approaching army in the distance. This line is the first perception of its advancing sound.
145 Page’s ed. of the OCT (1972) has no entry at all for this line.
iant readings from any MSS for this passage. In other words, there is no textual support in this locus for a final δ developing into a ν. For this to work for Jacobson’s argument, one would have to posit that the emendation of Enger, accepted from what I can tell by only one editor\(^\text{146}\) and not extant in any MS tradition, was first the correct reading, and then somehow was corrupted into what almost all today accept as the true text. In sum, Jacobson has provided no serious validation for this final δ to ν transformation, and very little for an initial β becoming a φ. One can only wonder at the dubious inferences by him here.\(^\text{147}\) If we are talking about scribal error, Jacobson has really skirted the issue.

Secondly, if we accept his QG emendation, then we are faced with Philo having provided three different etymologies for Βαραδ, not two.\(^\text{148}\) While the above data of multiple etymologies show that such is not impossible in Philo, a careful look reveals that such normally occurs with words that are far more prominent than Βαραδ: Isaac, Canaan, Hittite, and possibly Moses and Rebecca.\(^\text{149}\) Why would the relatively obscure place name Barad wind up fitting into this category? Most significantly, as has been repeatedly stressed in Chapters One and Three of this volume, like virtually all other academics Jacobson has not really considered the role of the onomastica in this issue.\(^\text{150}\)

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\(^{146}\) I have checked a total of seven editions that have appeared after Enger’s article. Only Johansen has accepted the proposal, first in his 1970. The others are Paley, 1883; Tucker, 1889 [his line 155]; Wecklein, 1902, (the old Teubner) where Enger is merely in the ap. crit. [his line 187, p. 42]; West (current Teubner); Page (OCT); Sommerstein, 2008 (LCL). Johansen and Whittle later produced a 3-vol. ed. of the Suppliants in 1980. Vol. 1 contains the text with Enger’s emendation in it, and vol. 2 contains their commentary. In the locus at issue they state that they agree that asyndeton exists here, argue that various explanations by Denniston do not apply, and find a possible example of a medial δ to ν in Comica Adespota 342.23, “the obscurer change of δ’ to -v” at Suppl. 271, and the possible reverse (ν to δ) in Suppl. 280, Johansen and Whittle, 2.146-147. None of this is referenced in Jacobson. As interesting as Enger’s emendation may be, the fact remains that save Johansen, all text critics of Aeschylus have not been won over to this view. For the uninitiated, the Comica Adespota are a collection of the unidentified fragments of comedy (adespota, without a δεσπότης = of unknown authorship), including the contents of about 130 papyri.

\(^{147}\) Should one really wish to pursue this matter of scribal error, a much more substantial investigation than three minor references (two of which are poor) should be done. What is needed is research that embraces, inter alia, considerations such as (1) the sort of script (uncial vs. cursive) along with the corresponding time frame of this supposed textual corruption and (2) phonology. On this last point, it is easy to see a β to φ change when one remembers that both are labials/stops (with the φ having an aspirate “p” sound, not an “f/ph” sound as today)—if indeed dictation played a role here (see Royse, 2008, 83-90, 752-754, on dictation in MS production), but just how a final δ came to be transformed into a ν is a more serious challenge and needs to be well documented. This is precisely where Jacobson offers nothing of substance.

\(^{148}\) Pace Runia, 2004a 107.

\(^{149}\) Nos. 22-24, and 19 and 21, respectively, above.

\(^{150}\) I have read four on-topic contributions of Jacobson (i.e, on etymology: 1992; 1996, 371-372; 1999; 2003). Commendably he refers to the editions of the onomastica by
What part might they have played in our QG 3.36 locus? First, we need to recall that these name lists are all based on the LXX, and secondly, that there were numerous formats of onomastica. These include being grouped by biblical book or sections within books (e.g., genealogies), topically, that is, small onomastica of angels’ (or prophets’ and later apostles’) names, by gender (women’s names), and marginal onomastica in biblical MSS themselves. Of course, there are the alphabetical name lists which one today probably first thinks of, but it is important to remember that such alphabetization was likely a later development, especially when one recalls that the Septuagint was produced piecemeal. Although there is always some risk in judging what was going on from the third century BCE to the first century CE (Philo’s day) by later ecclesiastical developments, the procedure is likely valid here. In the case of both the Onomasticum Coislinianum and the Glossae Colbertinae, it is clear that their compilers were working from readings in earlier lists and collecting them into larger ones—and employing alphabetization in doing so. Would not the progressive appearance of the LXX itself have encouraged first small onomastica (as above) and then secondly a redaction of, and incorporation of, names from those early smaller lists based on individual books, sections, or similar smaller collections, among academic Second Temple Period Jews as the body of their Greek holy writings continued to increase? Given all the variety and complexity within the onomastic tradition, could it be that some onomastica compilers, when they took entries from one (or more) small format(s) and entered them into another, larger collection, one that was now alphabetical, combined readings from the smaller onomastica with which they were working?

Is there a reading containing place names elsewhere in the LXX that could be called upon to elucidate our Philonic QG text? Indeed, there is. Our received LXX text contains a plus or addition at Num. 33.36 where Φαραν appears in close conjunction with Καδης. This is absent in the MT and, not surprisingly, therefore the Vulgate. It is also lacking in the Sam. Pent. Jeffries Hamilton comments that this apparently unique LXX reading “equates Paran and Kadesh … [and] could well be an attempt to harmonize the various references to Kadesh and Paran.”¹⁵¹ These other references likely included those of “Kades and Barad” at Gen. 16.14. It seems probable then, given the absence of substantial textual variants in our Gen. passage, this plus in LXX Num., and the etymological context of our QG 3.35 locus, that the reading we see in our Armenian QG text had an origin in the confused onomastic tradition upon which Philo relied rather than some unexplained corruption of Βαραδ to Φαραν per Jacobson. All one needs to do is posit that someone involved in the long pre-Christian history of the onomastica combined an etymology ultimately from Num. 33.36 with another from Gen. 16.14, easy to do since both contained Καδης and one other place name, and then that confusion appeared in the name

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¹⁵¹ ABD 5.162.
list(s) that Philo was employing, or again, among the etymological arguments in Philo’s allegorical predecessors. The fact that the only LXX evidence for a Φαραν reading in Gen. comes from an Armenian source may be viewed as supporting this perspective.\textsuperscript{152}

This notion may also be applied to the etymologies for the textually varying names for “Hittite.” That is, in the Latin tradition there appears a common lexeme in the etymological discussions for both of Philo’s very different spellings for this name Hittite: Εὐαλου and Χετ/Χετταιος, nos. 5 and 22 above, respectively. As we have already seen, one of the three etymologies for the latter is \textit{excessus} (for the Greek ἐκστασις). Is it mere coincidence that in his interpretation of Gen. 27.34 at \textit{QG} 4.195 frag. 10, immediately after his \textit{Heuei} (= Εὐαλου) \textit{enim serpentes interpretatur}, Philo states, “\textit{Excessus itaque mentis, Cetheus, et bestiarum merita figurae sunt furiarum qui sunt famuli iracundae et concupiscentae”}\textsuperscript{153} From the appearance of this word, as well as his employment of \textit{Cetheus} (= Χετταιος), Philo seems to have been aware of two things here: (1) that conceptually the same proper name was represented by Εὐαλου as well as Χετταιος in his Greek text; and (2) that he could therefore apply two sets of etymologies for his purposes—the names and meanings were interchangeable. How could all this have come about? The most likely explanation is that, again, there was a combining of originally separate onomastic traditions in the name lists available to our Alexandrian and/or his devanciers.

Number 8 above, the two etymologies for the Seraphim found in the fragment of \textit{De deo} should be discussed. The second of these is patent: ἐμπρησις accurately represents the Hebrew יִשְׁפַּר, “burn,” as Siegert notes.\textsuperscript{154} However, the first, τύπος, is cryptic. Siegert offers no workable solution and admits he is at a loss to explain it.\textsuperscript{155} While one might be tempted to roam extensively through the wide semantic domain of τύπος and attempt some sort of etymology, or even pursue the other meaning of “serpent” for our Hebrew root and conjecture some type-antitype/shadow-reality/allegorical interpretation extant in Second Temple Period Judaism, based, for example, on John 3.14, such reasoning would prove to be unsubstantiated conjecture. Most significantly, such thinking would not suit Philo’s application of τύπος in his following exposition, that of forms, seals, and patterns in the creation. Far more fitting is the unpublished research by James Royse on this \textit{De deo} 6 etymology. The scholarly community will have to wait until his insightful solution to this crux is available.\textsuperscript{156}

Yet another item above that was promised further attention is Philo’s repeated use of τοτὲ μὲν... τοτὲ δὲ... when he offers two etymologies. Of course, this expression is a

\textsuperscript{152} That is, could the Armenian translator(s) of Philo ultimately be responsible for the unspecified (by Brooke and McLean) testimonium in the Armenian LXX tradition at Gen. 16.14? As for how to place the etymologies given here, Grabbe provides a clear one of the “hail,” and several Semitic possibilities for the other, 1988, 212 (no. 147). Thus I am here classifying this name’s meanings as from two Heb. roots.

\textsuperscript{153} “So then a \textit{departure} from the mind, Hittite, and the comportment of the animals are the reflections of furies in which those prone to anger and desire take pleasure.”

\textsuperscript{154} 1988, 95.

\textsuperscript{155} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{156} I thank him for sharing some of the results of his investigation with me, under the condition that I would respect his desire for confidentiality.
strengthened form of the simpler μὲν… δὲ construction, one with originally a temporal element added. It is present from Homer on, but is otherwise rarely found in poetry. Rather it seems to have been latched onto by Attic historians, orators, and philosophers, and then picked up by various Greek prose writers in the Hellenistic, Roman, and Byzantine periods. Typical contrasts where the phrase occurs cover a wide range: a god appeared “sometimes before Odysseus … strengthening him, sometimes striking the suitors with panic;” a slave girl loves, “sometimes me, sometimes that man;” good leaders “will fare alternately, sometimes worse, sometimes better.” For our purposes, it is wise to look at how the construction is used in the context of language. In reported speech we find that the Persian satrap of Phrygia detained Athenian ambassadors, “alleging at times that he would lead them to the king, but at other times that he would send them home”; Socrates speaks of arguments that “are sometimes true, and sometimes not;” Plato uses it for the same letter that “sometimes belongs in the proper syllable, sometimes in another.” It is noteworthy that the construction appears in discussions of a linguistic nature that go beyond the normal speech evidenced in the last examples. Plato uses it for the same letter that “sometimes makes an expression from a noun, but at other times condenses that expression into a noun.” These indicate that τοτε μὲν… τοτε δὲ… was sometimes employed in a technical, grammatical setting.

157 As with the ἐν ἐτέρωσις research in the previous chapter, I have utilized the TLG for the data presented here.
158 τοτε μὲν προπάροσθ’ Ὁδυσσής … θαρσύων, τοτε δὲ μηνιστήρας οἰρών. Od. 24.447-8. This is only locus with our construction in Homer.
159 τοτε δὲ ἐμὲ … τοτε δὲ τούτων, Lys. De vuln. 8.
160 τοτε μὲν χείρον, τοτε δὲ βέλτιον, Isoc. Panath. 133.
161 φάσκων τοτε μὲν ἀνάξειν αὐτούς παρά βασιλέα, τοτε δὲ οὐκαδὲ ἀποτέμψειν, Xen. Hell. 1.4.6. Cf. a slave who, regarding the accused, τοτε μὲν … εἰργᾶσθαι τὸ ἔργον, τοτε δὲ οὐκ ἔφη, “said at one time [he] accomplished the deed, at another time not;” Antiphon, De caede Herodis 49.
162 τοτε μὲν δοκοῦσιν ἀληθέσιν εἶναι, τοτε δὲ μὴ, Plato, Phaedo 90D.
163 τὸ αὐτὸ [γράμμα] τοτε μὲν εἰς τὴν προσήκουσαν, τοτε δὲ εἰς ἄλλην πιθέντας συλλαβήν, Theat. 207E.
164 τοτε μὲν λόγον ἐξ ὁνόματος ποιῶν, τοτε δὲ εἰς ὁνόμα συνάγων τὸν λόγον, Epist. II ad Amm. (= De Thuc. idiom.) 2 line 17. Dionysius continues with this construction in discussing Thucydides sometimes changing case and grammatical function (τοτε μὲν πρὸς τὸ σημανόμενον ἀπὸ τοῦ σημαίνοντος ἀποστρέφον, τοτε δὲ πρὸς τὸ σημαίνοντος ἀπὸ τοῦ σημανόμενον, 2.29); in his work on literary composition Dionysius uses our phrase to describe clauses that sometimes admit additions, at other times reductions (τοτε μὲν προσθήκας … τοτε δὲ ἀφαρφαρέως, De comp. 9 line 2), once utilizing τοτε μὲν… τοτε δὲ… τοτε δὲ… to describe melodies that are times enharmonic, at times chromatic, and at times diotonic (ibid. 19.37). In his work on Demosthenes’ style he states that the orator’s μεταβολή (variatio) provides τοτε μὲν τὸ ἄρχωμπρεπὲς καὶ αὐστηρόν, τοτε δὲ τὸ μεληχρὸν καὶ φιλόκαμον, “old-fashioned severity at one point, and sweetness and novelty at another,” Usher, trans. LCL, 1974, De Demon. dict. 104.50.
In the context of proper names Philo is the first writer to so use the expression.\textsuperscript{165} In an initially non-etymological context he employs it at *Mut.* 103 where he states: “the oracles call the father-in-law of the chief prophet sometimes Jethro and sometimes Raguel.”\textsuperscript{166} It seems clear from the context that Philo employed τοτὲ μὲν… τοτὲ δὲ here because he knew of various Septuagintal loci where Moses’ father-in-law was called one name, while in different passages he was called another. Our received LXX text has Ἰοθορ at Ex. 3.1, 4.18, and 18.2-12. Ἑγουηλ is found at Ex. 2.18 and Num. 10.29. If one simply reads *Ebr.* 36-40 one would conclude that Philo’s LXX text had Ἰοθορ since he quotes Num. 10.29 in this passage where he is expounding Ἰοθορ, not Ἑγουηλ. However, according to the app. crit. in both Wevers\textsuperscript{167} and Brooke and McLean\textsuperscript{168} there is no evidence for this Ἰοθορ reading in Num. 10.\textsuperscript{169} From where then is Philo getting the name in this passage? Earlier, shortly after first mentioning Jethro, he had quoted Exodus 18.16, so it is easy to see why he uses this name for Moses’ father-in-law. Given what we have witnessed above with Hittite and Pharan, it also seems possible that we are seeing a glimpse of onomastic intrusion in the *Ebr.* passage. Indeed, one should consider the possibility that Philo was more apt, at least at times, to consult his name lists (or his allegorical predecessors’ use of them) than the biblical text, especially if he was simply working from memory regarding the latter.\textsuperscript{170}

All the above sets the stage for the most likely scenario of Philo’s employment of the μὲν… δὲ construction twice when reporting etymologies. We see this in nos. 14 and 15 above, where our Alexandrian provides differing etymologies for Esau and Harran. Given the presentation of matters above, both with the history of the τοτὲ μὲν… τοτὲ δὲ construction and with Philo’s use of the onomastica, it would seem most likely that, again, we are seeing testimony that “sometimes” one onomastic entry (whether in multi-

\textsuperscript{165} The next writer to utilize our expression with proper names does so in an instance that is really no different from its general use. Dio Chrysostom, when discussing the Persian Wars of the early fifth century, states that τοτὲ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι περιήγησαν, τοτὲ δὲ Πέρσαι, “at times the Athenians prevailed, at another time the Persians did,” *Or.* 13.25. It may be of interest to Philonic scholars in general that, as seen earlier with the ἐν ἑτέρως expression, Philo is also fond of τοτὲ μὲν… τοτὲ δὲ. He employs it 41 times (nos. 125 to 165 in the TLG’s enumeration, including 3 fragments). It is found in Xenophon 9 times, Plato 39, Aristotle only twice (these last two entries are more in line with Niehoff’s thesis?), Polybius and Diodorus Siculus once each, but 18 times in Dionysius Halicarnassensis, and 7 times in the first-cent. BCE tactician Asclepiodotus.

\textsuperscript{166} καὶ μὴν τὸν γε τοῦ ἀρχιπροφήτου πενθερὸν τοτὲ μὲν Ἰοθὸρ τοτὲ δὲ Ἑγουηλ οἱ χρησμοὶ καλοῦσαν. Later (in 103 and at 105) the two names are given appropriate single, independent etymologies.

\textsuperscript{167} 1982, 156-157.

\textsuperscript{168} 1911, 447. For some background on the issue of these variant names of the lawgiver’s father-in-law, see Dorival, 1994, 281-282, and Slayton, 1992, 821.

\textsuperscript{169} The only textual variant in our *Ebr.* locus is νοθόρ for Ἰοθορ in codex H (CW, 1897, 2.177). There is no evidence for any Raguel here.

\textsuperscript{170} Indeed, Philo does not make his quotation of Num. very exact at *Ebr.* 39. Our received LXX text reads ἐξαρμομέν and δεύτερο μεθ᾽ ἡμῶν καὶ εὗ σε ποιήσομεν where Philo has ἐξάραντες and ἰδίᾳ δή μεθ᾽ ἡμῶν καὶ εὗ σε ποιήσομεν.
ple entries for a single name in one list or in diverse onomastica Philo possessed) had one
meaning, whereas “sometimes” Philo found another, either in his own list(s) or among
his allegorical predecessors. More specifically, no. 15 has already been mentioned above
where it appears in the list of those names which likely had different onomastic contrib-
tors offers Greek synonyms for the same Hebrew root. As for no. 14 Ησαυ, Grabbe’s dis-
cussion of it shows that there were two traditions, based on different Jews seeing the
name as from two separate roots, in the onomastica that were extant prior to Philo’s day.
Grabbe also notes that testimony in the later ecclesiastical name lists is split pretty equal-
ly for both meanings.¹⁷¹ Thus it has already been put in the first list of the present sub-
heading. It does, however, perhaps tie in somehow with the next name to be discussed.

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¹⁷¹ 1988, 163 (no. 67).


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