PART ONE

ON THE CHERUBIM

CHAPTER ONE:
The banishment of Adam from paradise

What it means to be banished

The allegory of Hagar and Sarah (§§ 1–10)

Detailed Comments

(§ 1) Καὶ ἐξέβαλε τὸν Ἀδὰμ καὶ κατῴκισεν ἀπέναντι τοῦ παραδείσου τῆς τρυφῆς καὶ ἔταξε τὰ Χερουβὶμ καὶ τὴν φλογίνην ρομφαίαν τὴν στρεφομένην, φυλάσσειν τὴν ὁδὸν τοῦ ξύλου τῆς ζωῆς” (Gen 3:24). νῦν μὲν ἑξέβαλε φησί, πρότερον δ’ εἶπεν ἑξαπέστειλεν (ib. 23), οὐ παρέργως τὰ ὀνόματα θείς, ἀλλ’ εἰδὼς ἐφ’ ὧν κυρίως καὶ εὐθυβόλως πραγμάτων αὐτὰ τάττει.

“And he (God) cast out Adam and settled (him) facing the garden of pleasure, and he stationed the Cherubim and the flaming sword that turns itself to guard the way of the tree of life” (Gen 3:24). He (Moses) says here “he cast out” but earlier he had said “he sent out” (ib. 23), not putting down the words randomly but fully aware to which things he applies them in a proper and accurate sense.”

Note on the text of Gen. 3:24: Philo follows the text of the LXX, except for the omission of the direct object αὐτόν in κατῴκισεν αὐτὸν (LXX). Cohn wants to remedy this by eliminating καὶ ἔταξε and making the Cherubim the direct object of κατῴκισεν. To leave the text as it is, one could argue that αὐτόν is implied in Philo’s quotation.

ἐκβάλλω and ἐξαποστέλλω” – to throw out and send out from.
Philo builds up a contrast between between ἐκβάλλω and ἐξαποστέλλω, which is based on the LXX text – ἑξέβαλε in Gen 3:24 and ἑξαπέστειλεν in the previous vers (Gen 3:23), to which Philo refers. Gen 3:23 reads: καὶ ἑξαπέστειλεν αὐτὸν κύριος ὁ θεὸς ἐκ τοῦ παραδείσου τῆς τρυφῆς ἐργάζεσθαι τὴν γῆν, ἐξ ὧς ἐλήμφθη, “and the Lord God sent him forth out of the garden of pleasure to work the earth, from which he was taken.” Philo had quoted this text in Leg. I 96 in a different context, but in this passage he used both verbs ἐκβάλλω and ἐξαποστέλλω synonymously: διόπερ καὶ ὅτε ἐκβάλλεται τοῦ παραδείσου, τὰς αὐτὰς κλήσεις παρείληφε, λέγει γάρ „καὶ ἑξαπέστειλεν αὐτὸν κύριος ὁ θεὸς ἐκ τοῦ παραδείσου τῆς τρυφῆς, ....” “Therefore, when he is cast out (ἐκβάλλεται) of the garden, he (Moses) assumed the same titles (i.e. Lord/God); for he says: “and the Lord God sent him forth out (ἐξαπέστειλεν) of the garden of pleasure ...” Elsewhere Philo used the term φυγαδεύω (“to banish”) as in Cher. 3; 10; 103, and passim; f. e.
Congr. 171: οὕτω γὰρ τὰ γῆς ἄχθη, τὸν τε Ἀδὰμ καὶ Κάιν, ἐφυγάδευσεν ἐκ τοῦ παραδείσου, “thus he banished the ‘cumberers’\(^1\) of the ground, Adam and Cain from the garden.”

By using the single prefix ἀπο- in ἀποστέλλω instead of ἐξαποστέλλω in the subsequent paragraphs, Philo appears to weaken the verb ἀποστέλλω, perhaps to give the contrast between ἀποστέλλω and ἐκβάλλω more emphasis.

ὁ παραδείσος τῆς τρυφῆς – the garden of pleasure or delight.

There are several places in the LXX in which ὁ παραδείσος τῆς τρυφῆς “the garden of delight” is mentioned: Gen 3:23; 3:24; Ez. 31:9. Traditionally the Greek word παραδείσος stands for an enclosed park or pleasure garden for kings and nobles but in a biblical context it has been understood as the garden of Eden or Paradise, which in modern times and in most modern languages has become virtually synonymous with the hereafter. See Harl, 1986, 101.

Gen 2:8 adds the name Ἐδέμ as the location of paradise: καὶ ἐφύτευσεν κύριος ὁ θεὸς παράδεισον ἐν Ἐδεμ κατὰ ἀνατολὰς… “and the Lord God planted a garden in Eden toward the East.” Etymologically Eden stands for τρυφή or “delight,” a concept that Philo fully exploits allegorically when he refers to either παραδείσος or Ἐδέμ. In Leg. 45 Philo had stated: παραδείσος μὲν δὴ τροπικῶς εἴρηται ἢ ἀρετή, τόπος δὲ οἰκεῖος τῷ παραδείσῳ Ἐδέμ, τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶ τρυφή: “Virtue is figuratively called paradise, and the place suited for paradise is Eden, which means ‘delight’.” In Cher. 12 Philo repeats the etymology, as he does in Post. 32 and Plant. 38. For the etymologies, see Grabbe (1988) 151-2, no. 49.

Three biblical texts influenced Philo’s elaboration of the theme of Ἐδέμ and τρυφή: Gen 2:8; Gen 2:10ff.; Gen 4:16. In a general way Ἐδέμ or τρυφή signifies everything connected with virtue; in Leg. 45ff. earthly virtue is described as a copy of heavenly virtue that has been given for the support and assistance of humans in emulating excellence. In Plant. 38 τρυφή symbolizes the soul, planted in the garden of virtues that sees things perfect as they are; also in Conf. 61, the garden is portrayed as a garden of heavenly virtues. Eden is likewise connected with the wisdom of God (σοφία τοῦ θεοῦ) as the source of all virtue, see Leg. I 64: λαμβάνει μὲν οὖν τὰς ἀρχὰς ἢ γενικῆ ἀρετὴ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἐδέμ, τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ σοφίας..., “generic virtue takes its beginning from Eden, the wisdom of God.” At other times τρυφή is joined with ὁρθὸς and θεῖος λόγος as in Post. 32. The four rivers flowing out of Eden (Gen 2:10) form an important image for Philo’s speculation about individual virtues; the number four conveniently matches the four virtues: prudence, wisdom, temperance, and courage, as in Leg. 63-65. In this context, Philo stresses again the importance of heavenly virtue, as in Leg. 65: ποταμὸς ἢ γενική ἐστιν ἀρετή, ἢ ἀγαθότης- αὐτή ἐκπορεύεται ἐκ τῆς Ἐδέμ, τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ σοφίας- ἢ δὲ ἐστιν ὁ θεοῦ λόγος. “River’ is generic virtue, goodness; this streams out of Eden, the wisdom of God; and it is the Logos of God;” cf. Post. 128; Somn. 241-2.

In his interpretation of Gen 4:16 Philo places the names of Naid and Eden etymologically over against each other, as in Cher. 12: ἐρμηνεύεται δὲ Ἡ ναίδ μὲν σάλος,\(^1\) With a nod to Homer.
Ἐδὲ δὲ τρυφή, τὸ μὲν κακίας κλονούσης ψυχὴν σύμβολον, τὸ δὲ ἀρετῆς εὐπάθειαν αὐτὴς περιποιούσης καὶ τρυφήν, οὕτω τὴν δὲ ἀλόγου πάθους ἡδονῆς θρύψιν, ἀλλὰ τὴν μετὰ πολλῆς εὐμαρείας ἄπονον χαράν καὶ ἀταλαίπωρον. “Naid means ‘tossing’ and Eden ‘delight’; the former is a symbol of evil that agitates the soul, the latter of virtue that procures for itself well-being and delight, not softness through an irrational sensation of desire, but the joy (χαρά) that comes with much ease, free from trouble and toil;” cf. Post. 32. Since the word τρυφή has both positive and negative connotations – in a good sense it can mean “pleasure,” “delight” or “joy,” and in a lesser sense “softness,” “self-indulgence,” or “luxury” – the explanation by Philo in the above passage is clarifying: τρυφή represents for him a state of intense satisfaction, joy (χαρά), or delight, and not the engagement in a luxurious or self-indulgent lifestyle of revelry. See also Bauer and Lampe, s. v., and the verbal form ἐντρυφάω in LSJ, which show the negative implications.

In Somn. II 242, Philo again summarizes the concept: καλεῖ δὲ τὴν μὲν τοῦ ὄντος σοφίαν Ἐδέμ, ἣς ἑρμηνεία τρυφή, διότι, οἶμαι, ἐντρύφημα καὶ θεοῦ σοφία καὶ σοφίας θεός ..., “he calls Eden true wisdom, which means ‘delight’, wherefore in my opinion, both wisdom is to God and God to wisdom a thing to take pleasure in, ...”

κυρίως καὶ εὐθυβόλως – in a proper and accurate sense.
LSJ εὐθύβολος (from βάλλω): throwing straight; hence, hitting the mark, accurate, exact. Philo seems to be a pioneer in the use of this word - most examples in LSJ come from his works. In an almost technical way he employs the adverb for the interpretation of names or the justification of biblical texts and expressions; cf. Cher. 26, 2: ἡ δὲ μόνη τῶν τοῦ κόσμου μερῶν ἑστῶσα παγίως Ἑστία πρὸς τῶν παλαιῶν εὐθυβόλως ὠνόμασται ..., “the only one of the parts of the universe that stands firm has correctly been named ‘Hestia’ by the ancients, ...” Cf. Opif. 37, 1; 165, 1; Ios. 116, 2; Flac. 132, 1. As in Cher. 1 in which the adverbs κυρίως καὶ εὐθυβόλως are joined together, the word εὐθυβόλως is often used in other combinations. Philo likes to use equivalent words, such as εὐσκόπως, εὐστόχως, or intensifiers, such as εὐγενῶς, καλῶς, and δυνατῶς.

tὰ ὄνοματα and tā prāmāta – the names and the things or realities.
The topic of the correctness of names (περὶ ὄνομάτων ὀρθότητος) is much debated in ancient philosophy; it forms the main subject of Plato’s Cratylus. In the Stoic tradition names were perceived as natural (φύσει), but Platonists saw them as conventional (θέσει); in the latter tradition names are given or assigned by those who have insight in the nature of things. For Philo, a strong correlation exists between names and the things or realities that they represent, but the correctness of a given name also depends on the wisdom of the name giver. In Cher. 56. Philo elaborates further on this issue, when he explains that while all other people give things names that differ from the things themselves, Moses’ assignments of names have power, so that they do not differ at all from the things they signify but automatically equal them. See also: Opif. 148 (Adam); Agr. 1-2 (Moses). See also Runia (2001) 349-50.
ὁ μὲν οὖν ἀποστελλόμενος ἐπανόδου τυχεῖ οὐ κεκώλυται, ὁ δ’ ἐκβληθεὶς ὑπὸ θεοῦ τὴν ἀίδιον φυγήν ὑπομένει· τῷ μὲν γάρ μὴ πως κραταιῶς ὑπὸ κακίας καταληφθέντι δέδοται μετανοήσαντι καθάπερ εἰς πατρίδα τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀφ’ ἧς ἐξέπεσε κατελθεῖν, τὸν δὲ πιεσθέντα καὶ ὑποβεβλημένον σφοδρὰ καὶ ἀνιάτῳ νόσῳ φέρειν ἀνάγκη τὰ δεινὰ μέχρι τοῦ παντὸς αἰώνος ἀθάνατα σκορακισθέντα εἰς ἀσεβῶν χῶρον, ἵν’ ἄκρατον καὶ συνεχῇ βαρυδαιμονίαν ὑπομένῃ·

“He who is sent away is not prevented from eventually returning, but he who is cast out by God undergoes eternal exile. For the former, who is not yet firmly in the grasp of evil, is allowed, if he repents, to return to virtue as to a homeland from which he was driven; but the latter, oppressed and constrained by a violent and incurable disease, is forced to carry the undying sufferings forever, contemptuously dismissed to the place of the impious to endure a full dose of unremitting misery.”

Note on the text: ἀνελθεῖν mgHL, instead of κατελθεῖν. The latter verb has a second meaning: LSJ “come back, return, esp. come back from exile,” which suits the context here.

φυγή – exile.
The story of the exile of Adam is often used by Philo as an illustration of the bad soul as an exile; see Leg. III 1; esp. the corporeal nature of the soul as a source of desire and injustice, see Leg. III 37; further Leg. I 55; 61; Post. 10; Plant. 46; Congr. 58; see also below in Cher. 10.

ἡ ἀίδιος φυγή – eternal exile.
Philo sets up a contrast between “being sent out” and “being cast out” and uses strong language, of which “eternal exile” is part. Here he uses these words in a general way, but a few paragraphs later he applies them to the everlasting banishment of Hagar and her son Ismael, see Cher. 4 and 9. In Det. 143 Philo again condemns in a rather general way the foolish and unjust to eternal exile; but in Ebr. 224 the ire is directed at eunuchs and all those who do not generate virtue, and in Her. 169 he singles out polytheism and idolatry, including painters and sculptors as creators of ‘mischievous’ arts.

eἰς πατρίδα τὴν ἀρετὴν – to virtue as to a homeland.
Philo refers to the previous paragraph, in which homeland stands for the garden of pleasure or paradise, which in turn equals virtue; see Leg. 45: παράδεισος μὲν δὴ τροπικῶς εἴρηται ἡ ἀρετή, “Virtue is called figuratively paradise, ...”

σφοδρὰ καὶ ἀνιάτος νόσος – a violent and incurable disease.
Philo used the expression several times, especially calling “old age, the long and incurable disease,” ἡ μακρὰ καὶ ἀνιάτος νόσος, τὸ γήρας, see Post. 71; Abr. 182. Cf. Seneca, ep. 108.28: Senectus enim insanabilis morbus est.
εἰς ἀσεβῶν χῶρον – to the place of the impious.

The place of the impious is a commonly used expression usually identified with Hades; see also Psalms of Solomon 14, 6; Flavius Josephus: De Bello Judaico 2.156: τὰς μακάρων νῆσους δοκοῦσι δὲ μοι κατά τὴν αὐτὴν ἔννοιαν Ἑλληνες τοῖς τε ἀνδρείς αὐτῶν, οὕς ἡρωικοῖ καὶ ἦμιθέους καλοῦσιν, τὰς μακάρων νῆσους ἀνατεθείκειν, ταῖς δὲ τῶν πονηρῶν ψυχαῖς καθ’ ἄδου τὸν ἀσεβῶν χῶρον...

"It seems to me that the Greeks had the same idea when they set apart the isles of the blessed for their brave men, whom they call heroes and demigods, and the place of the impious for the souls of the wicked down in Hades, ...

In Somn. II 133, Philo contrasts the virtuous with the impious and connects them with the polarity of sun and moon or light and darkness. He maintains that the impious drive the virtuous souls: εἰς τὸν ἀσεβῶν ἀνήλιον χῶρον εἰσελαύνοντες, ὃν ἐπέχουσι νὺξ βαθεῖα καὶ σκότος ἀτελεύτητον ...

"Into the sunless region of the impious, where a deep night and a never-ending darkness remain."

In Congr. 57 Philo refers again to the place of the impious: τὴν δὲ ἄδικον καὶ ἄθεον ψυχήν φυγαδεύων ἀπ' ἑαυτοῦ πορρωτάτω διέσπειρεν εἰς τὸν ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν χῶρον. ὁ δὲ χώρος οὗτος προσφυέστατα ἀσεβῶν καλεῖται, οὐχ ὁ μυθευόμενος ἐν Ἅιδου...καὶ γὰρ ὁ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν Ἅιδης ὁ τοῦ μοχθηροῦ βίος ἐστίν, ὁ ἀλάστωρ καὶ παλαμναῖος καὶ πάσαις ἀραῖς ἔνοχος. “Banishing the unjust and godless soul as far away from himself as possible, he dispersed them to the place of pleasures and desires and injustices. That place is most suitably called the ‘place of the impious’, but not that which is called Hades in the myths; for it is the real Hades, the life of the wretched, the one who is damned, murderous and subject to every curse.”

σκορακισθέντα – contemptuously dismissed.

The rather rare verb σκορακίζω is used multiple times by Philo (11x). It is derived from ἐς κόρακας, literally “to the ravens,” in imprecations “go and be hanged,” and metaphorically “to dismiss contemptuously” or in passive: “to be treated contemptuously,” see LSJ s. v.

§3 ēπεὶ καὶ τὴν μέσην παιδείαν τὴν ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις χορεύοντας ὅρῳμεν Ἄγαρ δις μὲν ἐξιοῦσαν ἀπό τῆς ἀρχούσης ἄρετῆς Σάρρας, ἀπαξ δὲ τὴν προτέραν ὅδον υποστρέφουσαν, ἦ τότε μὲν ἀποδράσα, οὐ φυγαδευθεῖσα, κατάγεται ὑπαντήσαντος ἀγγέλου, ὃς ἐστὶ θεῖος λόγος, εἰς τὸν δεσποτικὸν οἶκον, ἀφ’ ἑαυτῆς δὲ κατὰ τὸ παντελῶς ἀνεπάνακτος ἐκβάλλεται.

“In this way we also see Hagar, or the ‘intermediate’ education, which plays its role in the general cycle of studies, departing twice from Sarah, or the authoritative virtue, but retracing her steps once. After she ran away the first time, although not banished, she returns to her master’s house after an angel, who stands for divine reason, met her (cf. Gen 16:6f.), but the second time she is thrown out definitively, never to return” (cf. Gen 21:14).
Note on the text: ἀνεπάνακτος is a conjecture of Wendland, while the mss have ἀνέπακτος. LSJ: ἀνεπ-ἀνακτος, ov, not to be brought back, ἀ. ἐκβάλλεσθαι Ph.1.139, cf. 2.338 (dub.). Philo is the only source mentioned here. Since we are dealing with a hapax – if the word exists at all – I wonder why ἀνέπακτος can not stand (? question for Jim Royse??); cf. ἐπακτός (from ἐπάγω).

ἡ μέση παιδεία – the ‘intermediate’ education.
There is no satisfactory translation for μέση παιδεία in English and for that reason it is punctuated. In Stoic vocabulary μέσος indicates a middle position, something that is neutral and is neither good nor bad; in this sense μέσος is equivalent to ἀδιάφορον, something that is indifferent; cf. Prob. 60 ...οἷς δὲ αἱ πράξεις, ἢ ἀπ’ ἀρετῆς εἰσὶ κατορθώματα ἢ ἀπὸ κακίας ἀμαρτήματα ἢ μέσα καὶ ἀδιάφορα. “...in which the actions are either righteous actions out of virtue, or sinful actions out of vice, or in the middle and indifferent.” When μέσος modifies παιδεία, it indicates a point “halfway” in the progress toward perfection; cf. Fug. 213. In general Philo views μέση παιδεία in the Hagar and Sarah allegory as preparatory training and as a lower stage in the progress toward the higher goal of wisdom. Alexandre (1967) 47ff.

ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις – in the general cycle of studies.
The general cycle of studies consisted of a variety of subjects used in schools for the training of students. In his Institutes of Oratory, 1-12, the first century Roman rhetorician Quintillianus (c. 35-c. 100 CE) gave an overview of such general studies for future orators; they include grammar, reading, writing, literature, history, music, geometry, arithmetic, and astronomy. These subjects were variable and changed over times, but in the Greek-speaking school systems the central works of Greek literature, most prominently the poems of Homer and other classical writers, formed a consistent core. Koskenniemi (2014) 102-128; Fuchs (1962) 365-98; Marrou (1956/1982) 176-85; 266-267; Morgan (1998) 33-39.

χορεύουσα – which plays its role.
The choice of the participle χορεύουσα, which literally means dancing around in a chorus may be evoked by the word ἐγκυκλίοις which also has the notion of a circular movement. Metaphorically the verb χορεύω or also ἐγχορεύω could be translated as “practising something” or “being versed in something.” Throughout his works, Philo uses the verb χορεύω and cognates in a literal sense, but a similar link between χορεύω and τὰ ἐγκύκλια also exists in Post. 137; Congr. 20; Mut. 229 (οἱ κεχορευκότες τῇ ἐγκυκλίῳ μουσικῇ) – μουσική (sc. τέχνη), is any art over which the Muses presided. In Ebr. 33 Philo employs a related word in this context: πατέρα τοίνυν εἶναί φαμεν τὸν ἀρρενα καὶ τέλειον καὶ ὀρθὸν λόγον, μητέρα δὲ τὴν μέσην καὶ ἐγκύκλιον χορείαν τε καὶ παιδείαν. “We say then that the masculine, perfect, and right reason is father, and the ‘intermediate’ and encyclical training and instruction is mother.” Similarly, in Leg. 168, Philo uses the negative adjective ἄχορευτος, (literally “not trained in dance,” stating: τῶν ἐγκύκλιων οὐχ ἦττον πεπαιδεύεσαι τὰ ἄχορευτα: “you have been trained in the regular cycle of studies no less than the ones not taught in schools.” The last text may
be a slight hint to Plato, Laws 654 A, in which ἀχόρευτος “not trained in dance” is equivalent to ἀπαίδευτος “not educated.”

Ἡγαρ – Hagar.
Hagar is introduced as an example for the main theme of “sending out” and “casting out” that started in Cher. 1-2. Philo only alludes to the allegory of Hagar and Sara as preparatory training for the loftier goal of philosophy and ultimately wisdom, but he does not fully develop the story here, probably because the focus is on a different theme.

Two passages from Genesis form the backdrop of the Hagar story in this context: Gen 16:2-9 and Gen 21:10-14. The Hagar story continues in Cher. 6 and 8-9, in which Philo quotes Gen 21:14 explicitly. In an earlier work, Leg. 3, 244, Philo had already anticipated the Hagar story, including the connection with school learning: συμβουλεύει ἐκ τῆς παιδίσκης τουτέσταν παιδείας τῆς ἐγκυκλίου παιδοποιεῖσθαι τῆς Ἁγαρ, ὅ λέγεται παροίκησις. “She (Sarah) advises (Abraham) to beget children out of the slave girl, Hagar, that is of the general cycle of study, which means ‘living beside’.” The latter is an etymology Philo frequently uses for Hagar; it is related to her Egyptian descent, as in Congr. 20: γένος μὲν ἐστιν Αἰγυπτία, καλεῖται δὲ Ἅγαρ, τοῦτο δὲ ἐρμηνευθέν ἔστι παροίκησις. “It is Egyptian by birth and called Hagar, which when translated means ‘living beside’.” Philo treats the full Sara and Hagar story from Gen 16:1-6 with its allegorical ramifications in his treatise De Congressu. Other works contain a few standard references to Hagar, such as Sacr. 43; Post. 130. 137; Sobr. 8; Fug. 2. 5. 202; Mut. 255; Somn. I 240. For the etymologies, see Grabbe (1988) 128, s. v. and Pearce (2007). For etymologies in Philo’s system, see Dillon (1977) 180-182.

τῆς ἀρχούσης ἀρετῆς Σάρρας – Sarah, or the authoritative virtue.
Philo refers to the origins of the names Sara and Sarah – in Greek spelled Σάρα (here transcribed as Sara) and Σάρρα (here transcribed as Sarah). The name change from one to the other is based on the passage in Gen 17:15: Ἐἶπεν δὲ ὁ θεὸς τῷ Αβρααμ Σαρα ἡ γυνὴ σου, οὐ κληθήσεται τὸ ὄνομα αὐτῆς Σαρα, ἀλλὰ Σαρρα ἔσται τὸ ὄνομα αὐτῆς. “And God said to Abraham: Sara your wife, her name shall not be called Sara, but Sarah will be her name.” Philo had already introduced one etymology in Leg. 2, 82: ἡ ἀρχούσα σοφία Σάρρα, “the authoritative virtue, Sarah,” and in Leg. 3, 217 he had quoted the biblical text (Gen 17:15-16). In De Cherubim Philo develops the etymologies that reflect the name change further. Cher. 3: τῆς ἀρχούσης ἀρετῆς Σάρρας, “of Sarah, or the authoritative virtue”; Cher. 5: Σάρα δὲ σύμβολον ἀρχῆς ἔμης–καλείται γάρ ἄρχη μου–, “Sara in turn, a symbol of ‘my authority’ – for she is called ‘authority of me’. ” Cher. 7: Σάρα δὲ ἀντὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς μου γέννηται Σάρρα, ἢς ἔστιν ἡ κλῆσις ἄρχουσα, “when Sara instead of ‘authority of me’ becomes Sarah, her title is ‘she who rules with authority’.”

It is clear that some of these etymologies were already in circulation before Philo’s time. Philo refers to other philosophers or theologians (he calls them φυσικοὶ άνδρες), who interpreted the roles of Abraham and Sarah symbolically as ‘good intellect’ and ‘virtue’, see Abr. 99: οἱ τὸν μὲν άνδρα συμβολικῶς ἔφασκον σπουδαίον εἶναι νοῦν ἐκ τῆς περὶ τούνομα ἐρμηνευθείσης δυνάμεως τεκμαιρόμενοι τρόπον
“They said that the husband stood symbolically for a ‘good intellect’, judging by the meaning when translated stands for a ‘noble character of the soul’. (They said) that his wife was ‘virtue’, whose name in Chaldean is Sarah, but in Greek ‘she who rules with authority’, because nothing is more ‘royal’ and ‘governing’ than virtue.” For the etymologies, see Grabbe (1988) 201, s. v.

ἀγγέλου, ὃς ἐστι θείος λόγος – an angel who stands for divine reason.
The angel in the story stands for divine reason or the divine logos. Philo’s treatise De Fuga et Inventione deals with the text on the expulsion of Hagar (Gen 16:6-12), with a similar interpretation of the angel: ἄρα Ἄγαρ ἀπαλλάττεται δι’ αἰδῶ· σημεῖον δὲ τὸ ὑπάντᾶν αὐτῇ ἄγγελον, θείον λόγον,… “Hagar departs because of shame; a sign of this is the fact that an angel, divine reason, meets her,…”

ἐκβάλλεται – she is thrown out.
The biblical text to which Philo refers does not fully correspond with his rhetorical presentation here: Gen 21:14: ἀνέστη δὲ Αβρααμ τὸ πρωὶ καὶ ἔλαβεν ἄρτους καὶ ἀσκὸν ὕδατος καὶ ἔδωκεν Ἁγαρ καὶ ἐπέθηκεν ἐπὶ τὸν ὦμον καὶ τὸ παιδίον καὶ ἀπέστειλεν αὐτήν. “Abraham rose up in the morning and took loaves and a skin of water, and gave them to Hagar, and he put the child on her shoulder, and sent her away.” The verb ἀποστέλλω and not ἐκβάλλω is used here; ἐκβάλλω, however, occurs earlier in the passage in Gen 21:10: καὶ εἶπεν τῷ Ἅβραμ ‘ἐκβάλε τὴν παιδίσκην ταύτην καὶ τὸν υἱὸν αὐτῆς· οὐ γὰρ κληρονομήσει ὁ υἱὸς τῆς παιδίσκης ταύτης μετὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ μου Ισαακ’, “and she (Sarah) said to Abraham, throw out this slave girl and her son, for the son of this slave girl shall not inherit with my son Isaac.” Later Philo will return to this text at the end of his allegory of the Hagar and Sarah story (Cher. 9).

§4 τὰς δὲ αἰτίας καὶ τοῦ προτέρου δρασμοῦ καὶ τῆς αὐθίς αἰδίου φυσῆς λεκτέων. μέχρι μὲν οὖσω μετωνομάσθησαν, ὁπερ ἦν μετεχαράχθησαν τοὺς ψυχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἄμεινον βελτιωμένου χαρακτήρας, ἀλλ’ ἐτὶ ἦν ὁ μὲν Ἅβραμ πατὴρ μετέωρος τὴν μετάρσιον τῶν κατὰ τὸν ἀέρα συμβαινόντων καὶ τὴν μετέωρον τῶν κατὰ τὸν οὐρανὸν υπαρχόντων φιλοσοφίαν μετιω, ἤν φυσιολογίας τὸ κράτιστον εἰδὸς ἀποτέτμηται μαθηματική,

“We must speak about the reasons for both the earlier flight and the everlasting exile thereafter. As long as their names had not yet been changed, which meant remodeled by improving the character of their soul, Abram was still the ‘father on high’, pursuing the high philosophy of things that happen in the air and the sublime philosophy of things that exist in heaven, which mathematics defines as the most excellent form of the study of nature.”
τοῦ προτέρου δρασμοῦ καὶ τῆς αὖθις ἀιδίου φυγῆς — for the earlier flight and the everlasting exile thereafter.

Philo uses the words δρασμός “running away, flight” and φυγή “flight, banishment, exile” often as a pair in his works; as in Leg. 2, 91: ἀλλά τοί γε ὁ θεὸς τὴν φυγήν οὐκ ἔπαινε· σοὶ μὲν γὰρ, ὦ διάνοια, μήπω τελειωθείσῃ φυγῆ καὶ δρασμὸν τῶν παθῶν ἀρμόζει μελετᾶν,... “God does not applaud the flight; for it suits you, mind not yet made perfect, to practice fleeing and running away from the passions,...” In Philo’s treatise, De Fuga et Inventione, one of the keywords is ἀπέδρα, “she ran away,” taken from the story of Hagar and Sarah in Gen 16. The Genesis passage, however, does not use the noun δρασμός, which doesn’t occur anywhere in the LXX, but the verb ἀποδιδράσκω, a verb from which the noun is derived; see Gen 16:6: εἶπεν δὲ Ἀβραμ πρὸς Σαραν ᾿Ιδοὺ ἡ παιδίσκη σου ἐν ταῖς χερσίν σου· χρῶ αὐτῇ, ὡς ἀν σοι ἀρεστὸν ἦ. καὶ ἐκάκωσεν αὐτὴν Σαρά, καὶ ἀπέδρα ἀπὸ προσώπου αὐτῆς. “and Abram said to Sara, behold your slave girl is in your hands, use her as it may seem good to you; and Sara maltreated her, and she ran away from her face.” Although both words can be translated as “flight,” δρασμός seems to be less emphatic than φυγή.

οὗπω μετωνομάσθησαν, ὅπερ ἦν μεταχαράχθησαν — (their names) had not yet been changed, which meant remodeled.

μετωνομάζω, “call by a new name” is a common verb with a special significance in the works of Philo, who takes great pride in interpreting double names in an elaborate way. He dedicates a full treatise to the subject: περὶ τῶν μετωνομαζομένων καὶ ᾿ϊν ἑνὲκα μετονομάζοντα, De Mutatione Nominum. The verb μεταχαράσσω, on the other hand, is very rare; LSJ: “to grave anew, remodel, recast.” It only occurs a few times before Philo. The Greek writer Menander had used the word in a different context, lamenting and perhaps mocking the miseries of old age. In a passage only preserved as a fragment, he writes (Men. 552): ὦ γῆρας ἐχθρὸν σωμάτων ἀνθρωπίων, ἅπαντα συλῶν τὰ καλὰ τῆς εὐμορφίας, καὶ μεταχαράττον τὴν μὲν ἀνδρία μελῶν ἐς τἀπρεπές, ... “oh old age, enemy of human bodies, robbing all the beauties of the beautiful shape and recasting the manliness of the limbs, so it becomes unsuitable, ...” LSJ: ἀνδρεία/ἀνδρία: “manliness and manly spirit,” also “membrum virile.”

Philo uses the verb μεταχαράσσω in general to stress ethical issues, such as the soul changing from good to bad or vice versa; see Post. 99; Migr. 120; Prob. 5; 98. In Det. 152, quoting Gen 4:14 and contrasting creation and its creator, Philo speaks ironically about remodeling and restamping the divine coinage, and states in a challenge to his audience: ἀλλ’ εἰ δύνασαι, μετάπλαττε καὶ μεταχάρατε τὸ θεῖον νόμισμα· “but if you can, remold and restamp the divine coinage!” The idea of recasting the ethical character of the soul is behind all the name changes in this context: Cher. 4; Mut. 71 (Abraham); Post. 93 (Jobel); Mut. 121;123 (Joshua); Migr. 39; Somn. 1, 129 (Jacob).

One passage may give a glimpse into the question how Philo became a pioneer in the usage of this obscure term. He employs the verb 17 times, while only the Menander fragment (besides some lexicographic notes by Ptolemaeus Gramm.) precedes him. Origen and other church fathers follow Philo later in using it. Perhaps Philo did take Menander’s example and recast the verb for his own figurative purposes.
In Spec. 1, 325 speaking about the law as author of fellowship and humanity, Philo brings up the issue of effemination and the kind of unworthy behavior of men who, as he claims: “debases the currency of nature,” οὗ τὸ φύσεως νόμισμα παρακόπτοντες. He then continues: θλαδίας γὰρ καὶ ἀποκεκομμένους τὰ γεννητικὰ ἐλαύνει τὸ τέτοιος ὄρας ταμιεύοντας ἄνθος, ἴνα μὴ ῥᾳδίως μαραίνοιτο, καὶ τὸν ἄρρενα τύπον μεταχαράττοντας εἰς θηλύμορφον ἰδέαν, “for it drives away eunuchs and those whose generative organs are cut off, who store up their youthful bloom, 2 lest it should quickly wither, and who restamp the masculine cast into a feminine form.” This is the only passage, in which Philo uses this verb explicitly in a sexual context, as did Menander. Though not a direct quote, Philo must have been familiar with Menander’s phrase.

έτι ἦν ὁ μὲν Αβράμ πατὴρ μετέωρος – Abram was still the ‘father on high’.
The background for the etymology of Abram-Abraham, can be found in Gen 17:5: καὶ οὖ κληθήσεται ἐτι τὸ ὄνομά σου Αβραμ, ἀλλ’ ἐσται τὸ ὄνομά σου Αβρααμ, ὅτι πατέρα πολλῶν ἐθελόν τέθεικά σε, “and your name will no longer be called Abram, but your name will be Abraham, for I have made you a father of many nations.” Just as with the name of Hagar and Sara in Cher. 3, Philo refers only briefly to the etymology of Abram here; he will further expand the etymology a few paragraphs later, see Cher. 7. For the same etymology, see also Leg. 3, 83, Gig. 62; Mut. 66; 69; Abr. 82; QG 3, 43.

Philo had anticipated πατὴρ μετέωρος, “father on high,” in Leg. 3, 83, linking the phase to the intellect (νοῦς) as an instrument to rise up high and away from all things mortal; see also Gig. 62. In Cher. 4, Philo only reflects on Abram as philosopher and observer of the cosmos and the heavenly bodies; his Chaldean background can be a justification for this thought, which is not reflected in the background text of Gen 17:5. Philo, in turn, does not mention the interpretation of the biblical verse “father of many nations,” which reappears in the interpretation of Rabbinic sources and later Greek and Latin Christian writers, such as Jerome: pater multarum gentium; see in Gen. 26 (together with pater excelsus); in Is. 14, 51; 17, 62 (with pater excelsus); in Mich. 2, 7; in Zach. 22, 10. For the etymologies, see Grabbe (1988) 126-128, s. v.; for Abraham as astrologer: Vermes (1973) 76-83.

ἀποτέτμηται – defines.
ἀποτέτμηται is a perfect with present meaning, which indicates an enduring result rather than a completed action; it may often be translated by the present. Smyth (1920) 434, no. 1946.

μαθηματική – mathematics.
The first meaning of the adjective μαθητικός is “fond of learning.” From there ή μαθηματική can mean “scientific” and “mathematical” with the noun ἐπιστήμη “knowledge” implied. In addition, LSJ lists ή μαθηματική τέχνη as “astrological skill,”

which brings the terminology into the astrological realm and suits the context of this passage. For the science of mathematics, see also Runia (2001) 296-7.

(§5) Σάρα δὲ σύμβολον ἁρχῆς ἐμῆς—καλεῖται γὰρ ἁρχὴ μου— γενικὴ μὲν οὐκ ἐφθη μεταβαλοῦσα ἁρετή γενέσθαι—γένος γὰρ πᾶν ἀφθαρτὸν—, ταῖς δὲ ἐν μέρει καὶ κατ’ εἰδος ἐξητάζετο, ὡς δὲ αὐτὴ φρόνησις τ’ ἐν ἐμοί καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ δικαιοσύνη τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, φθαρται δὲ αὐταί, ὅτι καὶ τὸ δεξάμενον αὐτὰς χωρίον ἐγὼ φθαρτός,

“Sara, in turn a symbol of my authority — for she is called ‘authority of me’ — had not yet changed to become generic virtue — for everything generic is imperishable. She was counted among individual and specific virtues; she was prudence in me and equally temperance, courage, and justice; they are perishable, since also the terrain that receives them, namely me, is perishable.”

Σάρα δὲ σύμβολον ἁρχῆς ἐμῆς—καλεῖται γὰρ ἁρχή μου — Sara a symbol of my authority — for she is called ‘authority of me’.

For the etymologies of Sara-Sarah in Cher. 3, 5, and 7, see above in Cher. 3.

γενικὴ ἁρετή—ταῖς (ἀρεταῖς) δὲ ἐν μέρει καὶ κατ’ εἰδος — generic virtue and specific virtues.

In a parallel passage, Philo explains the difference between generic and specific virtue in a similar way, and he also links it to the etymology of Sara and Sarah, see Mut. 77-78: ἔρμηνεύεται Σάρα μὲν ἁρχή μου, Σάρρα δὲ ἁρχουσα. τὸ μὲν οὖν πρότερον εἰδικῆς σύμβολον ἁρετῆς ἐστι, τὸ δ’ ὑστερον γενικῆς, δῶς δὲ γένος εἰδους διαφέρει κατὰ τὸ ἔλαττον, τοσοῦτο τὸ δεύτερον ὄνομα τοῦ προτέρου. “Sara means ‘authority of me’, but Sarah ‘she who rules with authority’. The former is a symbol of specific virtue, the latter of generic virtue. As much as genus is greater than species, so much is the second name greater than the former.”

In distinguishing between generic virtue and specific virtues Philo uses the concepts of genus and species in an ethical framework. He also adds another dimension to his ethical system, in which genus stands for the imperishable archetype and species for the perishable copy or copies. This whole framework is placed onto the biblical stories of the marriages of the patriarchs, not only of Sarah and Abraham, but also of Leah and Jacob, Rebecca and Isaac, or Sepphora and Moses, see Cher. 41-47.

Allegorically Philo views the conception and giving birth of the matriarchs as giving birth to the virtues, see Cher. 42. Somehow God is the cause of generic virtue, but it is as a gift through the human soul that the actual process takes place, or as Philo says in Cher. 44: τίς οὖν ὁ σπείρων ἐν αὐταῖς τὰ καλὰ πλὴν ὁ τῶν ὄντων πατήρ, ὁ ἀγένητος θεός καὶ τὰ σύμπαντα γεννῶν; σπείρει μὲν οὖν οὖσι, τὸ δὲ γέννημα τὸ ἴδιον, ὃ ἐσπειρε, δωρεῖται· γεννᾶ γὰρ ὁ θεὸς οὐδὲν αὐτῷ, χρείαν ἄτε ἐν οὐδένος, πάντα δὲ τῷ λαβεῖν δεσμένω. “Who then is the one who sows in them what is good, except for the father of the things that exist, the unbegotten God and begetter of all things? He sows, but the
product that he has sown, which is part of him, is offered as a gift. For God doesn’t bring
forth anything for himself since he is in want of nothing, but produces everything for the
one who asks to receive.” More succinctly he writes in Cher. 46: ὥστε τὴν ἀρετὴν
dέχεσθαι μὲν παρὰ τοῦ αἰτίου τὰ θεία σπέρματα, τίκτειν δὲ τινὶ τῶν ἑαυτῆς ἐραστῶν,
δὲ ἀν τῶν μνηστήρων ἀπάντων προκριθῆ. “Thus, virtue receives the divine seeds from
the (first) Cause but gives birth to some of its own lovers, who is preferred to all
suitors.” (see also below ad loc.). Jastram (1989).

φρόνησις καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ δικαιοσύνη – prudence, temperance,
courage, and justice.
Philo lists the four traditional virtues here; for the tradition, see Plato (Rep. 427e, and
passim) and the later Stoic diffusion (SVF I 199-204). For Philo, these four virtues form
the main group, to which he often refers, though not always in the same sequence. At
times, he only hints at two and leaves it to his audience to fill in the rest, as Agr. 104: αἱ
dὲ φρονήσεως καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν ὁδι, “the road of prudence and
temperance and of the other virtues, ...”; Sobr. 61: ...όπως καὶ ταῖς περὶ ψυχῆν ἄρεταῖς,
φρονήσει καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἐκάστη τῶν ἀνδρῶν, χρῆσαι δύναιτο, καὶ ταῖς σώματοις
“...so that he may be able to use not only the virtues of the soul, prudence, temperance,
and each of the others, but also those of the body...”

Philo does not always follow the traditional scheme; he may substitute
δικαιοσύνη “justice” or “righteousness” with εὐσέβεια “reverence” or “piety,” as in Det.
18; 24; Deus 164; at other times he replaces ἀνδρεία “courage” with εὐσέβεια, or adds
εὐσέβεια to φρόνησις and σωφροσύνη as a third virtue; Det. 114; 143. Philo also
extends the traditional four with εὐσέβεια and ὅσιότης “piety” or “holiness,” as in Mos.
2, 216; Spec. 4, 135; Praem. 160. At times he shows an altogether different selection, as
in Fug. 33: ..., ὡς δὴ κοσμιότητος καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ καρτερίας ἔρασται. “...as lovers
of propriety, temperance, and endurance.”

In Sacr. 27 Philo gives a vast and surprising array of specific virtues and, although
he does list them, claims that daylight will not be enough to recount all their names:
εὐσέβεια, ὅσιότης ἀλήθεια, θέμος ἀγιστεία εὐφορία δικαιοσύνη ἰσότης εὐσυνθεσία,
κοινωνία ἐκμοσοσύνη σωφροσύνης ἐγκράτεια προμήθεια ὀλιγοδεΐα εὐκολία ἀπραγμοσύνη ἀνδρεία
gενναιότης εὐβουλία προμήθεια φρόνησις προσοχῆ διορθώσις εὐθυμία χρηστότης ἡμερότης
ἴσοτης φιλανθρωπία μακαριότης ἠπιότης — “piety, holiness, truth, justice, ritual cult, faithfulness to oaths, righteousness,
equality, observance of treaties, fellowship, self-control, temperance, propriety, self-
restraint, meekness, contentment with little, good temper, modesty, freedom from
worldly cares, courage, nobility, good judgment, forethought, prudence, diligence, right
treatment, cheerfulness, kindness, gentleness, simplicity, humanity, magnanimity,
blessedness, goodness.” In contrast, the next paragraphs and particularly Sacr. 32
contain, as Colson remarks “the most formidable catalogue of bad qualities ever drawn
up.”

ἡ δὲ αὐτὴ φρόνησις τὴ ἐν ἐμοί καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ δικαιοσύνη – she
was prudence in me and equally temperance, courage, and justice.
For a similar exposition of the four virtues connected with the name of Sara, see Congr. 2: τὸ Σάρας ὄνομα μεταληφθέν ἐστιν „ἄρχη μου“· φρόνησις δὲ ἢ ἐν ἐμοὶ καὶ σωφροσύνη ἢ ἐν ἐμοὶ καὶ ἡ ἐπί μέρους δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἐκάστη τῶν ἄλλων ἄρετῶν, ἢν περὶ ἐμὲ μόνον εἶναι συμβέβηκεν, ἄρχη ἐστιν ἐμοὶ μόνου. “the name Sara translated means ‘authority of me’ – prudence in me and temperance, individual righteousness, and each of the other virtues that happened to belong only to me, exercises authority over me alone.”

§6 Ἀγάρ ἡ μέση καὶ ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία, κἂν τὸν αὐστηρὸν καὶ σκυθρωπὸν τῶν φιλαρέτων ἀποδρᾶναι βίον σπουδάσῃ, πάλιν ὑποστρέψει πρὸς τὸν αὐτὸν μήπω τὰς γενικὰς καὶ ἀφθάρτους ἀκρότητας ἔχειν δυνάμενον, ἀλλ’ ἐτι τῶν ἐν μέρει καὶ κατ’ εἶδος ἐφαπτόμενου, ἐν οἷς πρὸ τῶν ἄκρων τὰ μέσα αἱρετά·

“Hagar, the ‘intermediate’ and general cycle of studies, even though she was eager to escape from the austere and gloomy life of the lovers of virtue, was to return to the same life again, not yet able to hold onto the generic and imperishable heights but still clinging to individual and specific ranges, where the middle is preferred to the highest.”

Ἀγάρ – Hagar.
The connection of Hagar with the encyclia was already anticipated in Cher. 3, see above.

Ἀγάρ ἡ μέση καὶ ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία – Hagar, the ‘intermediate’ and general cycle of studies
Philo’s emphasis on paideia, whether the preparatory training of students in the general school system or the philosophical education in a later stage, shows the high opinion he has for education. In his view, general education is indispensable for the understanding of the law, and it also has a strong moral appeal.

Throughout his work Hagar, the female servant of Abraham and Sarah, represents for Philo the principle figure that symbolizes the general cycle of studies or preparatory training, while her mistress Sarah stands for the higher stage of philosophy in the progress toward wisdom. Sarah also symbolizes virtue, a role that she shares with other wives of biblical patriarchs. In the context here, the Hagar story is peripheral – Philo’s main theme is about flight and exile, and Hagar functions as an example. In his treatise, De Congressu in which he discusses the biblical background of Gen 16:1-6, Philo gives the Sarah and Hagar story a central role, elaborating it with a full array of allegorical twists and turns.

Scholars have pointed out that the comparison of the general cycle of studies with servants and philosophy with their mistress has reminiscences of the allegorical interpretations of Homeric myths by Stoic writers. In this way, the story of Sarah and Hagar finds a parallel in that of the suitors of Penelope, who unsuccessfully tried to reach the mistress and had to contend themselves with the handmaidens. The allegory must have been widespread, since it is attributed to a variety of authors. Diogenes Laertius (II 79) ascribed it to Aristippus: ὃ Αρίστιππος τοὺς τῶν ἐγκυκλίων
παιδευμάτων μετασχόντας, φιλοσοφίας δὲ ἀπολειφθέντας ὁμοίους ἔλεγεν εἶναι τοῖς τῆς Πηνελόπης μνηστήριοι καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνους Μελανθὼ καὶ Πολυδώραν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας θεραπαίνας ἔχειν, πάντα δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ αὐτὴν τὴν δέσποινα δύνασθαι γῆμαι.

“(Aristippos) said that those who participated in the general cycle of studies but left off at philosophy were like the suitors of Penelope; for they had Melantho, Polydora, and the other handmaidens, and everything except for the ability of marrying the mistress herself.”

Stobaeus identified Ariston of Chios as the origin (SVF I 350): Ἐκ τῶν Ἀρίστων Ὁμοιωμάτων. Ἀρίστων οὖσαν τὸ περὶ τὰ ἐγκύκλια μαθήματα πονουμένους, ἀμελοῦσα δὲ φιλοσοφίας, ἔλεγεν ὁμοίους εἶναι τοῖς μνηστήριοι τῆς Πηνελόπης, οἳ ἀποτυγχάνοντες ἐκείνους περὶ τὰς θεραπαίνας ἐγίνοντο. “From the Similarities of Ariston: Ariston of Chios said that those who toil in the general cycle of studies but are neglectful of philosophy are like the suitors of Penelope, who being unsuccessful with her became involved with the handmaidens.” Ps-Plutarch, De liberis educandis ascribed it to Bion: De liberis educandis 10.7 C–D: Ἄστειως δὲ καὶ Βίων ἔλεγεν ὁ φιλόσοφος ὅτι ὥσπερ οἱ μνηστῆρες τῇ Πηνελόπῃ πλησιάζειν μὴ δυνάμενοι ταῖς ταύτης ἐμίγνυντο θεραπαίναις, οὕτω καὶ οἱ φιλοσοφίας μὴ δυνάμενοι κατατυχεῖν ἐν τοῖς άλλοις παιδεύμασι τοῖς οὐδενὸς ἀξίοις ἑαυτοὺς κατασκελεύουσι. “The philosopher Dion said wittily that just as the suitors who were unable to associate themselves with Penelope, mingled with the handmaidens, thus also those who were unable to reach philosophy wasted themselves with other subjects of study not worth anything.” Later sources even mentioned Aristotle and Gorgias as the origins of the simile. Colson, PLCL I xvi; F. H. Colson, Philo on Education, JThS 18 (1916-17) 154. Alexandre (1967) 61-3. Mendelson (1982). Borgen (2001) 61-71. Pearce (2007) 170-7. Sterling (2017) 141-166. Zurawski (2017) 283-308.

αὐστηρὸν καὶ σκυθρωπὸν τῶν φιλαρέτων ἀποδρᾶναι βίον φιλαρέτων – the austere and gloomy life of the lovers of virtue.

The description of the life of lovers of virtue as ‘austere’ and ‘gloomy’ does not reflect Philo’s own opinion but is used ironically, presumably to show the views of his opponents. In Plant. 167, Philo employs the same terminology but states the opposite: πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοι κάκεινο λεκτέων, ὃτι οὐ σκυθρωπὸν καὶ αὐστηρὸν τὸ τῆς σοφίας εἶδος, ύπο συννοίας καὶ κατηφείας ἐσταλμένον, ἀλλ’ ἐμπαλιν ἱλαρόν καὶ γαληνίζον, μεστόν γηθοσύνης καὶ χαρᾶς· “In addition this should also be said that the nature of wisdom is not gloomy and austere, repressed by austerity and dejection, but rather cheerful and calm, full of joy and gladness.” φιλάρετος “lover of virtue” or “fond of virtue” is a term also used by Aristotle in his Ethica Nicomachea, arguing that a life of virtue is pleasant by nature and that things pleasant by nature are pleasant for those whose actions are conform their nature (EN 1099a11): τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὰ δίκαια τῷ φιλοδικιαίῳ καὶ ὅλως τὰ κατ’ ἁρετὴν τῷ φιλαρέτῳ. “In the same way are both acts of justice for the lover of justice and in short acts of virtue for the lover of virtue.” Philo uses this epithet frequently both for God (sometimes together with φιλόκαλος and φιλάνθρωπος) and for exemplary humans or the human soul.
τὰς γενικὰς καὶ ἀφθάρτους ἀκρότητας – the generic and imperishable heights.
For γενικὴ ἀρετή, see above Cher. 5.

Εἰτ τῶν ἐν μέρει καὶ κατ’ εἴδος ἐφαπτόμενον – still clinging to individual and specific ranges or virtues.
The opposite of generic is specific: ἐν μέρει καὶ κατ’ εἴδος. Philo used the same terminology in Cher. 5 above. In the following paragraph, he speaks about εἰδικὴ ἀρετή, see also Mut. 77-78.

tὰ μέσα – the middle.
For μέσος, see above Cher. 3.

(§7) ὅταν δὲ ἦδη ὁ μὲν Ἀβρὰμ ἀντὶ φυσιολόγου γένηται σοφὸς καὶ φιλόθεος μετονομασθεὶς Ἀβραὰμ, ὃς ἐρμηνεύεται πατήρ ἐκλεκτός ἥχους—ήχεϊ μὲν γάρ ὁ γεγονός λόγος, πατήρ δὲ τοῦτο ὁ νοῦς ἐπελημμένος τοῦ σπουδαίου—, Σάρα δὲ ἀντί τῆς ἀρχῆς μου γένηται Σάρρα, ἣς ἔστιν ἡ κλῆσις ἀρχουσα, ὅπερ ἦν ἴσον τῷ ἀντί εἰδικῆς καὶ φθαρτῆς ἀρετῆς γενικήν καὶ ἀφθαρτον γενέσθαι,

“When Abram, instead of studying natural phenomena, becomes wise and God-loving, his name is changed to Abraham, which means ‘chosen father of sound’ – for the word when pronounced makes a sound, and its father is the intellect that seized the one who takes virtue seriously; when Sara instead of ‘authority of me’ becomes Sarah, her name equals ‘she who rules with authority’; this meant that instead of a specific and perishable virtue she became generic and imperishable;”

Ἁβράμ, Ἀβραάμ – Abram, Abraham.
For the background of the name change from Abram to Abraham, see Cher. 4 above, in which the origin of Abram’s name was explained as πατήρ μετέωρος, “father on high.” In Cher. 7 Philo defines the etymology of the name Abraham as πατήρ ἐκλεκτός ἥχους, “chosen father of sound”; see also Gig. 62-64; Mut. 66-76; Abr. 81-84. In a concise way, Philo explains that ‘sound’ indicates a spoken word or thought and that the one pronouncing it or ‘father’ stands for the intellect of a virtuous person. In other passages in which Philo includes this etymology, he provides interpretations along the same lines though his words may differ.

In Gig. 64 Philo explains the etymology of ‘chosen father of sound’ as ὁ τοῦ σπουδαίου λογισμός, “the reasoning of the virtuous person.” In Mut. 70 Philo depicts Abram as a “star-gazer” (μετεωρολέσχης) who as Abraham turns into a “wisdom lover” and a “sage” (φιλόσοφος and σοφός). The most comprehensive interpretation occurs in Abr. 82-83: Ἀβραὰμ μὲν γάρ ἐρμηνευθέν ἐστι „πατήρ μετέωρος“, Αβραάμ δὲ „πατήρ ἐκλεκτός ἥχους”, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐμφαίνον τὸν ἀστρολογικὸν καὶ μετεωρολογικὸν ἑπικαλούμενον, οὕτως τῶν Ἰαλδαϊκῶν δογμάτων ἐπιμελούμενον, ως ἃν τις πατήρ ἐγγόνων ἐπιμεληθεῖη, τὸ δ’ ὑστερον τὸν σοφόν. διά μὲν γάρ τῆς ἥχους τὸν προφορικὸν
λόγον αἰνίττεται, διὰ τοῦ πατρός δὲ τὸν ἡγεμόνα νοῦν — πατὴρ γὰρ ὁ ἐνδιάθετος φύσει τοῦ γεγονοῦ πρεσβύτερός γε ὃν καὶ τὰ λεκτέα ὑποσπείρων — διὰ δὲ τοῦ ἐπιλέκτου τὸν ἀστεῖον· εἰκαῖος μὲν γὰρ καὶ πεφυρμένος ὁ φαῦλος τρόπος, ἐκλεκτὸς δὲ ὁ ἀγαθός, ἐπικριθεὶς ἐξ ἀπάντων ἀριστινήν. “For Abram means ‘father on high’, but Abraham ‘chosen father of sound’; the former indicates a so-called astronomer and meteorologist, who takes care of Chaldean beliefs, as a father would take care of children; the latter indicates the sage. Through ‘sound’ he hints at the thought put forward, through ‘father’ he hints at the ruling intellect – for the immanent thought is by nature father of the thought put forward, being older and secretly sowing the words – through ‘elect’ he hints at the noble person; for the wicked way of life is useless and mixed up, but the good one is ‘elect’, selected from all according to merit.”

In the last passage, we see the etymologies function on different allegorical levels. The word ‘father’ is part of both etymologies. As in the name change from Sara to Sarah, there is an upgrade from a lower to a higher moral ranking – from astronomer to sage. The word for ‘sound’ or ‘ringing sound’ (ἡ ἠχώ) evokes a different notion, namely that of the ‘uttered thought’ or the ‘thought put forward’, logos prophorikos; in the next line this is followed by the ‘immanent or inward thought’, logos endiathetos. These two aspects of the logos, the inward and outward part, reflect a discussion in antiquity on thought and speech, and whether these two aspects could be applied to animals. The discussion also touches on the function of speech in general and whether ‘speech’ reflects ‘thought’ accurately. In the Stoic tradition, names were perceived as natural (φύσει), but Platonists saw them more as conventional (θέσει). For Philo, a strong correlation exists between names and the things or realities that they represent, but the correctness of a given name also depends on the wisdom of the name giver. Adam Kamesar calls attention to the two brothers, Moses and Aaron, who are important symbolic representatives for Philo of the two logoi. Kamesar (2004) 163–181.

For the Logos as an active element of God’s creative thought, see below at Cher. 27ff.

Σάρα δὲ ἀντὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς μου γένηται Σάρρα, ἣς ἐστιν ἡ κλῆσις ἄρχουσα – when Sara instead of ‘authority of me’ became Sarah, her name equals ‘she who rules with authority’.

For the name change from Sara to Sarah, see above, Cher. 3 and 5.

§8 ἐπιλάμψη δὲ καὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονίας γένος, ὁ Ἰσαάκ, ἐκλιπότων τὰ γυναικεῖα καὶ ἀποθανόντων τὰ πάθη χαρᾶς καὶ εὐφροσύνης, καὶ παιδιάς, οὐ τὰς παίδων, ἀλλὰ τὰς θείας οὐκ ἄνευ σπουδῆς μεταδιώκων, ἐκβληθήσεται μὲν τὰ ἐπώνυμα τῆς “Ἀγαρ προπαιδεύματα, ἐκβληθήσεται δὲ καὶ ὁ σοφιστής αὐτῶν υἱὸς ἐπίκλησιν Ἰσμαήλ.

“when Isaac in turn shines forth his light, Isaac, who represents the generic form of happiness, of joy and good cheer of those who left behind the ways of women and died to the passions, he seriously engages in games, not those of children but those that are
divine; then the preparatory studies named after Hagar will be cast out, and their son the sophist named Ismael will be cast out as well.”

ἐπιλάμψη – (when Isaac) shines forth (his light).

Already in Leg. 1.82 Philo had referred to Isaac as laughter, an etymology that he repeats in full-fledged form in Leg. 3.87: εἰκότως τὸν Ἰσαὰκ πρὶν γεννηθῆναι ὀνόματός τε καὶ δωρεᾶς μεγάλης ἠξίωσε· γέλως γὰρ ψυχῆς καὶ χαρὰ καὶ εὐφροσύνη διερμηνεύεται οὗτος. “Naturally he (God) deemed Isaac, even before being born, worthy of a name and a great gift; for this name means ‘laughter’ of the soul and ‘joy’ and ‘gladness’.” For this and other versions of the etymology of Isaac, see Leg. 3.219; Det. 124; Plant. 169; Mut. 131; 157; Abr. 201; Praem. 31. The last two passages state the etymology most clearly in linguistic terms: see Abr. 201: καλεῖται Χαλδαϊστὶ μὲν Ἰσαὰκ, Ἑλληνιστὶ δὲ μεταληφθέντος τοῦ ὀνόματος ”γέλως”· “He is called ‘Isaac’ in the Chaldaean language (Akkadian/Babylonian ?), but when rendered in Greek the name means ‘laughter’.” In some instances, the etymology of Isaac is paired with that of Rebecca as ὑπομονή, “patient endurance,” see Det. 30; Plant. 169-70. Buth and Pierce (2014) 85. Grabbe (1988) 171-2, no. 82.

τὰ γυναικεῖα – the ways of women.

This is a reference to Gen 18:11: Αβρααμ δὲ καὶ Σαρρα πρεσβύτεροι προβεβηκότες ἡμερῶν, ἐξέλιπεν δὲ Σαρρα γίνεσθαι τὰ γυναικεῖα. “Abraham and Sarah were old and advanced in days, and the way of women ceased to be with Sarah.” Philo refers to this biblical verse in various ways, either according to the LXX rendition, as in Leg. 3.218, or in the form of a loose reference, as in Cher. 8; for other examples, see Cher. 50; Det. 28; Post. 134; Ebr. 60; Fug. 128; 167; Somn. 2.185.

παιδιάς, οὐ τὰς παιδών, ἀλλὰ τὰς θείας οὐκ ἄνευ σπουδῆς μεταδιώκων – engaging in games, not those of children but those that are divine.

The word παιδιά stands for “childish play,” “pastime,” or “amusement,” and is the very opposite of σπουδή: “zeal,” “seriousness,” or diligence; for the same contrast, see Plant. 167; Mos. 1.190; Spec. 1.314. In Cher. 8 Philo neutralizes the contrast between playfulness and seriousness by adding the notion of “divine” play. In a similar way, Plato (Leges 656c) had shown the difference between παιδεία ("instruction") and παιδιά ("play"), two contrasting elements that sound the same except for the accent.

The word παιδιά does not occur in the LXX, but its cognate παιζω does, as in Gen 26:8, a text that Philo may have had in mind in this passage: ἐγένετο δὲ πολυχρόνιος ἔκει· παρακύψας δὲ Αβιμελεχ ὁ βασιλεὺς Γεραρων διὰ τῆς θυρίδος εἶδεν
τὸν Ἰσαὰκ παῖζοντα μετὰ Ῥεβεκκας τῆς γυναικὸς αὐτοῦ. “and he (Isaac) remained there (in Gerar) a long time, and Abimelech the king of Gerarah leaned to look through the window, and saw Isaac playing with Rebecca his wife.” Isaac had pretended that Rebecca was his sister – for fear of being killed because of her beauty; in this context, Isaac’s playing with Rebecca meant “playing amorously.” The notions of play and laughter in a serious context are also highlighted in Plant. 168-169, in which passage Philo refers explicitly to Gen 26:8.

τὰ ἐπώνυμα τῆς Ἀγαρ προπαιδεύματα – the preparatory studies named after Hagar.
See above in Cher. 3 and 6.

ἐκβληθήσεται (2x) – will be cast out
In Gen 21:10 the verb ἐκβάλλω is used in Sarah’s request to Abraham to cast out Hagar and her son. With this verb, Philo returns to the main theme of the beginning of Cher. 1-2, in which he reflects on the difference between ἐκβάλλω and (ἐξ)αποστέλλω.

ὁ σοφιστὴς αὐτῶν υἱὸς Ἰσμαήλ – their son, the sophist by the name of Ismael.
Philo has little admiration for the sophists of his time. In the next paragraph he will define sophistry further as “finding persuasive arguments to establish a false opinion, which damages the soul.” Other passages equally convey Philo’s contempt for sophists and sophistry. In Det. 34 he writes: οἱ δ’ αὐτῶν ἐπιμελούμενοι ἔνδοξοι, πλούσιοι, ἡγεμόνες, ἐπανούμενοι, τιμῶμεν, [πάλιν] ὑγιεῖνοι, πίονες, ἐρρωμένοι, θρυπτόμενοι, πόνον οὐκ εἰδότες, ἡδοναῖς συζῶντες διὰ πασῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐπὶ τὴν πανδεχῆ ψυχὴν τὰ ἡδέα φερούσαις. “but those (sophists) who take care of themselves are held in high esteem, rich, leaders, praised, honored, healthy, fat, powerful, living luxuriously and enfeebled, unaware of toil, living with enjoyments that through all the senses carry the pleasures to the soul that receives them all.”

In Agr. 143-4, Philo compares sophists with pigs and cites Leviticus to make his point: μυρίοι οὖν τῶν λεγομένων σοφιστῶν θαυμασθέντες κατὰ πόλεις καὶ τὴν ὁμοιόμονην σχεδὸν ἀπασαν ἐπὶ τὴν ἐπιστρέψαντες ἔνεκα ἀκριβολογίας καὶ τῆς περιτοίχιας ἐκείνης ἐνθαρρυντικά καὶ τῆς ἰδιώτης ἑρρωμένης. Καὶ διό καὶ ἐγκαταδύναται καὶ ἐγκατεστάθηκε ἀνθρώπων...  Countless so-called sophists, who gained admiration from city to city and won over virtually the whole inhabited world to honor them because of their hair-splitting arguments and clever inventiveness, grew old in their passions up to full strength and consumed their life, not differing in any way from the neglected nobodies and most worthless people. Therefore, the lawgiver rightly compares the sophists who live in this way with the pig family...,” see also Agr. 136. In Migr. 72, Philo has a slightly more positive appreciation for the rhetorical talents of sophists.

In Cher. 8 the term ‘sophist’ for Ismael is intended as an insult, which Philo employs a few more times, see Sobr. 9; Mut. 204. Ismael is not unique in this respect, for elsewhere Philo attaches the epithet to others, such as Balaam; in Det. 70-1 Philo
writes: ὥστε καὶ τὸ „τί ἐποίησας“ ἵνα εἴην τῷ „οὐδὲν ἐποίησας“, οὐδὲ ἦννυσας, οὕτω γάρ ὁ σοφιστής Βαλαάμ, μάταιος ὄν ὄχλος ἐναντίων καὶ μαχομένων δοξῶν, ... “so that “what have you done” equals “you have done nothing, accomplished nothing.” Nor did the sophist Balaam, being an empty mass of incompatible and contradictory beliefs, ...” In the next paragraph, Philo mentions the term again and sets up a contrast between sophistry and wisdom.

For further commentary on Agr. 143-4, see Geljon and Runia (2013) 70-1. In general, see White (2015) 89.


(§9) ἐνδύσονται δὲ τὴν φυγὴν ἀίδιον, βεβαιοῦντος τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν ἔλασιν αὐτοῖς, ὅταν κελεύῃ τῷ σοφῷ ὑπακούειν τῶν λεγομένων ὑπὸ Σάρρας· λέγει δὲ ἄντικρυς „ἐκβαλεῖν τὴν παιδίσκην καὶ τὸν υἱόν.“ ἀρετῇ δὲ πείθεσθαι καλὸν καὶ μάλιστα τοιοῦτον εἰσηγουμένη δόγμα, ὅτι αἱ τελειόταται φύσει τῶν μέσων πάμπολυ διεστᾶσι καὶ ὅτι σοφία σοφιστείας ἀλλότριον· ἢ μὲν γὰρ τὰ πιθανὰ ἐπὶ κατασκευῇ ψευδοῦς δοξῆς, ἢτις λυμαίνεται ψυχήν, ἐκπεπόνηκε, σοφία δὲ διὰ διά μελέτης τῶν ἀληθῶν τὸ μέγα διανοίας ὀφελοῦς, ἐπιστήμην ὀρθοῦ λόγου, πεπόρισται.

“They will enter into eternal exile, for God confirms their expulsion when he urges the wise man to give heed to the words of Sarah, who says explicitly “to cast out the slave girl and her son” (Gen 21:10). Obeying virtue is a noble thing, especially when it leads to such a belief that the most perfect natures stand far apart from the intermediate conditions and that wisdom is alien to sophistry; for the latter works hard at finding persuasive arguments to establish a false opinion, which damages the soul, but wisdom through practice of the truth provides the great profit for the mind, knowledge of right reason.”

ἐνδύσονται δὲ τὴν φυγὴν ἀίδιον – they will enter into eternal exile.

After his excursion into the etymologies and symbolic meanings of the names of Hagar, Sarah, Abraham, Isaak, and Ismael, Philo returns to his point of departure, which was the distinction between temporary “sending out” and everlasting “casting out,” (see Cher. 1-2).

τῷ σοφῷ – the wise man.

In Cher. 7 Philo introduced and explained the epithet σοφός for Abraham, which he repeats in Cher. 31. Throughout Philo’s work Abraham represents the wise man par excellence, and ὁ σοφός Ἀβραάμ is his characteristic description, see Leg. 3.244; Sacr. 122; Post. 27; Plant. 73; Ebr. 24; Sobr. 17; 55; 65; Conf. 26; migr. 122; Congr. 92; 109; Mut. 270; Somn. 1.214; 2.89; QG 3, fr. 24.

ἐκβαλεῖν τὴν παιδίσκην καὶ τὸν υἱόν – to cast out the slave girl and her son.

Concluding his argument about the patriarchs and returning to his main theme, Philo gives an abbreviated reference to Gen 21:10: καὶ εἶπεν τῷ Αβραάμ ἐκβαλε τὴν
παιδίσκην ταύτην καὶ τὸν υἱὸν αὐτῆς..., “and she (Sarah) said to Abraham, throw out this slave girl and her son, ...”

ἀρετῇ δὲ πείθεσθαι καλὸν καὶ μάλιστα τοιοῦτον εἰσηγουμένη δόγμα – trusting in virtue is good, especially when it leads to such a teaching (etc.).

In a subtle way, Philo hints again at the allegories of Hagar and Sarah: not only does Sarah represent virtue, she also stands for philosophy and wisdom; the connotations of both virtue and wisdom (through teaching) are invoked here.

ότι αἱ τελειόταται φύσεις τῶν μέσων ἔξεων πάμπολυ διεστᾶσι καὶ ὅτι σοφία σοφιστείας ἀλλότριον – that the most perfect natures stand far apart from the intermediate conditions and that wisdom is alien to sophistry.

Philo introduced this sentence with the statement that it is good and noble to listen to virtue, especially, when virtue teaches about the human condition, in this case the deep divide between the most perfect natures (φύσεις) and the intermediate states (ἔξεις).

Making an “encore” and in reversed order (stylistically a chiasmus), he adds the contrast between wisdom and sophistry.

The concepts of φύσις and ἔξις are philosophical categories, but used by Philo here in a rather loose way. In the physical theory of the Stoics, the sustaining cause of all bodies is πνεῦμα, which enters bodies in different gradations and to a different degree: in inanimate objects πνεῦμα is called ἔξις (holding together or coherence); in plants, it is called φύσις (growth or nature), in animals it is ψυχή (soul, life, or vital principle), and in rational animals it is νοῦς (intellect or intellectual perception); the guiding or commanding faculty of the latter is also called ἡγεμονικόν.

There are two passages in the Philonic corpus that show Philo’s knowledge of Stoic physical theory particularly clearly. They have been incorporated by von Arnim as part of Stoic thought that the universe has pneuma, tonos, and hexis (SVF 2.457-460; 2.458=Philo).

In Leg. 2.22, commenting on Gen 2:21 (the creation of Eve from Adam’s side), Philo allegorizes “side” or “rib” (πλευρά) as pure intellect ( νοῦς): κἀκεῖνο λεκτέον, ὅτι ὁ γυμνὸς καὶ ἁνένδετος σώματι νοῦς…πολλὰς ἔχει δυνάμεις, ἡκτικὴ φυτικὴ ψυχικὴ λογικὴ διανοητικὴ, ἃλλας μυρίας κατὰ τε εἴδη καὶ γένη. ἢ μὲν ἔξις κοινή καὶ τῶν ἄψυχων ἔστι λίθων καὶ ἕξις, ἢς μετέχει καὶ τὰ ἐν ἠμῖν ἔοικότα ὅστε. ἢ ἐξις διασεῖν καὶ ἐπὶ τα ὅμικα· καὶ ἐν ἠμῖν δὲ ἐστιν ἕοικότα φυτικής, ὅνυχές τε καὶ τρίχες· ἐστὶ δὲ ἡ φύσις ἔξις ἢδη κινουμένη. “We should say this, that the intellect unclothed and unbound to the body ... has many powers; of holding together, of growing, of principle of life, of rational life, and countless other powers, in terms of genus and species. The power of coherence (ἡ ἔξις) is also common to lifeless things, such as stones and wood, of which our bones, which resemble stones, are also part. Growth (φύσις) extends to plants, and there are things in us, such as nails and hair, that resemble plants. Growth (φύσις) is a moving coherence (ἔξις κινουμένη).” Philo continues to say that human nature shares with irrational creatures the power of receiving impressions and impulses, but that the power of thinking (ἡ διανοητική
δύναμις) is peculiar to the intellect and perhaps kindred to more divine natures (ἡ λογικὴ κοινὴ μὲν τάχα καὶ τῶν θειοτέρων φύσεων).

In Deus 35-51, Philo repeats the Stoic theory of the four categories: τῶν γάρ σωμάτων τὰ μὲν ἐνεδήσατο ἕξει, τὰ δὲ φύσει, τὰ δὲ ψυχῇ, τὰ δὲ λογικῇ ψυχῇ. “Some of the bodies are bound together by coherence (ἐξείς), others by growth (φύσεις), others by soul (ψυχῇ), other by rational soul (λογικῇ ψυχῇ).” In a discussion that resembles Leg. 2.22-24, Philo goes on to describe the four physical categories in ascending order culminating in the rational mind. In Deus 45 he writes: ἰδώμεν δὲ τίνι τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ὑπερβέβληκεν ἄνθρωπος. ἐξαίρετο οὗτος τοίνυν γέρας ἔλαχε διάνοιαν, ἣ τὰς ἁπάντων φύσεως σωμάτων τε ὁμοῦ καὶ πραγμάτων εἰώθε καταλαμβάνειν. καθάπερ γάρ ἐν μὲν τῷ σώματι τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ὄψις ἐστίν, ἐν δὲ τῷ παντὶ τὸ φωτὸς φύσις, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ κρατιστεῦον ὁ νοῦς· “Let us now see where man has surpassed other animals. He has received an extraordinary privilege, the human mind (διάνοια), which is accustomed to understanding both the natures of all bodies and things in general. Just as sight is the leading part of the body, and the nature of light is the leading part in the universe, so the intellect (ὁ νοῦς) is the most powerful part in us.”

Anthony Long has highlighted the divergencies between Philo and Stoicism in the use of these categories, arguing that Philo (and others for that matter) used the Stoic terms and ideas as a common philosophical or even cultural language, a lingua franca, but without the principles of a school system. Moreover, Philo’s main philosophical background was in Platonism. In fact, Plato had speculated about the discovery of the “natures” and “conditions” of the souls (τὸ γνῶναι τὰς φύσεις τε καὶ ἕξεις τῶν ψυχῶν) in his art of politics (Leg. 650b), and Aristotle had written about “natures” and “conditions” in an ethical context (EN 1152b); he also used the term “intermediate conditions” (αἱ μέσαι ἕξεις) as a middle way between two extremes (EN 1108b). Thus, it seems that some of Philo’s terminology in Cher. 9, such as the “most perfect natures” (αἱ τελειόταται φύσεις) and “the intermediate conditions” (αἱ μέσαι ἕξεις) may, as John Dillon expressed it, just be learned allusions of a philosophical “magpie” or, as he put it more tactfully, “eclectic synthesis.” The synthesis, however, is his own. See Dillon (1977) 182. Long (2008) 140. Further Long (1995). Long, Philo on Stoic Physics, in Alesse (2008) 121-40, esp. 134-40. Drozdek (2016) 232-8.

σοφία δὲ διὰ μελέτης τῶν ἀληθῶν τὸ μέγα διανοιάς ὁφελός, ἐπιστήμην ὀρθοῦ λόγου – wisdom through practice of the truth has provided the great profit for the mind, knowledge of right reason.

Philo’s conclusion here is Platonic with Stoic overtones: wisdom can be reached through knowledge and reason. This sounds like an abbreviated form of the Platonic theme that through knowledge and reasoning access can be gained to the truth of the intelligible realm. Various words for knowledge are used here: διανοια for mind – as the faculty of thinking, comprehending, and reasoning; ἐπιστήμη for scientific knowledge or knowledge in an organized form; ὀρθὸς λόγος for right reason – the Stoic concept derived from Aristotle that knowledge is developed through training of the intellect according to the natural order of the universe and results in the achievement of the
right action. For Philo “right reason” has different implications, since for him it also functions as the “right Logos,” an aspect or a hypostasis of God. In Post. 32, Philo speaks of ὁρθὸς καὶ θεῖος λόγος, “the right and divine Logos.” In Post. 91, he gives a further interpretation: μήποτ’ οὖν πατέρα μὲν τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῶν τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον καλεῖ, πρεσβυτέρους δὲ τοὺς ἔταρχους αὐτοῦ καὶ φίλους. “Perhaps he calls the right Logos ‘father of the soul’ and (he calls) its associates and friends ‘elders’.‘ When in Opif. 143 Philo refers to τῆς φύσεως ὁρθὸς λόγος, “the right reason of nature,” he may be closer to the Stoic concept, though it remains to be seen what he exactly means by “nature.” See also the comments of Runia (2001) 341, ad loc. 

§ 10  
τί οὖν θαυμάζομεν, εἰ καὶ Ἀδὰμ τὸν νοῦν ἀφροσύνην ἀνίατον νόσον κτῆσαμεν ἐκβέβληκεν εἰσάπαν ὁ θεὸς ἐκ τοῦ τῶν ἀρετῶν χωρίου μὴ ἐπιτρέψας ἔτι κατελθεῖν αὐτῷ; ὁπότε καὶ παῖδα σοφιστὴν καὶ μητέρα αὐτοῦ, τὴν τῶν προπαιδευμάτων διδασκαλίαν, ἐλαύνει καὶ φυγαδεύει ἀπὸ σοφίας καὶ σοφοῦ, οὐν ὀνόματα Ἀβραάμ τε καὶ Σάρραν καλεῖ. “Why are we then surprised if God cast out forever from the space of the virtues Adam, the intellect that contracted the incurable disease of folly without allowing him to ever return? Since he also drives out and banishes the child sophist and his mother, the teaching of preparatory learning, from wisdom and the wise man, on whom he bestows the names of Abraham and Sarah.”

Note on the text, which reads: ὁπότε καὶ πάντα σοφιστὴν καὶ μητέρα αὐτοῦ … ἐλαύνει καὶ φυγαδεύει: “since he drives out and banishes every sophist and his mother.” Cohn makes the conjecture: ὁπότε καὶ <κατὰ>πάντα: “ganz und gar,” “in every respect.” Mangey reads παῖδα instead of πάντα: ὁπότε καὶ παῖδα σοφιστήν, “the child sophist.” The text πάντα σοφιστήν καὶ μητέρα αὐτοῦ “every sophist and his mother” is problematic and makes little sense. Cohn’s conjecture is also problematic, since it adds an extra word to the sentence. For this reason Mangey’s suggestion is attractive since it leaves an equal number of letters in place. In addition, we can compare the passage in Cher. 10 with Sobr. 8-9, in which Philo gives a clear reason why Ismael should be called a child – the word there is παιδίον, a “little kid,” the diminutive of παῖς. Sobr. 8: τὸν γοῦν Ἰσαὰκ ἤδη κατ’ ἐπιτροπὴν ζωῆς κατὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν ἐν ἀρεταῖς τέλειον Ἰσαὰκ σύγκρισιν ὀνομάζει παιδίον· “He (Moses) calls Ismael who already lived some twenty years a “little kid,” in comparison with Isaac who was full-grown in virtues.” The word τὸ παιδίον is a keyword in this whole passage, which Philo repeats multiple times. He continues to say in Sobr. 9: ἀλλ’ ὁ ὀρθὸς παιδίον νεανίας ὦν ἤδη καλεῖται ὁ σοφιστής ἀντεξεταμένος σοφῷ· σοφίαν μὲν γὰρ Ἰσαὰκ, σοφιστείαν δὲ Ἰσαμήλ κεκλήρωτα… “But nevertheless he is still called a “little kid” in spite of being a young man, the sophist who is being measured against the sage; for Isaac inherited wisdom and Ismael sophistry, …"
Ἀδὰμ τὸν νοῦν ἀφροσύνην ἀνίατον νόσον κτησάμενον – Adam, the intellect that contracted the incurable disease of folly.

At the end of a long detour about the differences between “sending out” and “casting out” and allegorizations of the Sarah and Hagar motif, Philo returns to Adam, with whom he had started his treatise in Cher. 1. It was, in fact, Adam who was cast out from Eden in Gen 3:24, and it is surprising that Philo did not include Adam at all in his elaborations on this theme but replaced him with other exiles. The name of Adam only reappears in Cher. 40, when Philo introduces the next biblical text (Gen 4:1-2), followed by another biblical quotation (Gen 4:25) with Adam’s name in Cher. 54. The last appearance in Cher. 57ff. is the most significant, because it describes Adam symbolically as intellect (νοῦς) in relation to Eve as sense perception (αἴσθησις).

As David Runia so eloquently has shown, the story of Adam and Eve and their sons can be viewed as the development of the human soul and its moral struggles. The intellect (νοῦς) in and of itself is neutral, neither good nor bad. Philo explained this in his earlier work in Leg. 2.53: γυμνός ἐστιν ὁ νοῦς ὁ μήτε κακίᾳ μήτε ἀρετῇ ἀμπεχόμενος, “the intellect, which is clothed neither in vice nor in virtue, is naked,”... In a later passage, elaborating on the meanings of being naked, he wrote in Leg. 2.64: τρίτη γύμνωσίς ἐστιν ἡ μέση, καθ’ ἣν ὁ νοῦς ἄλογός ἐστι μήτε ἀρετῆς πω μήτε κακίας μετέχων. “A third form of nakedness is the middle (or neutral) one, according to which the intellect is irrational, having no part yet in either virtue or evil;” see also Leg. 3.246, and Opif. 149. Runia (1986) 264; 267; 330; 523.

When sense perception (αἴσθησις) comes on the scene, the moral struggle begins, and the intellect (νοῦς) now has the choice either to follow the path toward virtue or to veer off course into other directions. In Cher. 60 Philo explains how ‘woman’ or ‘sense perception’ is introduced: βουληθεὶς οὖν ὁ θεὸς μὴ μόνον τῶν ἀσωμάτων ἀλλὰ καὶ στερεῶν σωμάτων κατάληψιν αὐτῷ παρασχεῖν, ἐξεπλήρου τὴν ὅλην ψυχὴν τὸ ἕτερον τῷ προειργασμένῳ τμῆμα συνυφαίνω, ὃ κέκληκε προσηγορικῶς μὲν γυναῖκα ὀνομαστικῶς δὲ Εὔα ἵνα ἀνευρίσκεται ἀἴσθησιν. “Now wishing to provide the mind with not only comprehension of incorporeal substances but also of solid bodies, God filled out the whole soul, weaving together the part made previously with the other fragment, which he called by the general name ‘woman’ and by the special name ‘Eve’, indicating metaphorically ‘sense perception’.” The name Adam does not appear in the remainder of the treatise, but it hovers in the background whenever the intellect (νοῦς) is mentioned.

For the full story of Adam and Eve and their symbolic roles we should look at Legum Allegoriae. In these treatises, Philo followed their ramifications in lockstep with the Genesis story, which takes place in the garden of Eden. We hear that the nakedness of Adam and Eve meant that that they were neither good nor bad. The disobedience of the divine command and the seduction by the serpent change this neutrality, and passions and desires come into play. No longer does Philo speak of the nakedness of the body but instead of the nakedness of the soul, explaining in Leg. 3.55: ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τούτου βούλεται σε διδάξαι, ὅτι γυμνότητα οὐ τήν τοῦ σώματος παραλαμβάνει, ἀλλὰ καθ’ ἴναι δοσίς ἀμοιροί καὶ γυμνός ἀρετῆς ἀνευρίσκεται. “but also by this he wants to teach you, that he understands ‘nakedness’ not of the body but that in which the
intellect is found bereft and stripped of virtue.” He also emphasizes the adverse relationship between the intellect (νοῦς) and the senses (αἰσθήσεις). In Leg. 3.185 he writes: ... ὃς ἐκ τοῦ Ἀδὰμ πεπλάσθαι φησὶ τὴν γυναῖκα, τὴν αἰσθήσιαν ἐκ τοῦ νοῦ. ὁπερ οὖν ἔδον ἐπὶ πρὸς αἰσθήσιν, τοῦτο πάθος πρὸς νόον, ὃς' ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνα ἔχθρα, καὶ ταῦτ' ἂν εἰῤῥ πολέμια. “(Moses) who says that the woman was fashioned out of Adam, sense perception out of intellect. What pleasure is to sense perception, that is passion to intellect, therefore since the former pair is hostile, the latter should also be at war.”

In the end, Adam, who stands symbolically for the intellect (νοῦς) and is etymologically connected with the earth (γῆ), becomes earthly and perishable, as in Leg. 1.90: τοῦτο γὰρ Ἀδὰμ ἐρμηνεύεται, ὥστε ὅταν ἰκόνα ᾽Αδάμ, γήϊνον καὶ φθαρτόν νοῦν εἶναι νόμιζε· ὃ γὰρ κατ’ ἐκλόνα οὐ γῆϊνος, ἀλλ’ οὐράνιος. “For this is the meaning of Adam, so that when you hear (the name) Adam, consider that it is the earthly and perishable mind; for the mind that was formed after the image is not earthly but heavenly.” In addition to the earthly and perishable mind, Adam also represents the exile, as in Leg. 3.1. Philo interprets the episode of Adam and his wife hiding themselves (Gen 3:8) as “teaching that the worthless man is an exile.” ... δόγμα εἰσηγεῖται διδάσκον, ὅτι ὁ φαῦλος φυγάς ἔστιν. Again, in Leg. 3.54, he states: μία μὲν πυνθανομένῳ “ποῦ εἶ” ἢ ὡδαμοῦ”, τόπον γὰρ οὐδένα ἔχει ἢ τοῦ φαύλου ψυχή, ἦν ἐπιβήσεται ἢ ἐφ’ οὗ ἱδρυθήσεται, παρὸ καί ἀτοπος λέγεται εἶναι ὁ φαύλος—ἀτοπον δὲ ἔστι κακὸν δύσθετον—: “One answer to the question “where are you?” (Gen 3:9) is “nowhere,” for the soul of the worthless man has no place upon which to set foot or settle; wherefore the worthless man is also said to be placeless – for being placeless is an evil that is hard to set right.” The latter is a play on words since ἀτοπος “placeless” also means “wicked,” and δύσθετος “in bad case.”

These earlier interpretations sketch the background for the harsh description of Adam in Cher. 10, as “the intellect that contracted the incurable disease of folly,” a symbolic role that Adam continues to play throughout Philo’s works. The surprising absence of Adam from the discussion of exiles in the first ten paragraphs of De Cherubim, although he is the protagonist of the primary biblical text, the expulsion from Paradise (Gen 3:24), may lie in the extensive treatment of Adam and Eve in the preceding Legum Allegoricae. It is as if Philo had exhausted the theme previously and was eager to move on in De Cherubim to the next generation of the descendants of Adam and Eve and other luminaries.