

PHILO'S ALLEGORY OF LADY VIRTUE AND DAME PLEASURE: A SAMPLE
COMMENTARY ON *SACR.* 19–33

Abstract: The Philonic allegory of Virtue and Pleasure has its origins in the Prodicus myth quoted at the beginning of Xenophon, Mem. 2. Philo depends on a rich scholastic reception of the text, and alters it to feature Jacob (rather than Heracles!) as the student choosing between the goods of Virtue and the ills of Pleasure. Highly rhetorical in nature, Philo's diatribal excursus on Deut 21:15–17 culminates in the longest vice list preserved from the ancient world. I shall provide a sample commentary on this text, drawing parallels to major themes located in the Allegorical Commentary.

Introduction

Philo's *De sacrificiis* is an exegetical commentary on Gen 4:2–4a. The first half of the treatise (§§1–51) does not deal with sacrifices at all, but with Cain and Abel as types of souls (§2). In his usual fashion, Philo searches for scriptural parallels to substantiate his primary level of exegesis. Indeed, he locates Jacob and Esau who likewise represent types of souls (§4), leading to a series of examples of patriarchal “additions” (§§5–10). The second movement of the treatise turns us back to the biblical lemma (§11). Here Philo asks why Cain is born before Abel when in fact the profession of Abel is mentioned before that of Cain (§§11, 14–16). Philo never considers the probability of a biblical chiasm here, but instead builds an inter-Pentateuchal case that the

younger is always exalted above the older. How can this be? Returning to the “soul types” paradigm, Philo concludes that vice (e.g., Cain, Esau) is older than virtue (e.g., Abel, Jacob).

Thus far Philo has laid the groundwork for two exegetical insights, namely (1) there are two types of souls (or modes of behavior) in each individual, and (2) the one first realized is the worse.¹ Only by education, effort, and divine grace can the individual become disentangled from vice in order to choose virtue. These insights set the context for our passage.

The Text

Philo is drawn to the Deut 21:15–17 because: (1) He has been discussing the inheritance of Jacob and Esau (§§17–18); (2) the term “firstborn” has driven his exegesis since §14; and (3) the presence of two brothers in the lemma matches Philo’s focus on the Abel-Cain/Jacob-Esau comparison since §4. What follows, however, represents a temporary excursus from the focus of *Sacr.* thus far. Philo has apparently genericized the σοφίας ἐραστής and the φαῦλος (§18), and now considers the two wives, just as Abel and Cain and Jacob and Esau, to be competing forces within the soul. The entirety of §§19–45 represents the mental challenge to abandon vice and embrace virtue, with Jacob (not Hercules!) as the star pupil (§42 makes this clear).

Philo quotes the text of Deuteronomy 21:15–17 three times in his extant treatises, but we have chosen to omit *Her.* 49 from the chart below because it seems to be more of a paraphrase and, in any case, basically agrees with *Sacr.* and *Sobr.*

LXX	Philo, <i>Sacr.</i> 19	Philo, <i>Sobr.</i> 21
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¹ This insight gives the appearance of some Philonic doctrine of “original sin” (see Laporte 1988). Of course, the Bible is consistent with such an idea (Gen 8:21; Prov 22:15), but the Greeks also recognized the misbehavior of youths.

<p>ἐὰν <u>δὲ</u> γένωνται ἄνθρωπῳ δύο γυναῖκες, μία αὐτῶν ἡγαπημένη καὶ μία αὐτῶν μισουμένη, καὶ τέκωσιν αὐτῷ ἢ ἡγαπημένη καὶ ἢ μισουμένη, καὶ γένηται ὁ υἱὸς ὁ <u>πρωτότοκος τῆς μισουμένης</u>, καὶ ἔσται <u>ἢ ἂν ἡμέρα κατακληρονομῆ</u> τοῖς υἱοῖς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα αὐτοῦ, οὐ δυνήσεται πρωτοτοκεῦσαι τῷ υἱῷ τῆς ἡγαπημένης ὑπεριδὼν τὸν υἱὸν τῆς μισουμένης τὸν πρωτότοκον· ἀλλὰ τὸν πρωτότοκον υἱὸν τῆς μισουμένης ἐπιγνώσεται δοῦναι αὐτῷ διπλᾶ ἀπὸ πάντων, ὧν ἂν εὕρεθῇ αὐτῷ, ὅτι οὗτός ἐστιν ἀρχὴ τέκνων αὐτοῦ, καὶ τούτῳ καθήκει τὰ <u>πρωτοτοκεῖα</u>.</p>	<p>ἐὰν γένωνται ἄνθρωπῳ δύο γυναῖκες, μία αὐτῶν ἡγαπημένη καὶ μία μισουμένη, καὶ τέκωσιν αὐτῷ ἢ ἡγαπημένη καὶ ἢ μισουμένη καὶ γένηται ὁ υἱὸς τῆς <u>μισουμένης πρωτότοκος</u>, καὶ ἔσται <u>ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ</u>, ἢ ἂν <u>κληροδοτῆ</u> τοῖς υἱοῖς αὐτοῦ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα αὐτοῦ, οὐ δυνήσεται πρωτοτοκεῦσαι τῷ υἱῷ τῆς ἡγαπημένης ὑπεριδὼν τὸν υἱὸν τῆς μισουμένης τὸν πρωτότοκον, ἀλλὰ τὸν πρωτότοκον υἱὸν τῆς μισουμένης ἐπιγνώσεται δοῦναι αὐτῷ διπλᾶ ἀπὸ πάντων ὧν ἂν εὕρεθῇ αὐτῷ, ὅτι οὗτός ἐστιν ἀρχὴ τέκνων αὐτοῦ καὶ τούτῳ καθήκει τὰ <u>πρωτοτόκια</u>.</p>	<p>ἐὰν <u>γὰρ</u> γένωνται ... ἄνθρωπῳ δύο γυναῖκες, ἡγαπημένη καὶ μισουμένη, καὶ τέκωσιν αὐτῷ ἢ ἡγαπημένη καὶ ἢ μισουμένη, καὶ γένηται υἱὸς πρωτότοκος τῆς μισουμένης, ἢ ἂν ἡμέρα <u>κληροδοτῆ</u> τοῖς υἱοῖς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, οὐ δυνήσεται πρωτοτοκεῦσαι τῷ υἱῷ τῆς ἡγαπημένης ὑπεριδὼν τὸν υἱὸν τῆς μισουμένης τὸν πρωτότοκον· ἀλλὰ τὸν πρωτότοκον υἱὸν τῆς μισουμένης ἐπιγνώσεται, δοῦναι αὐτῷ διπλᾶ ἀπὸ πάντων ὧν <u>ἐὰν</u> εὕρεθῇ αὐτῷ, ὅτι οὗτός ἐστιν ἀρχὴ τέκνων αὐτοῦ καὶ τούτῳ καθήκει τὰ <u>πρωτοτόκια</u>.</p>
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The only place where Philo appears to have had a different text than the LXX is with the term κληροδοτῆ (UF have κατακληρονομῆ), which is found in both full quotations of the passage, instead of the LXX's κατακληρονομῆ (see Wevers 2006, 245, who disagrees with the earlier text of Rahlfs). The majority of LXX mss have κατακληροδοτῆ, which is closer to Philo's text, but in the Göttingen edition Wevers decided against it (for rationale, see Wevers 1995, 342). The *Sacr.* version, however, does reflect a little Philonic manipulation. He moves πρωτότοκος to the end of

the clause καὶ γένηται ὁ υἱὸς τῆς μισουμένης πρωτότοκος. Philo does not bother with the alteration in *Sobr.*, indicating that he chose in *Sacr.* to alter his text for the sake of clarity. He wanted to make explicit a paradox he will go on to exploit: the preferred son is the son of the hated woman.

Translation

(§19) And concerning this doctrine Moses registers a law, putting it forth extremely well and profitably. And it proceeds as follows: “if a man has two wives, one loved and one hated, and both the loved and hated wives bear him children, and the son of the hated wife is the firstborn, it shall be on the day on which he divides his inheritance to his sons that he shall not be able to give the portion due to the firstborn to the son of the loved wife, overlooking the firstborn son of the hated wife, but he shall recognize the firstborn son of the hated wife by giving him a double portion of all things that are found to be his, because he is the beginning of his children and to him the right of the firstborn properly belongs.”² (§20) Recognize and understand, O my soul, who is the hated wife and who is the son of the hated wife, and you will instantly perceive that to this son alone, and to no other, rightfully belongs the rights of firstborn. For each of us has two wives living within us who are antagonistic and hostile to one another, who fill up the home of the soul with contentious jealousy. And of these we love the one who is submissive and deferential, and who we think is most beautiful and best suited to ourselves. This woman we call pleasure. But the other we hate, regarding her as unruly, untamable, uncivilized and most hostile. And her name is virtue. (§21) So the first woman comes forward playing coy³ like a prostitute or courtesan, with a seductive sashay marked by an overwrought daintiness and charm. She bats her eyes,⁴ and using them as bait, hooks the souls of the young. She fixes her eyes on her mark with self-assured shamelessness, holding her neck high, raising herself up⁵ beyond what nature has assigned her. She grins and giggles, the hair of her head braided in excessively elaborate styles, her face smothered with make-up,⁶ her eyebrows engulfed in paint. She often makes use of warm baths, her flush artificial. She is completely covered with gaudy floral dresses, and bracelets and necklaces and all other types of feminine jewelry crafted from gold and precious stones hang around her. Her breath is laden with the sweetest perfumes. She thinks the entire marketplace her home, but she is nothing more than a common whore. Devoid of true beauty,

² Deut 21:15–17.

³ For this definition of θρόπτω cf. Plutarch, *Flam.* 18.2.

⁴ Philo is the only ancient author to use the expression σαλεύω τῷ ὀφθαλμῷ, which could mean “roll the eyes.” LSJ lists a text from Galen in which the phrase describes nystagmus (*Galenī in Hippocratis prognosticum commentaria* iii.18b.67-68).

⁵ The reading of F (ἐνορθιάζουσα), which PCW places in the text, is probably unoriginal since it occurs only in Philo. The Coptos papyrus is legible only with -ζουσα. MA¹G¹ have the term ἐνορθαίζομαι (“put on airs”), which is more consistent with the context. But modern conjectures (ἐξορθιάζω, ἐπορθιάζω) seem to carry the sense of “raise up.” Ambrose seems to have simply paraphrased: “etenim quia verum decorem naturae habere non potest” (“since she is able, indeed, to assume a beauty that is true to nature”).

⁶ Literally, “[her] face underlined” (cf. *Leg.* 3.62; *Fug.* 153; *Prov.* 2.31).

she pursues the false. (§22) And some of her best friends follow her: cunning, rashness, distrust, flattery, trickery, deception, lying, perjury, impiety, injustice, and intemperance. In the midst of them she stands as the leader of a chorus and says the following to the mind: “Listen, my friend, in my possession are coffers full of all good things, or at least, the ones accessible to people (divine goods exist in heaven), and you will find nothing outside of these. And if you wish to dwell with me, I will lay open these coffers and offer you the most generous use and enjoyment of their contents forever. (§23) But first I want to tell you about the many goods I have to share, so that, if you consent, you may indulge as you please, and if you turn away, ignorance will not be the reason you refuse.⁷ In my possession are rest, security, leisure, indifference toward labor, a diversity of colors, the most melodious modulations of voice, expensive food and drink, the most abundant varieties of the sweetest-smelling scents, passionate love constantly, unregulated escapades, careless intercourse, conversation without criticism, action without consequence, life without care, sleep soft and sweet, an abundance that never runs out. (§24) So if you are willing to live your life with me, I will furnish whatever suits you, once I have made preparations. I will join you in sampling whatever you enjoy eating or drinking, or what you delight in seeing with the eye, hearing with the ear, or smelling with the nostrils. And of all that entices you nothing will fail [to be offered], and you will find the items produced more than can be consumed. (§25) For in the treasuries I have mentioned are evergreen plants blooming and bearing fruit in constant succession, so that the peak maturity of the seasonal and fresh produce succeeds and replaces those already ripened. And no war, either domestic or foreign, has ever cut down these plants, but ever since the earth first took them in, she has been feeding them like a good nurse. She made their roots as strong as possible, driving them deep like foundations, while above the ground extending their trunks skyward. She generates branches — imitations analogous to the hands and feet of animals — and causes leaves to grow like hair, with shade and adornment at the same time. Then she provides the fruit, the very purpose of all these things.

(§26) When she heard these things, the other woman, standing in a hidden place but within earshot, became afraid that the mind, unaware it was being taken in and enslaved, might be misled by such lofty gifts and promises, and that it might also yield to the visible face of her who was so well and variously dressed for deception (for by her charms and amulets she was pricking the mind, bewitching it, provoking titillations in it). So, coming forward all of a sudden, she makes her appearance, bringing forth all the marks of a free citizen: a steady gait, the most serene countenance, an authentic coloring both in her modesty and on her body, her character without deception, her life unadulterated, her intention straightforward, her speech without deceit, the truest representation of a sound mind. Her style is not artificial, her step without swagger, her clothing modest, her adornment of understanding and virtue—more precious than gold. (§27) And her companions are piety, holiness, truth, right,⁸ sanctification, oath-keeping,⁹ justice, equity,¹⁰ trustworthiness,¹¹ congeniality, restraint,¹² temperance, moderation, self-

⁷ I have attempted to reflect the Greek alliteration with a more poetic translation: ἴνα κἄν συναντῆς ἐκὼν ἄσμενίζης, κἄν ἀποστρέφῃ μὴ ἄγνοῶν ἄρνη.

⁸ Méasson translates θέμις rather loosely “respect for the divine law” (PAPM 4: 89). This appears to be the only place in Philo’s corpus where θέμις describes a virtue.

⁹ The term εὐορκία occurs only here in Philo, although it is used in the title to *Spec.* book 2.

¹⁰ Pap omits the six virtues from ἀλήθεια to ἰσότης, probably due to parablepsis: (ὀσιότης ... ἰσότης). PCW is wrong to follow Scheil’s edition here.

¹¹ The term εὐσυνθεσία occurs only here in Philo.

¹² The term ἐχεθυμία occurs only here in Philo. Before him, the term ἐχεθυμος occurs only once, in Homer (*Od.* 8.320). Several manuscripts correct the term to ἐχεμυθία.

mastery, meekness, austerity, thriftiness, modesty, tranquility, courage, nobility, wise counsel, foresight, prudence, attentiveness, will to make right,¹³ cheerfulness, generosity, kindness, gentleness, humanity, liberality, happiness, and goodness. Daylight will fail me if I keep listing the names of all her specific virtues.

(§28) These were stationed on each side as her bodyguard, with Virtue herself standing in the middle. And she, assuming her usual demeanor, began speaking as follows: “I see Pleasure, that lewd wonderworker and storyteller,¹⁴ dressed in the pomp of a tragic actress, buttering you up with constant conversation, and really laying it on thick.¹⁵ And since it is my nature to hate evil, I was afraid that you might drop your guard, and once deceived, give consent to the worst of evils, mistaking them for the best of goods. I thought it best to forewarn you with full disclosure what that woman really possesses, in order that you might reject nothing in ignorance that is to your advantage, and in so rejecting, end up an unintended failure. (§29) Know then that her attire is a mere costume. For of what relates to genuine beauty, nothing is brought out that naturally belongs to her. For she has bound herself with a counterfeit and deceptive means of retaining her figure—nets and snares designed to ensnare you. But if you are wise, you will see these ahead of time, and thus escape her catch. For while the sight of her is sweet to the eyes, and her voice music to the ears, she is naturally disposed to desecrate the soul, your most precious possession, by these and many other means. And she has detailed the things that belong to her which are sure to entice you as a listener, but she has concealed in cowardice¹⁶ and left unspoken all the other things that make you uncomfortable, to which she expects no one to consent readily. (§30) But I will expose these things in full disclosure, and will not imitate the ways of Pleasure, so as to reveal only what is alluring about myself, and thus to obscure and cover up what is disagreeable. On the contrary, I will keep silent about the things that of themselves bring delight and joy, knowing the results will speak for themselves, but the things that are burdensome and hard to endure I will explain in detail, setting them before you in plain words, so as to reveal the nature of each thing clearly, even for those who see poorly. For the things in my possession that seem the worst evils will be proven by those who try them out to be beautiful and more honorable than the best goods of Pleasure. (§31) And before I start with my own items, I will mention as many things as possible that Pleasure passed over in silence. For when she spoke of the things she has stored away – the colors, sounds, scents, flavors, qualities and faculties activated by touch and every other sense – she sweetened these by the attraction of her lecture, but she did not make known other illnesses and plagues which you will necessarily experience if you choose her. She left these unspoken in the hopes that you would be induced by the thrill of some gain¹⁷ and be caught in her net. (§32) Know then, my friend, that if you fall in love with Pleasure, you will be all these things: cunning, insolent, discordant, asocial, intractable, abnormal,¹⁸ unpleasant,

¹³ Philo uses the noun διόρθωσις only here, and never the verb διορθόω. Some translations seem to leave open the possibility of self-improvement (esp. PAPM 4:91), but Amir’s יישור הדורים (the quality of settling disputes) seems more in line with the context (1997, 195).

¹⁴ The terms τερατουργός and μυθολόγος occur only here in Philo.

¹⁵ I believe the idiomatic American English translation best captures the Greek, which can more literally be rendered, “preparing and conversing with you, persistently and often” (ἐνεσκευασμένην καὶ λιπαρῶς θαμινά σοι προσομιλοῦσαν).

¹⁶ Amir notes the term ἐθελοκακέω refers to cowards who flee in battle (citing Herodotus 1.127.3; 1997, 196 n. 45).

¹⁷ Literally, “by some breeze of gain.”

¹⁸ The adjective ἔκθεσμος seems to carry the sense of acting outside the bounds of accepted behavior (θεσμός). We are tempted to translate the term “weird.”

irritable, obstinate, vulgar, incorrigible, rash, deceptive, impossible to get along with, unjust, inequitable, unsociable, irreconcilable, implacable, covetous, ill-governed, without friend, without home, without city, seditious, disorderly, impious, unholy, unsettled, unstable, irreligious,¹⁹ profane, polluted, falsely devoted,²⁰ wretched, heinous,²¹ base, harsh, savage, slavish, cowardly, unbridled, indecent, shaming and being shamed,²² unblushing, immoderate, insatiable, a boaster, conceited, arrogant, crude, captious, contentious, slanderous, frivolous, fraudulent, swindling, aimless, ignorant, stupid, argumentative, [faithless], disobedient, rebellious, a cheat, dissembling, mischievous, leery, ill-reputed, elusive, inaccessible, abominable, averse, unbalanced, prating, rambling, babbling, full of hot air, a flatterer, dimwitted, inconsiderate, unobservant, short-sighted, improvident, negligent, unprepared, tasteless, offensive, stumbling, utterly failing, disordered, unmanaged, unchaperoned, greedy, easily led, easily manipulated, easily yielding, most treacherous, double-minded, double-tongued, conniving, deceitful, unscrupulous, irremediable, dependent, always insecure, vagrant, fearful, subject to impulse, easily persuaded, mad, fickle, clinging to life, thirsting for fame, vindictive, ill-tempered, irascible, disconsolate, quick-tempered, skittish, dilatory, a procrastinator, suspicious, faithless, selfish, stubborn, paranoid, a pessimist, tearful, malicious, rabid, deranged, unshapen, baneful, avaricious, self-infatuated, willingly subject, willingly inimical, a rabble-rouser, mismanaging, stiff-necked, effeminate, degenerate, languid, a mocker, greedy, a fool, sodden with unmitigated misfortune. (§33) Such are the great mysteries²³ belonging to that most beautiful and highly-prized Pleasure. And these things she purposely concealed for fear that you would avoid any association with her if you knew about them. But who could adequately describe the multitude and magnitude of goods stored up with me? Those who partake already know, as well as those who have a well-disposed nature, once they have been called to share in my banquet—not the kind where the pleasures of the filled stomach fatten the body, but where the mind rejoices and is glad at the nourishment it receives and the pleasure it takes in virtue.

Summary

The Philonic exegesis of the “two wives” passage borrows from the famous myth attributed to Prodicus of Ceos. In Xenophon’s retelling, Hercules stands at the crossroads forced

¹⁹ Translating ἀνοργίαστος is difficult. LSJ gives the definition “united,” citing our passage (cf. Yonge). This definition is relevant for *Ebr.* 146 as well. Colson evidently attempts to understand the term in light of the homeless theme as “excommunicate.” The translation provided here takes its cue from the European language translations (cf. Leisegang’s “ohne Gottesdienst” [PHC 3:227], Méasson’s “sans religion” [PAPM 4:95]; and Mazzarelli’s “senza religione” [Radice-Reale 2005, 399]).

²⁰ The term βωμολόχος normally refers to a joker, but Philo clearly uses it in a cultic sense (*Cher.* 94). Very difficult to translate, Colson simply eliminates the cultic associates by rendering “a buffoon.” The translation here follows the rationale of Harl (PAPM 4:94–95, n. 1).

²¹ These occur in Euripides and Xenophon as pairs.

²² The term ἀσχροπαθής seems to be a Philonic coinage.

²³ Colson translates less literally “that grand pageant,” acknowledging the non-technical use of μυστήριον. We retain it here in an attempt to reflect the tongue-in-cheek expression (see Commentary).

to choose between virtue and vice.²⁴ This was a popular allegory in Philo's day, especially in educational circles,²⁵ and has remained an important cultural symbol. Therefore, Philo does not seem to depend exclusively on Xenophon for his information,²⁶ but inherits the allegory through the scholastic tradition.²⁷ Furthermore, it does not appear to me that Philo is significantly influenced by the biblical book of Proverbs, as has been argued.²⁸

Subtle movements in the text, such as the identification of the two women as "virtue" and "pleasure," rather than "virtue" and "vice," are indications that Philo is reflecting a retelling.²⁹ However, Philo does not slavishly borrow from any one author or tradition. As Wendland long ago declared, "It would be a lost cause to search for a specific name as Philo's source."³⁰ Indeed, our primarily philological investigation demonstrates Philo's mind at its most creative, a variety of terms being borrowed from the caricatures of the theatre, from the technical terminology of botany, and from the usual suspects, Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics.

Nevertheless, it seems clear that §§20–33 feature a consistent anti-Epicurean tone, and this use of the Prodicus myth probably dates to Stoic sources.³¹ "Pleasure" is presented as the Epicurean system of ethics, which exalts the senses as true. Epicurean key words and images are sprinkled throughout, such as Pleasure as a prostitute, the terms *γαργαλισμός* (§26), *ἀπραγμοσύνη* (§27), *ῥαστώνη* (§29), and the expression *ἡδονὴ γαστρὸς* (§33), just to name a

²⁴ Xenophon, *Mem.* 2.1.21–34.

²⁵ E.g., Cicero, *Off.* 1.118; Quintilian 9.2.36; Philostratus 482–83; Athenaeus, *Deipn.* 12.2.

²⁶ Many verbal parallels between Philo and Xenophon remain, however (e.g., *κοσμέω*, *σχῆμα*, *χρῶμα*).

²⁷ On the suggestion that the Prodicus myth was a common school text in Philo's day see Rochette 1998, 107; Franchi 2015, 34. For our text see Boulluec 1998.

²⁸ Angel 2007, 148–49, following and strengthening Sly 1990, 15. Sly considers Philo's knowledge of the passages about women in Prov "probable," whereas Angel states Philo is "clearly drawing on" Prov 1–9. Interestingly, when Sly analyzes *Sacr.* 20–45, she neglects to mention Prov, instead assuming Xenophon to be the guiding influence on Philo's allegory (167–70).

²⁹ See notes in the commentary on §20 below.

³⁰ "Nach einem bestimmten Namen für die Quelle Philos zu suchen wäre verlorene Mühe" (1891, 142).

³¹ Cf. Cicero, *Off.* 1.32.118 (Panaetius?); *Fin.* 2.14.44 (Chrysippus); 2.21.69 (Cleanthes).

few. “Virtue,” on the other hand, exalts the Stoic view of the morally good. The Stoic-Cynic diatribe provides the general style, and the concluding paragraph (§33) echoes the famous *Phaedrus* myth of the mind as charioteer, borrowed from Plato.³² In other words, Philo features wisdom from all the schools of philosophy in his anti-Epicurean attack.

In this fascinating little excursus, Philo seems to have forgotten that his discussion began with dispositions in the soul, one referring all things to God (Abel), and the other all things to self (Cain). It is difficult to force Philo to the point of consistency, and make the two women dispositions in the soul. Rather, Philo has eliminated any mention of the “crossroads,” allowing the two women to represent the two paths. The Stoic-Cynic-Platonic way of life leads the young man to take hold of Virtue, fully aware of the effort required to enjoy her. In fact, Philo will launch an additional sermonette on the importance of *πόνος* in §§35–42. The Epicurean path of Pleasure, by contrast, allows every indulgence, but will ultimately bring him to misery. As though Philo realizes he has gone far enough, he attempts to tie off the original thought by returning to Jacob who, though younger in age than Esau, proved himself superior in virtue (§42).

Commentary

§20. ***O my soul.*** Winston and Dillon suggest this routine Philonic exclamation is characteristic of the diatribe style (1983, 333; for ancient parallels see Leopold 1983, 153 n. 15), but Terian notes the specific expression *ὦ ψυχή* occurs only five times outside of Philo in post-Socratic writers before the fourth century CE (1995, 57). The exclamation and its synonym, *ὦ διάνοια*, signal Philo’s originality of thought, according to Terian. For the expression elsewhere in Philo cf. *Leg.* 3.11; *Post.* 135; *Gig.* 44; *Deus* 114; *Migr.* 219; *Somn.* 1.149. For Philo and the diatribe, Wendland 1895 is still fundamental, although it needs updating (see the comments of Stowers 1981, 12–16, 68–69).

you will instantly perceive. The Greek *εὐθύς αἰσθάνομαι* is used elsewhere in Philo of Noah’s recovery of his senses after a drunken haze (*Sobr.* 30). Once the sage focuses his sensory faculties, it will be obvious which of the two wives he ought to choose.

³² This theme is discussed more fully in §49.

two wives living within us. Instead of rival brothers within the soul, the dichotomy is expressed in terms of their respective sources. The Abel/Jacob conviction is born from the hated wife (virtue), and the Cain/Esau conviction is born from the beloved wife (pleasure).

antagonistic and hostile. Philo pairs the two adjectives ἐχθρός and δυσμενής rather frequently (e.g., *Leg.* 3.1; *Ebr.* 69; *Spec.* 3.113; *Praem.* 61).

Pleasure ... Virtue. Philo utilizes these nouns as the names of the two women. Baynes notes this is one of the rare cases in which feminine imagery is positive in Philo (2002, 46). In Xenophon's version of the Prodicus myth the women are named Κακία and Ἀρετή (*Mem.* 2.1.21), but Philo's Ἡδονή seems to reflect a Stoic retelling, which Cicero sets in the context of Epicurean polemic (cf. Cicero *Fin.* 2.44, citing Chrysippus; 2.69 citing Cleanthes; *Off.* 1.88, perhaps with reference to Panaetius' original). Philo's pair is repeated in Roman-era authors, including Seneca (*Virtus* and *Voluptas: Vit. beat.* 11.2; 13.4–5), and Maximus of Tyre (*Diss.* 14.1–2 [Trapp]). This leads to the conclusion that the Prodicus myth was a common school text in Philo's day (Rochette 1998, 107; Franchi 2015, 34). For use of the myth elsewhere, see Cicero, *Off.* 1.118; Quintilian 9.2.36; Philostratus 482–83; Athenaeus, *Deipn.* 12.2. For the Philonic context see Boulluec 1998.

§21. Earlier editions of *Sacr.* omit §§21–32 (Turnebus, Mangey), although Mangey included §§20–33, along with *Spec.* 1.280–84, in the otherwise spurious *De mercede meretricis* (Mangey 2.164–69; on the inauthentic nature of this treatise, see Wendland 1891, 125–45). Wendland was able to restore the paragraphs to their proper location on the basis of a superior manuscript tradition (PCW 1.lxxxvii–viii). The third century *Sacr.* codex, fragments of which contain part of §§31–32 (POxy IX.1173), would have originally included the entire section (see Royse 1980, 160). Pap also contains these paragraphs in mostly legible form, although PCW made the mistake of relying too heavily on Scheil's edition of Pap, and therefore misrepresent the codex in their apparatus criticus. So the two most ancient Philo manuscripts agree with the text Ambrose had before him. There can now be no doubt that this section, as unusual and pedantic as it is, even for Philo, belongs to the original text of *Sacr.*

playing coy. This definition of the verb θρύπω is found of a young lover flirting with his pederast Lucius (brother of Titus Quinctius Flamininus; Plutarch, *Flam.* 18.2). Philo has a fondness for subtle vocabulary that renders translation difficult. The term here has the advantage of connoting debauchery while also suggesting a coquettish aloofness.

like a prostitute or courtesan. This pair of terms is used only two other times in Philo (*Somn.* 1.88; *Ios.* 43). Prostitutes generally represent falsehood with a surface attraction, just as the reasonable and convincing premises described in §12 (e.g., *Leg.* 3.61–62; *Aet.* 56; *Prov.* 2.31). Pentateuchal law, at least in Philo's interpretation, requires they be put to death (*Spec.* 3.51; *Ios.* 43; cf. Deut 23:17–18). For a brief discussion of prostitution in Roman era Egypt, see Bagnall 1991. Pleasure as a prostitute seems to have been a traditional anti-Epicurean image (Lévy 2000, 132). Cicero uses the imagery as well (*Fin.* 2.12).

an overwrought daintiness and charm. Philo's portrait of Pleasure is intended to acknowledge her allure, but to underscore the artificial. The term τρυφή is a double entendre, referring both to ease and luxury, and to a self-indulgent debauchery. "Charm" or "beauty" (χλιδή) is a synonym for an ornamented, contrived daintiness (e.g., of hair, Sophocles, *El.* 52, or jewelry, Euripides, *Ion* 26).

batts her eyes. The expression σαλεύω τὸ ὄφθαλμῷ is unusual. It could mean “roll the eyes” (cf. Colson, Amir), but I opt for a translation that better suits a modern context. In any case, Galen uses the expression in reference to a condition causing the eyelids to quiver uncontrollably (known as nystagmus, in *Hippocratis prognosticum commentaria* 3.18b.67-68 [Kühn]), and thus my translation seems justifiable.

hooks the souls of the young. Philo borrows the language of the angler in pursuit of a catch, using her eyes as the bait. Philo elsewhere presents the prostitute as “hooking” (ἀγκιστρῆω) her lovers (*Opif.* 166; *Mos.* 1.296; *Virt.* 40; *Prov.* 2.31).

Philo’s metaphor of the two women is taken from the scholastic tradition of educating the young (see notes to §20). Such an association is present already in Xenophon, who introduces the Prodicus myth in the context of educating young men for rule (*Mem.* 2.1.1). Heracles was passing from youth to maturity (ἥβη, one’s middle teen years) when forced to choose between Virture and Vice (*Mem.* 2.1.21). The “two women” motif also has a social connection. Philo informs us that “among others” (i.e., non-Jews) young men over fourteen years of age are permitted to engage prostitutes (*Ios.* 43). Since rationality is complete at age fourteen according to the Stoics (see notes to §14), the young man is tested sexually and educationally at the same time (cf. *Mut.* 172).

self-assured shamelessness. The audacity (θράσος) of the prostitute leads her to gaze at her mark, defying the customary discretion implicit in illicit sexual encounters. The pair ἀνασχυντία and θράσος occur elsewhere in reference to Sophists engaged in εἰκότα and πιθανά (*Opif.* 45) and to sense-perception (*Leg.* 2.67). For the pair cf. also (*Migr.* 224; *Abr.* 213; *Mos.* 1.302; *Spec.* 1.270; 3.66; 4.2, 127; *Legat.* 56, 132).

raising herself up beyond what nature has assigned her. The text is difficult here (PCW has ἐνορθιάζουσα, a *hapax legomenon* in ancient Greek), but PCW’s alternative conjectures involve “straightening herself” or “evelating herself” (ἐξορθιάζουσα, ἐπορθιάζουσα). While this could be merely metaphorical (cf. Colson’s translation), or could simply indicate good posture, artificial “heightening” is attested among ancient Greek women. We have evidence of such in the fragments of the Alexandrian poet Alexis, describing courtesans (*apud* Athenaeus, *Deipn.* 568b), and even earlier in Xenophon (*Oec.* 10.2).

hair ... braided. Having described the prostitute’s manner of behavior, Philo turns to the manner of her dress and ornamentation. Hair is routinely associated with sexual attraction (e.g., Horace, *Carm.* 1.5.1–4; *Epod.* 11.28. Ovid, *Ars* 3.133–55; Juvenal *Sat.* 6.501–506), although not necessarily with prostitution (but see Philo, *Spec.* 3.37). The early empire witnessed a significant shift in the elaborate hairstyles fashionable among women (Bartman 2001), and may have provoked moralists such as Philo to intensify the polemic (cf. Lucian, *Nigr.* 6). Societal emphasis on head coverings, particularly for married women, should be understood in this light (Myerowitz Levine 1995). Philo never directly recommends head coverings for women (although Paul does, see 1 Cor 11:3–15). In general, Philo negatively associates veiling with concealment (e.g., *Gig.* 53; *Congr.* 124–25; *Fug.* 34; *Spec.* 3.156).

face smothered with make-up. Philo elsewhere describes prostitutes as “painting the face” (*Leg.* 3.62; *Fug.* 153; *Prov.* 2.31; and *Spec.* 3.37 of male prostitutes). The verb ὑπογράφω is also used specifically of make-up applied under the eyes (Josephus, *B.J.* 4.561; Lucian, *Bis acc.* 31; Pollux 5.102). Colson in fact translates “under her eyes are pencil lines.” This translation is probably too restrictive, however, since Philo never uses ὑπογράφω with reference to the eyes. Instead, Philo seems to mean all her natural features were “traced” and “highlighted” with excessive make-up (cf. the Prodicus myth, Xenophon, *Mem.* 2.1.22).

The wealthiest women of the Imperial age often used *purpurissum* (Pliny, *Hist. nat.* 35.30; Greek: πορφυρίζον) and white lead (*cerussa*; Greek: ψιμίθιον) to color the face (Plautus, *Mos.* 258–61; *Truc.* 290; Martial 1.72.6). But excessive cosmetics could be viewed negatively, as in the case of older women trying to regain the false appearance of youth (cf. Aristophanes, *Eccl.* 178, 929, 1072). And, although modern scholars often assume the aristocracy set the stylistic tone for all classes, sources also suggest aristocratic women copied the dress and cosmetics of prostitutes (Olson 2006, 197; cf. Seneca, *Helv.* 16.3). On cosmetics in general see Olson 2008, 58–79; 2009.

her eyebrows engulfed in paint. The verb ἐγκαλύπτω carries the meaning of “wrap up” or “conceal.” Roman ladies used an antimony mixture (*stibium*) to color the eyelashes and eyebrows (Pliny, *Hist. nat.* 11.154; Juvenal 2.93). See Olson 2009, 298–99.

flush artificial. The term ἔρευθος (“blush, flush”) occurs only here in Philo. It could refer to the steam from the bath coloring the woman’s cheeks, or more probably refers to a cosmetic mixture to color the face (Xenophon, *Oec.* 10.7; Alexis *apud* Athenaeus, *Deip.* 568; Olson 2009, 296–97). A natural blush was viewed positively in ancient Roman society (Barton 1999), but Alicia Batten writes,

Covering up the face with creams and colours could hide the involuntary act of blushing, which was a manifestation of shame that the Romans apparently found endearing and forgivable. If someone blushed, the community might likely find it charming and could readily restore that person’s honour. Thus one of the reasons why thick make-up was viewed suspiciously is that its wearer indicated an unwillingness to expose her shame in the form of a blush, and in turn, enable the onlookers to redeem her honour (2009, 489).

Philo’s vocabulary subtly suggests an attempt to cover the true self with artificial ornamentation. Such a sentiment is consistent with the moralistic literature (cf. Xenophon, *Oec.* 10.2–9; Dio Chrysostom 7.117). However, Ovid’s mockery is a testament to the popularity of excessive cosmetics in Philo’s time (Johnson 2016), and male invective against such is typical (Richlin 1995; Batten 2009, 489). Richlin states, “Roman sources consistently link women’s use of makeup with deception, covering a body often described by men as inherently repugnant; moreover, free women who use makeup are said to align their bodies with the open bodies of slaves and prostitutes” (1995, 186).

gaudy. Expensive clothing (the adjective πολυτελής means expensive or gaudy) is a regular object of scorn among the moralists (Seneca, *Contr.* 2.7.3; 1 Tim 2:9; Tertullian, *Pall.* 4.9; *Cult. fem.* 2.12.3). The reason is because a “blatant and purposeful display of the self, however clothed, led to a dwindling of female modesty Women supposedly became sexually excited when they put themselves on display: chastity was eroded by being seen” (Olson 2006, 199, citing Propertius 3.21.3; Ovid, *Am.* 2.2.3–4; 2.19.19; 3.2.34). A number of sources report the colors of female clothing (Plautus, *Epid.* 229–35; Ovid, *Ars* 3.169–92). “Escorts” (ἑταῖραι) of Greek texts are generally presented as being fully and extravagantly clothed, but “whores” (πόρναι) generally wear transparent clothing or are topless (Dalby 2002, 112–13, 118–19). On female dress in general see Olson 2008.

floral dresses. Floral dresses were so much associated with prostitution that some cultures allowed only prostitutes to wear them (Lucian, *Dial. meretr.* 6.2; Athenaeus, *Deipn.* 521b; Clement, *Paed.* 2.11). In others, they were disallowed during festivals (see LSJ s.v. ἀνθίζω). In general, flowery dress seems to be standard courtesan clothing (Dalby 2002, 119). For similar language elsewhere in Philo, cf. *Somn.* 1.224; 2.53.

bracelets ... necklaces ... jewelry. The moralists often find ostentation so objectionable that they recommend wearing no gold or jewelry at all (Seneca, *Helv.* 16.3–5; 1 Pet 3:3; Plutarch, *Mor.* 141e, 144a–146a). Prostitutes were also quite aware of the attractive nature of jewelry (Plautus, *Most.* 248–92; Lucian, *Dial. meretr.* 6), and some cultures allowed only prostitutes to wear gold (Diodorus Siculus 12.21.1; Athenaeus, *Deipn.* 521b).

perfumes. Perfumes came in all different varieties, and were fashionable (cf. Pliny, *Hist. nat.* 13.2), but were in general eschewed by the moralists (Plutarch, *Mor.* 693b–c; Athenaeus 686e; Clement, *Paed.* 2.8).

a common whore. The term τριοδίτις σοβάς occurs only in Philo (here and in *Fug.* 153). LSJ gives the definition “streetwalker,” but literally the term means something like “a strutter at the crossroads,” once again reminding us of the Prodicus myth.

Devoid of true beauty, she pursues the false. Philo is generally opposed to ornamentation intended to deceive (associated with κενὴ δόξα, *Somn.* 2.57; πρὸς ἀπάτην τῶν ὁρώντων, *Praem.* 24), and concealing true beauty (*Gig.* 17, 44; cf. *Det.* 20; *Migr.* 97, 105). The basis for such a position may be located in the Bible (e.g., Isa 3:18–24), or in Greco-Roman ethics (cf. Cicero, *Att.* 2.1.1–2; Ovid, *Ars* 3.159–60, 206–208, 257–58; Tertullian, *Cult. fem.* 2.5.4). The Testament of Reuben is strikingly similar to Philo: “They [women] contrive in their hearts against men, then by decking themselves out they lead men’s minds astray, by a look they implant their poison, and finally in the act itself they take them captive. For a woman is not able to coerce a man overtly, but by a harlot’s manner she accomplishes her villainy” (T.Reu 5:3–4). New Testament moralists also object to jewelry and expensive clothing (1 Tim 2:9–10; 1 Pet 3:3–4).

§22. **cunning, rashness, distrust.** The alliterative trio πανουργία, προπέτεια, and ἀπιστία serve as an introduction to Pleasure’s associates. The term πανουργία is later defined as “a voluntary disease of the soul” (ἐκούσιον ψυχῆς ἀρρώστημα), which cannot be cured by education alone (*Sacr.* 48). Pleasure (ἡδονή) is elsewhere associated with πανουργία (*Leg.* 2.107), as is sophistry (*Post.* 101). Rashness (προπέτεια) is elsewhere associated with shamelessness (ἀναισχυντία) and recklessness (θράσος) (*Conf.* 117; *Spec.* 3.66; *Legat.* 262; *QG* 4.52). Distrust (ἀπιστία) can be associated with opinion (δόξα) (*Ebr.* 40; *Conf.* 57; cf. Plato, *Resp.* 7.533e; 6.511e). Aristotle and the Stoics defined πίστις similarly as a “strong assumption” (Aristotle, *Top.* 4.5 [126b]), and regarded ἀπιστία as inappropriate for the sage (*SVF* 3.548). On Philo’s use of πίστις in general see Hay 1989.

flattery, trickery, deception, lying, perjury. These traits of Pleasure fit under the rubric of falsity, scaled toward the more grievous. Flattery (κολακεία) is a “disease to friendship” (*Leg.* 3.182 discussing pleasure; cf. *Conf.* 48), and is associated with insincerity (*Abr.* 126). Trickery (φενაკισμός) is also an instrument of pleasure, associated elsewhere with prostitution (*Opif.* 165–66) and sophistry (*Agr.* 164). Deception (ἀπάτη) is “most akin to pleasure” (*Leg.* 3.64) and the “worst enticement and menace of the soul” (*Agr.* 16; cf. *Congr.* 18). The term is associated with art (*Gig.* 59) and rhetoric (*Agr.* 13, of sophistry in general; cf. *Agr.* 96; *Sobr.* 15), as well as prostitution (*Plant.* 104; cf. *Jos.* 56). Lying (ψευδολογία) and perjury (ψευδορκία) are connected elsewhere in Philo (*Conf.* 117; *Virt.* 182).

impiety, injustice, and intemperance. This alliterative triplet opposes the cardinal virtues (cf. *Opif.* 73; *Conf.* 90; *Heres* 245; *Mut.* 197; see § 15 and notes). For this triplet elsewhere see *Det.* 72; *Post.* 52; *Deus* 112. Although the traditional four virtues are φρόνησις, σωφροσύνη, ἀνδρεία, and δικαιοσύνη, Philo and others had added εὐσέβεια as the “queen of the virtues” (see Sterling

2006). Thus, here we not do find ἀφροσύνη (opposite of φρόνησις) or δειλία (opposite of ἀνδρεία).

the leader of a chorus. Philo borrows the theatrical image of a choral director coming forward to speak from the stage (see §28 and notes). For this language elsewhere see *Agr.* 80; *Ebr.* 121; *Conf.* 174; *Migr.* 104; *Fug.* 124. Méasson calls attention to Apuleius' *Metam.* 10.32 where a play is described in which Venus is paraded across the stage in an attempt to seduce Paris (PAPM 84–85, n. 2). For the importance of the chorus in the Augustan era see now Curtis 2017.

my friend. The Greek ὃ οὔτος is found twenty times in Philo (*Leg.* 3.179, 192; *Sacr.* 22, 32, 55; *Deus* 66; *Agr.* 111; *Sobr.* 50; *Migr.* 9; *Somn.* 2.252; *Abr.* 71; *Ios.* 24, 64; *Dec.* 88; *Spec.* 1.259; 3.66; 4.10, 59, 227; *Flacc.* 6). Sometimes it is Philo himself speaking to the reader, and sometimes, as here, it is Philo speaking in character (a literary technique known as προσωποποιΐα). The style is textbook Greek rhetoric (e.g., Theon, 2.115.11–118.5; Hermogenes 9.1–43).

use and enjoyment. Philo pairs the nouns χρῆσις and ἀπόλαυσις no less than twenty-seven times (e.g., *Opif.* 42; *Det.* 114; *Gig.* 60; *Deus* 156; *Migr.* 11). He acknowledges human need and desire for pleasures, but insists Reason (λόγος) must always remain in control (e.g., *Leg.* 3.155; *Cher.* 113).

§23. **I have to share.** The verb ταμιεύομαι (47 times in Philo) indicates an ample supply from which one can distribute. It can thus mean “store up” (*Cher.* 48; *Agr.* 168) or “give out” (*Conf.* 14; *Legat.* 158), or perhaps, as here, “store up with the intention of sharing” (*Heres* 106; *Ios.* 161).

rest, security, leisure, indifference toward labor. Cleverly selecting terms that carry both positive and negative meanings, Pleasure offers the mind a life of moral and physical relaxation. The first three terms are summarized by the last description. Education is hard work, says Plato, and ἄνεσις (“rest”) and ἄδεια (“a sense of security”) must be driven from the soul of the youth (*Resp.* 561a). Leisure (ἐκεχειρία) literally means “holding out the hand,” either for a truce in war (e.g., Thucydides 4.58), or to receive a hand-out (e.g., Aristophanes, *Pax* 908). The terms here are frequently found together in other Philonic contexts (all three: *Cher.* 92; ἄδεια with ἐκεχειρία: *Congr.* 158; *Ios.* 85; *Dec.* 50; *Spec.* 2.42, 109; *Prob.* 148; *Flacc.* 40, 67; ἄνεσις with ἐκεχειρία: *Spec.* 1.192; *Legat.* 12). Philo uses the term ἀμελετησία consistently to mean “indifference” (*Sacr.* 86; *Heres* 213; *Fug.* 14, 121). The portrait is of a carefree retirement.

colors ... voice ... food and drink ... scents ... love. With these descriptions Philo covers the five senses: sight, hearing, taste, smell, and [sexual] touch. Colors and scents are frequently associated with temptation in Philo (*Opif.* 165; *Leg.* 3.235; *Det.* 157; *Ebr.* 190–191; *Abr.* 148). Harmonious sounds can describe the voices of birds (*Leg.* 2.75; *Post.* 105–106), or musical instruments (*Deus* 24–25), but human voices should not draw on the emotions (e.g., *Plant.* 159). Expensive food and wine were condemned by the moralists in general (Philo, *Post.* 142; *Ebr.* 211; *Contempl.* 35; Seneca, *Epist.* 8.5; Dio Chrysostom 6.12–13). See Winston 2008, 219 n. 39. The term ἔρωσ is usually positive in Philo, and is rarely to be taken sexually as it is here (e.g., *Opif.* 70; *Agr.* 84; *Plant.* 144; *Congr.* 112). On the theme in general see Nissen 1974, 429–45.

unregulated escapades. Philo hints here at the original context of the allegory with this phrase, more literally rendered “unsupervised games” (ἀπαιδαγώγητοι παιδιὰ). “Games” (παιδιὰ) are decisively negative in Philo, excepting athletic contests (e.g., *Mos.* 1.20; 2.211).

careless intercourse. Philo uses the adjective ἀνεξέταστος more than any other ancient writer, but its most famous appearance is in Socrates' quip, "the unexamined life is not worth living" (ὁ δὲ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπου; *Apol.* 34a).

§24. **whatever suits you.** Plutarch quotes Chrysippus as asserting "the bad man [ὁ φαῦλος] needs nothing, uses nothing, nothing is useful to him, nothing is appropriate, nothing is suitable" [οὐδὲν ἀρμόττον] (*SVF* 3.674 = *Comm. not.* 20 1068a).

preparations. The term εὐτρεπίζω is associated with preparations for a sumptuous feast (*Agr.* 66; *Somn.* 2.181), and by extension, for the satisfaction of pleasure (*Opif.* 158; *Det.* 26).

join in sampling. The verb συνεπισκοπέω is used only one other time in Philo with the meaning "pay attention" (*Mos.* 2.5). Here, Pleasure promises to "join in experimentation" with the mind as it samples the products she makes available. Philo repeats four of the five senses, claiming each of them "is delighted by pleasure" (ἡδομαι). Mentioned again in this section is the mind's "consent" (§§23, 24). The Stoics were careful to regard pleasure and sense-perception as morally neutral. They are bad only when the individual gives consent (συγκατάθεσις, *SVF* 3.171) to an impression (φαντασία, *SVF* 2.70, 72). A passion is therefore an erroneous judgment (LS 61B).

§25. **evergreen plants.** Philo is the first to use the adjective ἀειθαλής (Geljon and Runia 2013, 256), which occurs six times in his preserved works (*Opif.* 153; *Sacr.* 25; *Agr.* 171; *Mut.* 140; *Spec.* 4.181; *Prob.* 69).

seasonal and fresh produce. Fruits were distinguished as ripening in early summer, summer, and autumn. The expression "seasonal fruits" (οἱ ὠραῖοι καρποὶ) specifically refers to those that (1) ripen for a period of only forty days in the summer, and that (2) cannot be stored (Galen, *Alim. fac.* 2.2). Consequently, they were suitable only for local markets (cf. the *forensis* grape, Pliny, *Hist. nat.* 14.42). Pleasure's vines, by contrast, produce every fruit in all seasons.

no war ... has ever cut down. Military campaigns often brought large-scale deforestation (cf. Philo, *Spec.* 4.23; Josephus, *B.J.* 6.6). Deut 20:19–20 forbids the cutting of fruit trees, and Plato also limits soldiers to taking one year's produce (*Resp.* 470a–e). That Philo is thinking specifically of the Plato text is supported by his reference to the earth as a "nurse and mother" (cf. *Resp.* 470d). Hellenistic Jews in general emphasize this humanitarian law (Pseudo-Phocylides 38; 4 Macc 2:14; Josephus, *Ap.* 2.212). For the affect of the military on deforestation, see Meiggs 1982, 154–87.

good nurse. Philo portrays the earth as a nurse (τροφός) cultivating the soil. The image is borrowed from Plato (*Tim.* 40b; *Menex.* 237e–238a; *Resp.* 414e, 470d). For the language elsewhere in Philo see *Opif.* 38, 133; *Plant.* 15; *QG* 2.7; cf. *Aet.* 57–66.

roots ... foundations. The architectural metaphor is first found in Theophrastus, *Caus. plant.* 1.12.4, although with slightly different language (see also *Opif.* 41; *Virt.* 158 with the comments of Wilson PACS 3:336).

branches ... hands and feet ... leaves ... hair. Personification of trees is biblical (cf. Isa 55:12 LXX). The term κόμη with reference to foliage is Homeric (*Od.* 23.195, of the olive tree; cf. also Theophrastus, *Hist. plant.* 2.6.4; 3.12.9; 4.4.4).

provides the fruit. Fruit trees must have a fully established root system before they can bear fruit (Theophrastus, *Caus. plant.* 1.12.1–10).

§26. **the other woman.** Virtue waits patiently as Pleasure speaks, as in the Prodicus myth preserved in Xenophon (*Mem.* 2.1.27).

taken in and enslaved. Both of the terms ἀνδραποδίζω and αἰχμάλωτος are borrowed from a military context, and refer to prisoners of war (the latter term) to be sold as slaves (the former term) (for the terms together, e.g., Xenophon, *Anab.* 4.1.12; Diodorus Siculus 33.14.1). See Philo, *Mos.* 1.36.

dressed for deception. See §21 and notes.

charms and amulets. Aristotle uses the term charm (περίαπτος) to refer to the lifestyle of the virtuous “which needs nothing from pleasure as a mere ornament [περίαπτος], but has pleasure in itself” (*Eth. nic.* 1.8.12 [1099a]). The second term (μαγγανεία) is rarer, occurring only here in the Philonic corpus. Galen makes clear that μαγγανεία is the more generic of these two terms (*De simplicium medicamentorum temperamentis ac facultatibus* [Kühn 11:792]). Philo may have picked up the term from Plato, who uses it with reference to the deception of Sophistry (*Leg.* 908d).

bewitching. The term κηλέω occurs regularly in Plato, and refers to being enchanted, as by music (Plato, *Prot.* 315a) or by oratory (Plato, *Euthyd.* 289e–290a). Consequently, it can describe being “won over” in an argument (e.g., *Resp.* 358b). Closer to our context, Aeschines describes pleasure [ἡδονή] as a charmer, driving men to do foolish and dangerous things (1.191). In the only two other contexts in which the term appears in Philo, it is closely associated with the deception of pleasure (*Post.* 106, 155). Little has been published regarding Philo’s views on magic, enchantment, and the like (in general, see Berchman 1998; Seland 2006).

provoking titillations. Philo uses the term γαργαλισμός four times (*Leg.* 3.160; *Det.* 110; *Spec.* 3.110). Ranocchia calls the term a “*terminus technicus* in Epicurus for the solicitation exercised on the senses by the kinetic pleasures” (2008, 98). See LS 21Q–R. In fact, Leisegang believes this language (and this entire section) to be indicative of an anti-Epicurean polemic (based on Athenaeus, *Deipn.* 12.67 = fr. 413 [Usener]; PCH 3:224). On Philo and Epicureanism in general, see Lévy 2000; Ranocchia 2008.

marks of a free citizen. Although dress could be viewed negatively, as we have seen above, Roman matronae were distinguished by the quality of their appearance. Lucius, for example, encounters a woman in the market whose dress “distinguished her as matrona indeed” (Apuleius, *Metam.* 2.2). Late Republican ladies complained that dressing down destroyed their ability to mark status (e.g., Livy 34.4.12–14).

steady gait. In §21 Philo describes the courtesan coming with a broken gait (κεκλασμένῳ τῷ βαδίσματι; in the Greek fragment of *QG* 4.99 the courtesan has a “stutting step,” βάδισμα σεσοβημένον), as opposed to the free woman’s steady step (σταθερὸν βάδισμα). These are the only three uses of the term βάδισμα in Philo.

most serene countenance. Whereas the courtesan’s face is smothered in makeup (ὑπογεγραμμένη τὴν ὄψιν, §21), the free woman’s is calm and gentle. We are tempted to translate ἡρεμαιοῦτητα “of the smoothest quality” (for this definition cf. Theophrastus, *Lap.* 62 [of paint]) because a smooth face is considered ideal (e.g., Pliny, *Hist. nat.* 28.183, 32.65; for recipes of concoctions to smooth the face see Olson 2009, 300–301). But the more traditional definition fits the context as well.

an authentic coloring. Some ancient sources tend to assume women adorn themselves *only* for men (e.g., Terence, *Haut.* 287–91; Plautus, *Most.* 166–69; Ovid, *Her.* 15.77–78). On ancient praise for the woman who is content to remain unadorned, see Olson 2008, 89–92.

Her style is not artificial, her step without swagger. Philo again uses terms with a double meaning. The term “nature” (σχέσις) can also mean “style” of hair (Xenophon, *Symp.* 4.57), and ἄπλαστος the “formation” of an elaborate hairstyle. These terms also indicate a person of high character. Likewise, the verb σοβέω recalls an artificial wig of horse’s hair (σόβη), as in the later author Synesius, *Opusc.* 5.80d. For a similar context, cf. *Virt.* 40, 173.

Philo is also fond of pairing the nouns σχέσις and κίνησις (*Opif.* 117; *Leg.* 3.206; *Heres* 119). Philo writes, “We can observe vice both in posture [σχέσις] and in movement [κίνησις]. Vice that is set into motion [κινεῖσθαι] tends to satisfy the full measure of its potential, and is thus worse than vice that merely remains a posture” (*Leg.* 3.34; cf. *Sobr.* 34–37). Philo may be taking aim against the Epicureans who identified pleasure as a “calm” (see Lévy 2000, 131, citing Philo, *Leg.* 3.160).

her adornment of understanding and virtue. The legend of Philo’s wife printed in some editions of Philo, and obviously spurious (see Royse 1991, 80–82), bears some relevance here (cf. Méasson, PAPM 4:88–89). It states that “Philo’s wife ... did not wear gold jewelry [κόσμος], claiming that the virtue of the husband is sufficient adornment [κόσμος] for the wife.” Such is well in line with what Philo says about the nature of adornment, and such a mistaken attribution would not have immediately alerted Byzantine readers.

§27. In this paragraph Philo lists some thirty-four generic virtues in no obvious order. Stoic lists class virtues under the “first four,” φρόνησις, σωφροσύνη, ἀνδρεία, and δικαιοσύνη (e.g., *SVF* 3.264), but popular forms of the lists do not typically follow the Stoic scheme (e.g., Cicero, *Tusc.* 4.6–14; Plutarch, *Tranq. an.* 468b). Philo has the four cardinal virtues scattered in the list, but they do not seem to be organized as headings.

piety ... sanctification. Méasson suggests the first five qualities relate to one’s relationship with God, although she must regard θέμις as distinctively religious in order to do so (PAPM 4:196). Pap omits six of the virtues from ἀλήθεια to ἰσότης. PCW is wrong to follow Scheil here, claiming the virtues from αἰδώς to προσοχή are omitted. They, in fact, are present in Pap.

piety. At the head of Philo’s list of virtues is εὐσέβεια. This “queen” (*Spec.* 4.135; *Praem.* 53) of the virtues for Philo encompasses the others (Sterling 2006). Philo apparently wrote a work Περὶ εὐσέβεια which is now lost (see Royse 2006). The point is significant since Judaism was labeled a superstition (δαισινισμὸς) (Josephus, *Ant.* 12.5; see Amir 1987). Thus Judaism’s εὐσέβεια (i.e., the proper balance of religiosity) needed to be defended.

holiness. Philo pairs εὐσέβεια with ὁσιότης 28 times, as it is here (*Opif.* 155, 172; *Sacr.* 37; *Plant.* 35; *Ebr.* 91; *Migr.* 194; *Mos.* 2.142), labeling it also “queen” of the virtues (*Spec.* 4.135; *Decal.* 119). Plato can refer to ὁσιότης as a fifth cardinal virtue (*Prot.* 329C), and both Plato and the Stoics understood the term as proper service to God (Plato, *Euth.* 12E; *SVF* 2.1017; 3.660).

right. Philo uses θέμις in most cases with the infinitive (“it is right to ...”). Only here does he use the term as an independent virtue. The term might broadly relate to the religious terms preceding it (cf. Plato, *Symp.* 188d where the term occurs with εὐσέβεια). This is Méasson’s suggestion (PAPM 4:89). Or it might relate to the theme of “law and order” that follows (cf. *Somn.* 1.94).

oath-keeping. The noun εὐορκία is a *hapax legomenon* in Philo, although the verb εὐορκέω occurs four times (*Plant.* 82; *Dec.* 84; *Spec.* 2.13, 14). Oath-keeping was a Classical Greek virtue (e.g., Hesiod, *Op.* 285; Euripides, *Med.* 495).

truthworthiness. The noun εὐσυνθεσία is also a Philonic *hapax*, although the verb εὐσυνθετέω is perhaps a Stoic coinage in the sense of “loyalty to agreements” (*SVF* 2.197).

restraint. The term ἐχεθυμία is exceedingly rare, occurring only once before Philo, in Homer (*Od.* 8.320). Some manuscripts substitute the more common synonym ἐχεμυθία, a Pythagorean word for silence (e.g., Plutarch, *Num.* 8.6; *Curios.* 519c). See notes on §60 below.

moderation. Philo uses the noun κοσμιότης eight times, all but two (*Fug.* 50; *Flacc.* 99) in conjunction with σωφροσύνη, indicating a close connection between the two (here; *Fug.* 33, 50, 154; *Somn.* 1.124; *Ios.* 40; *Spec.* 3.51; *Flacc.* 99).

austerity, thriftiness. The term ὀλιγοδεΐα is rare before Philo, being used in this sense before him only in Posidonius, who describes a more austere life being in accord with old Roman custom (see EK T6, fr. 267). Philo, however, uses the noun 21 times. Philo pairs the far more common term εὐκολία with ὀλιγοδεΐα five times in his extant corpus (here; *Spec.* 1.173; 4.101; *Virt.* 8; *Prob.* 77, 84).

tranquility. The term ἀπραγμοσύνη generally refers to a withdrawal from politics (so LSJ), but sometimes for the purpose of devoting oneself to study (e.g., Plutarch, *Tranq. an.* 13). The term also carries an anti-Epicurean tenor in Plutarch, *Tranq. an.* 2–3, which fits our context well.

courage. One of the four cardinal virtues, ἀνδρεία is the Aristotelian mean between cowardice (δειλία) and recklessness (θράσος) (*Eth. nic.* 2.8.6), a scheme Philo repeats (*Deus* 164). Philo uses the term 55 times, usually in opposition to cowardice (e.g., *Opif.* 73; *Leg.* 1.68; *Det.* 51; *Deus* 164).

nobility. Philo uses the noun γενναιότης only three times (here; *Mos.* 1.309; *Virt.* 5). Following ἀνδρεία, the term ought to imply courage in keeping with the status of one's family (e.g., *Virt.* 17, 167; cf. *Mos.* 2.274; *Spec.* 4.45). Philo here uses the term as a synonym with the more common εὐγένεια, on which he writes an entire treatise (*Virt.* 187–227). Perhaps the rarer word occurs here because Greek authors of Philo's era more closely associate γενναιότης with noble character than ancestry (e.g., Plutarch, *Brut.* 49.9; Epictetus, *Diatr.* 4.1.109). This is precisely how Philo defines εὐγένεια (*Virt.* 189–191).

wise counsel, foresight. The term εὐβουλία for Philo captures the first in a three-step process of thinking, speaking, and acting (e.g., *Mut.* 237; *Somn.* 2.180; *Praem.* 107). The noun προμήθεια is among Philo's stock of terms associated with “providence” (πρόνοια; *Opif.* 171; *Deus* 29; see §121 and notes below).

attentiveness. Attentiveness (προσοχή) is a post-Classical term, often associated with silence, or ἡσυχία (Philo, *Heres* 10–13; *Congr.* 66; *Somn.* 1.193; 2.37; *Spec.* 2.62; and outside of Philo, e.g., Dionysius of Halicarnassus 6.85.3). Chrysippus associates attention with silence as “relative goods” (*SVF* 3.111).

will to make right. Philo uses the noun διόρθωσις only here, and never the verb διορθόω. The term normally indicates “setting straight” what is broken (e.g., of “setting” a bone, Hippocrates, *Fract.* 16), and implies a person or object for correction. The term does not seem to refer to self-improvement, as Méasson's “la volonté de devenir meilleur” implies (PAPM 4:91).

cheerfulness. The Stoics classed εὐθυμία as one of the three forms of joy (χαρά), defining it as “joy in everyday life, or lack of desire for anything” (*SVF* 3.431–32). This latter definition reminds us of Democritus, the contemporary of Socrates, who proposes εὐθυμία as the *telos* of life, defining it as “a state in which the soul continues calm and strong, undisturbed by fear or superstition or any other emotion” (Diogenes Laertius 9.45; trans. Hicks, LCL). This sounds much like the Stoic ἀπάθεια, and indeed Panaetius wrote a book Περὶ εὐθυμίας (Diogenes Laertius 9.20).

generosity, kindness, gentleness. These three terms, each ending in -της, are grouped euphonically and semantically. Generosity (χρηστότης) is a key term for doing good to others

(Philo, *Mos.* 1.249; *Virt.* 84), especially exalted among the Stoics (*SVF* 3.264, 273, 291), and classified under δικαιοσύνη (*SVF* 3.264). Philo uses the term as a special description of God's character (*Leg.* 3.73; *Migr.* 122; *Praem.* 166). Kindness (ἡμερότης) is used to refer to the tameness of animals (Aristotle, *Hist. an.* 588a21; 610b21; 631a9), and is cited as an attribute of God (e.g., Philo, *Cher.* 29, 99; *Fug.* 99). It is often paired with φιλανθρωπία (e.g., *Spec.* 2.79; 4.18; *Virt.* 121, 188), as here and in Josephus (*Ap.* 2.213). Gentleness (ἡπιότης) is much rarer synonym, occurring in Philo only here and in *Decal.* 167. Hecataeus of Abdera (*apud* Josephus, *Ap.* 1.186) uses the term, along with φιλανθρωπία, in reference to Ptolemy.

humanity. Closely related to kindness in Philo is φιλανθρωπία. Jews in antiquity were accused of μισανθρωπία (e.g., Diodorus Siculus 34/35.1.1–5; Apolonius Molon *apud* Josephus, *Ap.* 2.148; cf. of Christians in Tacitus, *Ann.* 15.44.4). Thus, the opposite virtue was regularly emphasized in Hellenistic Jewish apologetics (see Berthelot 2003). In *Virt.* 51 Philo considers φιλανθρωπία “most closely related to piety [εὐσέβεια], its sister and twin” (trans. Wilson 2011, 55). This reference marks the opening of a separate treatise *Περὶ φιλανθρωπίας* (*Virt.* 51–174).

liberality. Philo uses this term (μεγαλοφροσύνη) only four times, three times (counting the present passage) in reference to generosity (*Spec.* 2.72, 88; cf. the adjective μεγαλόφρων in *Virt.* 90), and once in reference to greatness of reputation (*Mos.* 2.29, of Ptolemy II Philadelphus). The adjective also occurs in a virtue list similar to the one under consideration here (*Virt.* 182). Like Philo, Josephus uses the term to describe the Jewish nation and law (e.g., *Ant.* 2.141; 8.175; 12.224).

happiness and goodness. Happiness (μακαριότης) is a synonym of εὐδαιμονία in Philo, the pair occurring some 67 times (e.g., *Opif.* 235; *Det.* 86; *Spec.* 1.209; *Virt.* 205). The pairing of these terms betrays Philo's Jewish and Greek philosophical backgrounds, since the term εὐδαιμονία never occurs in the Greek Bible, while the μακαρία word group occurs over 100 times. Goodness (ἀγαθότης) appropriately rounds out Philo's list since he terms it “the most generic virtue ... from which the particular virtues derive” (*Leg.* 1.59). God is closely associated with goodness (*Leg.* 3.73), as it is one of his two Powers (*Cher.* 27), through which he creates the world (*Leg.* 3.73; *Deus* 108).

Daylight will fail me. This rhetorical device is found elsewhere in Philo (*Somn.* 2.63; *Spec.* 4.238), and is quite common in Greek authors (Isocrates, *Demon.* 11; Demosthenes, *Cor.* 296; Heb 11:32; Athenaeus, *Deipn.* 5.63).

specific virtues. Philo routinely distinguishes between generic and specific virtue (e.g., *Deus* 95; *Ebr.* 138; *Fug.* 176). See further Jastram 1991 and the comments on §84 below. Philo also seems to speak of generic and specific virtue in two different senses, one expressing an ontological difference, appearing to be of Platonic origin, and the other expressing an ethical and logical distinction, appearing to be of Stoic origin (Radice 1994, 443).

§28. **bodyguard.** Philo utilizes the image of the body-guard (δορυφόρος) more than forty times. Here he depicts generic Virtue surrounded by the particular virtues (cf. *Leg.* 1.59; *Migr.* 37; *Spec.* 1.137). On the term δορυφορέω in general see §59 below.

Virtue. Following the Stoics, Philo regards Virtue (singular) as a unitary concept, with the specific virtues (plural) deriving from generic Virtue (e.g., *Leg.* 1.64; *Sacr.* 84; *Mut.* 77–78). In general see *SVF* 3.262–94. *SVF* 3.199 is clear: “The person who has general virtue also has specific virtue, and the person who has specific virtue also has generic virtue.”

dressed in the pomp of a tragic actress. The adjective τραγικός can refer to a pompous style of dress in general, but Philo's fondness of the theater should lead us to read his language here more

literally, as though he is presenting a dramatic scene on the stage (cf. *Leg.* 3.202; *Ios.* 78). *Prob.* and *Aet.* especially abound in Tragic quotations (e.g., *Prob.* 116; 134; 152; *Aet.* 5, 30, 49). On Philo and Greek dramatic literature in general, see Koskenniemi 2006.

it is my nature to hate evil. Philo is fond of the expression μισοπόνηρος φύσει, although he is the first Greek author to use it (*Conf.* 46; *Mut.* 108; *Mos.* 1.149; *Decal.* 87, 177; *Legat.* 193).

drop your guard ... deceived. Neglect (λανθάνω) is often associated with deception (ἀπατάω) in Philo (*Conf.* 54; *Spec.* 4.188; *Legat.* 40, 62, 80).

once deceived, give consent. The Epicureans themselves debated the reliability of sense-perception to determine good and bad (Cicero, *Fin.* 1.31), although Epicurus himself identified αἴσθησις, πρόληψις, and πάθος as the criteria of truth (Diogenes Laertius 10.31). Deception was always a theoretical problem, since the other schools believed the senses could be easily tricked.

worst of evils ... best of goods. For similar language, cf. *Mos.* 2.200.

an unintended failure. Philo uses the language of a failed business venture (ἀπωσάμενος ἀβούλητον ἐμπορεύση κακοπραγίαν). The student who fails to evaluate properly might invest a fortune in a proposition destined to fail.

§29. **costume.** Literally, “other, foreign” (ἄλλότρια). In *Spec.* 4.185 Philo uses similar language to refer to stage costumes, a meaning that fits the context here (see §28 and notes).

nets and snares. Méasson notes that Philo applies this metaphor in three ways: (1) to pleasure as a trap (cf. *Agr.* 103; *Virt.* 39), (2) to sense-perception as an intermediary through which pleasure works (cf. *Ebr.* 70), and (3) to objects that appear good to the senses (cf. *Deus* 153; *Praem.* 20) (PAPM 4:90 n. 2).

to desecrate the soul. Leisegang draws attention to Cicero, *Fin.* 1.55, “The pleasures and pains of the soul are born from the pleasures and pains of the body,” also noting the anti-Epicurean context of Cicero’s remarks (PCH 3:225 n. 3). Cf. also Plutarch, *Frat. amor.* 491C. For the anti-Epicurean tone of this section see notes to §§20, 26 above.

sweet to the eyes ... music to the ears. The senses of sight and hearing are usually listed first among the five, and thus stand as the most reliable (e.g., *Opif.* 62; *Leg.* 3.44; *Sacr.* 73; *Abr.* 236). However, the inability of the senses to offer accurate judgments is a common ancient theme, dating back to the Presocratics (e.g., Anaxagoras, *Fr.* 21; Democritus, *Fr.* 9, 125). See further notes on §34.

the soul, your most precious possession. The language is inspired by Plato’s *Laws* 728c: “No possession (κτῆμα) is better suited by nature to the human being than the soul” (cf. 726a; 727e; 731c).

entice ... uncomfortable. Leisegang believes the words προσηνής and ῥαστώνη are taken from Epicurean doctrine of the Good (PCH 3:226 n. 1). Plutarch, for example, writes, “For without a teacher, these good, smooth, gratifying [προσηνής] movements of the soul ... will suck in even those who refuse to admit or acknowledge being bowed and softened by them” (*Adv. Col.* 27 [1122e]). Plutarch elsewhere also refers to “the ease [σχολή] and leisure [ῥαστώνη] of Epicurus” (*Quaest. conv.* 655C).

§30. **In full disclosure.** In the Allegorical Commentary, Philo frequently uses the verb “stripping” (ἀπαμφιάζω) with reference to the soul’s vulnerability (*Leg.* 2.53–54; *Cher.* 17; *Gig.* 53; *Deus* 56, 103; *Somn.* 2.170). In contrast to the deceptive ornamentation of Pleasure, Virtue will expose herself free of clothing, makeup, and jewelry.

to obscure and cover up what is disagreeable. Pleasure always aims to deceive by concealing her less desirable traits (e.g., *Opif.* 165–166; *Leg.* 3.61–64). Pleasure is for Philo, as it was for Plato, a mere illusion (on Plato, see Moss 2006). By contrast, Epicurus trusted pleasure as the *telos* of human action (Cicero, *Tusc.* 5.96).

burdensome and hard to endure. The term ἐπαχθής elsewhere in Philo refers to the life of the wicked (*Leg.* 3.251; *Migr.* 145), and both terms are used to describe slavery (*Deus* 114; *Spec.* 2.90). This is the only context in which either term is associated with virtue.

in plain words. Philo is the first author to use the expression ὄνομα γυμνόν (*Opif.* 24; *Spec.* 2.131).

things that seem the worst evils. Ancient dogmatic philosophy holds that humans desire what is good. The problem comes with their inability to judge correctly the good from the bad. Seneca, for example, writes:

Badness sometimes takes the appearance of rectitude, and excellence shines forth from its opposite. Virtues and vices, as you know, border on one another, and a likeness of what is right pertains to those who are also depraved and base The similarity between these forces us to take thought and to distinguish things which are related in appearance but are immensely different in fact” (*Epist.* 120.5–6; trans. LS 60E).

§31. **stored away.** The noun θησαυρός has been used above (§§22, 25), the verb here and in §33. The term is regularly found in Theophrastus of “preserving” fruits and vegetables (*Hist. plant.* 3.12.5; 6.4.10; 8.11.6).

sweetened. Although Philo uses the noun ἡδονή 422 times, the verb ἡδύνω occurs only six times, twice in reference to hearing (*Leg.* 2.75; *Post.* 106), twice in reference to seeing (*Sacr.* 29; *Contempl.* 50), and twice in reference to taste (*Ebr.* 219; *Contempl.* 53), 53). The verb used here (ἐφηδύνω) occurs only twice in Philo (*Fug.* 139), and, according to the TLG, only once before him (in an Aeschylus fragment).

colors ... flavors. Athenaeus quotes Epicurus as saying, “I cannot recognize the good if you take away the pleasures I get from flavors [χυλός]... sexual dalliances [ἀφροδίσιος] ... pleasant sounds [ἀκρόασμα] and the sweet movements [ἡδεῖα κίνησις] of the visual form” (Athenaeus, *Deipn.* 12.67 = Usener fr. 67).

illnesses and plagues. The routine pairing of νόσος and κῆρ seems to be more characteristic of Philo than of other ancient authors (e.g., *Det.* 44, 98; *Sobr.* 38; *Somn.* 1.222; *Spec.* 4.200), but the terms fit well within the ethical context of Hellenistic psychology (see Nussbaum 1994). Soul sickness is a special concern of the Stoics, so much so that Chrysippus authors an entire treatise on the subject (see Cicero, *Tusc.* 3.1–21), and considers the philosopher a “physician of the soul” (Galen, *PHP* 5.2.22–24).

induced by the thrill. Literally, “lifted up by some breeze” (αὔρα τινός ... ἐπαρθείς), the term αὔρα can metaphorically apply to any fleeting “thrill” brought on by poor judgment (Euripides, *Hipp.* 166; cf. *El.* 1202; *Orest.* 1427).

§32. We have already observed Virtue’s itemization of 34 traits the young soul should find desirable (§27). To balance, here we have the longest vice list to survive from the ancient world. Philo enumerates some 147 undesirable traits that Pleasure has left concealed.

Vice lists are standard in the diatribe, and are readily taken up in philosophical works (e.g., Diogenes Laertius 7.92–93; Epictetus, *Diatr.* 4.9.16–17). They are often balanced with

virtue lists as well (e.g., Seneca, *Epist.* 95.65–67; Dio Chrysostom, *4 Regn.* 83–96). Although Greco-Roman examples are abundant, Jewish literature is not without parallels as well (e.g., Jer 7:9; Hos 4:2; 1QS 4.9–11; Wis 14:25–26; 4 Macc 1:26–27). Of course, much has been written on the virtue and vice lists in the New Testament, including their original *Sitz(e) im Leben* (e.g., Vögtle 1936; Wibbing 1959; Charles 1997). Here, it is sufficient to note simply that ancient moralistic literature in general uses lists of desirable and undesirable traits as a teaching mechanism, and such fits well the immediate context of *Sacr.*, as well as with a hypothesized scholastic setting for the Allegorical Commentary in general (see, e.g., Sterling 1999; 2017). For other Philonic vice lists see, e.g., *Post.* 52; *Conf.* 117; *Abr.* 135–36; *Virt.* 180–83.

It is difficult to decipher any structure in the vice list here, but a number of common features stand out. Grammatically, Philo prefers strings of alpha-privatives (e.g., ἀδιάγωγος—ἄσπονδος, ἄτακτος—ἀνοργίαστος, ἀμαθής—ἀπειθής), and strong compounds, such as δυσ- (e.g., δυσσπονόητος—δυσέφικτος) or βαρυ- terms (βαρύμηνης—βαρυπενθής). Philo’s preference for adjectives beginning with letters early in the alphabet may reflect an alphabetic list of vices, or at least an Alexandrian tendency to alphabetize (see Daly 1967). Thematically, Méasson isolates five general categories: (1) Solitude (πανούργος—ἄτακτος); (2) Religion (ἀσεβής—παλαμναῖος); (3) Sensuality (ἀνελεύθερος—ἄπληστος); (4) Attitude toward others (ἀλαζών—κόλαξ); (5) The effects of vice on the body and spirit (from νωθής on) (PAPM 4:197).

O friend. See §22 and notes.

in love with Pleasure. Philo uses the noun φιλήδονος 23 times (all except three in the Allegorical Commentary), far more than any ancient author. Polybius says of a certain Aulus Postumius that he was “both fond of pleasure and averse to toil” (καὶ γὰρ φιλήδονος ἦν καὶ φυγόπονος) (39.1.10), a description with resonances in our context (see §§35ff on the nature of toil). Posidonius indeed regards the love of toil (φιλόπονος) as the opposite of the love of pleasure (φιλήδονος) (EK 168F). The serpent is Philo’s paradigmatic symbol of the “pleasure lover” (*Opif.* 157–60), who receives an Epicurean presentation (see Booth 1994). The Stoics define φιληδονία simply as ἐπιθυμία ἡδονῶν [ἄμετρος] (*SVF* 3.395, 397).

Antisocial Behavior

cunning. The opening section of the list deals with anti-social behavior, according to Harl. Philo uses the adjective πανούργος twelve times and the noun πανουργία 24 times. The reason why the term leads his vice list can be explained by Philo’s definition of πανουργία as “an intentional sickness of the soul” (*Sacr.* 48), and by his remark that “we do wrong because of pleasure, and wrongdoing cannot occur without extreme cunning” (*Leg.* 2.107). Through cunning, the senses are aroused to pursue wickedness (cf. *Opif.* 156).

insolent. The adjective θρασύς is characteristic of sense-perception gone wild (*Leg.* 2.67). It can describe “rashness” born from excessive courage (*Det.* 18, 24), and is the result of arrogance (*Det.* 44; *Heres* 21). It is the latter association that best fits here.

discordant. The adjective ἀνάρμοστος, refers to disharmony in music (LSJ), and is “a Platonic word associated with vice in the soul” (Winston and Dillon 1983, 276, citing *Gorg.* 482b; *Phaed.* 93c).

asocial. The adjective ἄμικτος is used of inhospitable places (Euripides, *Iph. taur.* 403), or of creatures, such as the Cyclops (Euripides, *Cycl.* 429). Anti-social behavior was also an accusation against Jews (*Virt.* 141; Josephus, *Ant.* 11.212). For the meaning here, see *Fug.* 35; *Spec.* 2.16. The term is often paired with ἀκοινωνήτος (see below).

intractable. The adjective δύσχηστος, a *hapax* in Philo, can indicate stubborn animals elsewhere (Xenophon, *Cyn.* 3.11; Plutarch, *Alex.* 6.1). Philo probably intends it as a synonym for the more common and previously mentioned ἄμικτος, which has a similar range (*Spec.* 4.204; *Praem.* 92).

abnormal. The adjective ἔκθεσμος is used in Philo more than in any other ancient author (14 times), with the exception of Eusebius. The term is paired in Philo with ἔκφυλος, or anomalous behavior (*Det.* 61; *Abr.* 137), and is associated with impiety (*Det.* 72; cf. *Aet.* 85).

irritable. The term ἀκρόγολος occurs three times in Philo, and is the product of senselessness (ἀφροσύνη) (*Somn.* 2.192). Ps-Aristotle refers to the term, along with πικρία and βαρυθυμία (also in Philo's list), as "the three types of irritability" (ὀργιλότης) (*Virt. vit.* 1251a). Chrysippus likewise associated the term with those who have "a proclivity toward passion or some other unnatural quality, such as pain (ἐπιλυπία), irritability (ὀργιλότης), envy (φθονερία), and incorrigibility" (ἀκροχολία) (*SVF* 3.421).

obstinate. See notes to §121.

vulgar. The term φορτικός occurs only one other time in Philo in a quotation of Plato, *Theat.* 176c (*Fug.* 82).

incorrigible. The term ἀνουθέτητος is found only in *Sacr.* in the works of Philo (§§23, 32), and before him only in Isocrates (*Nic.* 2.4), Demosthenes (*Epist.* 3.11), and possibly Menander (Meineke line 49).

rash. The term εὐχερής indicates thoughtlessness and carelessness, especially in speech (e.g., Plato, *Theaet.* 154b). While the term can be positive, Philo uses it six times, always in a negative sense (cf. *Heres* 81, 97; *Somn.* 1.13).

deceptive. The word κακοτέχνος refers to fraudulent activity with the intention to deceive. Thus the term can indicate "seductive" dancing (Philodemus apud *Anthologia Palatina* 5.129.1) or rhetorical affectation (Ps-Demosthenes, *Lacr.* 56; *Macart.* 2). The Wisdom of Solomon states, "Wisdom does not enter into a deceptive soul" (1:4).

impossible to get along with. The term ἀδιάγωγος from all appearances is a Philonic coinage, and is found only twice in extant Greek literature (*Leg.* 3.156 and here).

unjust. With this term Philo launches into a series of adjectives with natural opposites. The Stoics regard ἀδικία as a cardinal vice opposed to δικαιοσύνη (Diogenes Laertius 7.92), and Philo follows suit (e.g., *Post.* 93; *Heres* 243; *Mut.* 197). Interestingly, Paul uses the same term at the head of his vice list in 1 Cor 6:9–10.

inequitable. Whereas ἀδικία opposes δικαιοσύνη, ἄνισος is the opposite of ἴσος (*Conf.* 48; *Spec.* 1.121; 2.21; cf. Plato, *Phaed.* 74c; *Parm.* 140b; *Resp.* 558c).

unsociable. Philo uses this term twenty times (eight with ἄμικτος, on which see above), sometimes in a positive sense of abstaining from contacts bad for the soul (*Cher.* 86; *Dec.* 123), but usually in a negative sense (e.g., *Spec.* 2.16; *Virt.* 141). The term is the opposite of κοινωνία (*Dec.* 171; *Spec.* 2.75; 4.187).

irreconcilable. The word ἀσύμβατος indicates the impossibility of reconciliation, such as the natural friction between good and evil (*Abr.* 14), virtue and vice (*Abr.* 105), enemies in war (*Spec.* 1.313; 3.16), criminals (*Ios.* 156), or former friends (*Mos.* 1.242).

implacable. The term ἄσπονδος is a synonym for the previous adjective, referring to those who are unwilling to entertain a truce. Thus the term is frequently paired with ἐχθρός (*Post.* 165; *Conf.* 45; *Spec.* 3.195).

covetous. Philo uses the adjective πλεονέκτης only three times (here; *Mos.* 1.56; *QG* 4.172). The term appears in three New Testament vice lists (1 Cor 5:10–11; 6:10; Eph 5:5; cf. Rom

1:29). Both Philo and the New Testament associate covetousness with idolatry (*Spec.* 1.23, 25; Eph 5:5; Col 3:5).

ill-governed. The adjective κακόνομος is a *hapax* in Philo, and occurs only once before him in Herodotus 1.65.2. The noun κακονομία is the opposite of εὐνομία (cf. Ps-Xenophon *Ath. resp.* 1.8; Ps-Ocellus 4.8). We thus surmise the term refers to those whose bad behavior reflects a poor ethical system.

without friend, without home, without city. These adjectives seem to have originally derived from Tragedy (Euripides, *Iph. taur.* 220; *Hipp.* 1029; Sophocles, *Phil.* 1018), but are taken up into Stoic thought by Zeno. In his *Respublica* Zeno states only good people (σπουδαῖοι) could be “citizens (πολίτης), friends (φίλοι), kin (οἰκείοι) and free (ἐλεύθεροι)” (Diogenes Laertius 7.33). Epictetus likewise adopts the theme in addressing the Cynic life (*Diatr.* 3.22.45, 47 in a vice list!). Philo is especially fond of the same pair (ἄοικος, ἄπολις), found six times in his writings (*Leg.* 3.2–3; *Sacr.* 32; *Gig.* 67; *Congr.* 58; *Virt.* 190), each time as a characteristic of the bad man (φᾶῦλος).

seditions. The political origins of στασιώδης are obvious, and Josephus uses the term in precisely this sense (στάσις 165 times and the adjective 16 times; see Price 2003). Chrysippus, by contrast, uses the term in a moral sense to refer to the havoc passion wreaks on the soul (*SVF* 3.563), and this usage is more in line with Philo’s application. In the Philonic corpus, the adjective στασιώδης is found only here and *Spec.* 4.89. In the latter passage it describes the force of ἐπιθυμία on the human intellect.

disorderly. See notes to §§45, 85.

Impious Behavior

impious. Just as “cunning” (πανουργία) is a fountain head for social misbehavior (see above), so also “impiety” (ἀσέβεια) is the source of spiritual error (see §15 and notes).

unholy. Philo uses the term ἀνίερος 30 times—more than any ancient author. Although the cultic associations are relevant here, Philo also connects the term with pleasure (*Congr.* 169; *Spec.* 1.292). The ceremonial and the moral are connected in *Sacr.* 138: “what is disgraceful is profane, and what is profane is entirely unholy.”

unsettled, unstable. The term ἀνίδρυτος would seem to relate better to the adjectives ἄοικος and ἄπολις just above, but Philo elsewhere employs the collocation ἀνίδρυτος...ἄστατος as a metaphor for mental instability (e.g., *Det.* 12; *Post.* 22; *Deus* 4; *Somn.* 1.156). Philo is in fact the first author to use the term ἀνίδρυτος in a metaphorical sense (Winston and Dillon 1983, 277). *Virt.* 39–40 is especially noteworthy since Philo there portrays the wily woman adorning herself with the intent of luring a young man: “And drawing near with lewd glances and beguiling words and licentious postures and movements they enticed the weak-minded part of the youth, whose disposition was unstable and unsettled [ἀνερμάτιστα καὶ ἀνίδρυτα]” (trans. Wilson, PACS 3:51). Additionally, Winston and Dillon highlight the potential Epicurean background of the term ἄστατος (1983, 277), where the text refers to the vicissitudes of chance (τύχη; *Epist. ad Menoeceum* 133 [Arrighetti]).

irreligious. The adjective ἀνοργίαστος is found five times in Philo (*Cher.* 94; *Sacr.* 32; *Ebr.* 146; *QG* 1.2, 14), and is obviously borrowed from the language of the mysteries (cf. Yonge’s translation “uninitiated”). Based on *QG* 1.2 (Paramelle) it appears the term carries the associations of reckless indifference in cultic affairs (cf. *Cher.* 94). See §33 for Philo’s own tongue-in-cheek acknowledgment of his mystery terminology.

profane. Like the previous term, βέβηλος also derives from the mysteries (Plato, *Symp.* 218b), but Philo probably uses it in the biblical sense (Lev 10:10; cf. *Spec.* 1.100–104). See §138 and notes.

polluted. The term may describe divinely “cursed” people, such as Cain (*Det.* 96; *Fug.* 60; *Praem.* 68), but here probably has the cultic meaning of polluted (*Mos.* 2.196; *Spec.* 1.89; 3.93).

falsely devoted. The term βωμολόχος is usually associated with jokes and pranks in Greek literature, but Philo used it in a cultic sense (*Cher.* 94), especially of the absurd rituals of the mystery cults opposed to pious worship (*Deus* 102; cf. *Spec.* 1.319). Cf. Plutarch, *Pyth. orac.* 407c.

wretched, heinous. The terms ἀλάστωρ and παλαμναῖος refers either to (divine) avengers or to those who deserve vengeance. Philo uses ἀλάστωρ only three times, but he uses it in both senses (*Congr.* 57; *Flacc.* 175). Plutarch defines it, “An ἀλάστωρ is someone who has done unforgettable things (ἄληστα) that will be remembered for a long time” (*Quaest. rom.* 297a). Chrysippus also associates the term with an etymology, this time from ἀλάομαι (*SVF* 2.156–58). The term παλαμναῖος occurs only four times in Philo (*Mos.* 2.203; *Legat.* 89), once more with ἀλάστωρ (*Congr.* 57), and the pair appears in Cornutus (*Nat. d.* 10) and in Plutarch (*Def. orac.* 418b; *Quaest. rom.* 297a).

Sensual Behavior

base. The term ἀνελεύθερος refers to an ignobility or courseness; that is, not being servile, but *acting* servile. Plato gives the term as a mark of wickedness (τὸ κακοήθης) (*Resp.* 401b), and associates it with the body rather than the mind (*Gorg.* 518a; cf. Xenophon, *Symp.* 8.23). It is the opposite of self-abasement (Xenophon, *Mem.* 3.10.5). The term is also used of the deceptiveness of appearance (Plato, *Gorg.* 465b) and of youths who reject philosophy (*Gorg.* 485c).

harsh. Philo uses the word ἀπότομος only here, and the noun ἀποτομία only twice (*Spec.* 2.94; *Flacc.* 95). Again, we seem to find the influence of theatrical language in this section, as the metaphorical application belongs exclusively to that tradition in the Classical period (e.g., Euripides, *Alc.* 118, 982; Sophocles, *Oed. tyr.* 877). However, Wis uses the term five times (5:20; 6:5; 11:10; 12:9; 18:15), and Josephus uses the adjective to describe Herod (*Ant.* 19.329).

savage, slavish. θηριώδης καὶ ἀνδραποδώδης is a Platonic collocation (*Resp.* 430b; cf. Aristotle, *Nic. eth.* 1118a). The term θηριώδης is connected with passion (*Abr.* 32) controlling the mind (*Agr.* 46). Philo uses the term ἀνδραποδώδης five times, each in connection with sense perception, especially the sense of taste (*Abr.* 149; *Spec.* 1.174; 4.100; *Contempl.* 45).

cowardly. The term δειλία is the opposite of θρασύς, both of which oppose ἀνδρεία on either side of the Aristotelian mean (see §27 and notes; see *Deus* 162–65). Plato defines δειλία “the strongest shackle of the soul,” basing himself on an etymology from δέω (“to bind”) and λίαν (“excessively”) (*Crat.* 415c; cf. *Soph.* 228e). The Stoics

unbridled. The term ἀκολασία describes the prostitute in §22 above.

§33. **the great mysteries.** Philo refers to τὰ μεγάλα μυστήρια four times (*Leg.* 3.100; *Cher.* 49; *Sacr.* 33, 62). In contrast to the “little mysteries” (τὰ μικρὰ μυστήρια), which can liberate the soul from the passions, the great mysteries liberate the soul from the senses (*Sacr.* 62; *Mos.* 1.62; *QG* 4.110; Lévy 2018). See §62 and notes. Here, Philo uses the phrase fecitiously, the 147 vices just listed representing the apex of a vicious life.

purposely concealed. Philo once again exposes the disingenuous nature of Pleasure (cf. §§21–25 and comments).

avoid any association. The term σύννοδος is used in Philo to refer to sexual unions that result in pleasure (*Opif.* 161; *Congr.* 12; *Ios.* 43; cf. *Cher.* 50; *Abr.* 101). Of course the Greek title of *Congr.* adopts the metaphorical application of the term (Περὶ τῆς πρὸς τὰ προπαιδεύματα συνόδου).

multitude and magnitude of goods stored up with me. Here, Virtue mockingly refers to pleasure's claim to have “coffers full of all good things” (§22). Philo is fond of the πλῆθος-μέγεθος pair, which may derive from a Platonist tradition (cf. *Leg.* 733b; 860b; *Alc. maj.* 134b; Diogenes Laertius 3.12).

well-disposed nature. Α φύσις ἕλωος is mentioned twelve times in Philo, nine times describing God (e.g., *Opif.* 168; *Mos.* 2.61; *Spec.* 1.310). Here and in *Fug.* 154; *Mos.* 1.160 alone the expression refers to humans. Philo is the first author to use the expression, but Plato, *Leg.* 792e uses vocabulary reminiscent of this paragraph.

my banquet. The term θοίνη indicates a sumptuous feast, and is usually paired in Philo with εὐωχία (*Agr.* 66; *Mos.* 1.187; *Legat.* 356). The banquet here, however, aims not to please the body, but the mind—the only time Philo uses the term in a positive sense. The scene Philo paints here is obviously borrowed from the charioteer myth of Plato's *Phaedr.* 247, which is also described as a θοίνη (247a).

pleasures of the filled stomach fatten the body. The expression ἡδονὴ γαστρός is apparently of Epicurean origin, and Philo uses the phrase more than 25 times (e.g., *Leg.* 1.86; *Sacr.* 49; *Ios.* 61). Leisegang cites the famous Epicurean fragment: “Pleasing the stomach is the beginning and root of all good, and all wisdom's excessive pursuits find their reference point in it” (Athenaeus, *Deipn.* 12.546f = fr. 409 [Usener]). On the Epicurean origin further, see Plutarch, *Suav. viv.* 1087d; 1098d). The moralists rage against food and drink merely to please the body (e.g., Seneca, *Marc.* 22.2; Epictetus, *Diss.* 1.9.8; 3.3.17; 4.8.34; Musonius Rufus, *Diss.* 18a–b), and Wendland regards this sort of discussion as a chief characteristic of the diatribe (1895, 8–15).

the nourished mind happily devoted to the virtues. Philo's language of the nourished mind reminds us of Plato's charioteer (*Phaedr.* 247d). This mind at least temporarily beholds pure essence (τὸ ὄν) and “the true” (τῶν ἀληθῶν), and thereby is “nourished and receives enjoyment” (τρέφεται καὶ εὐπαθεῖ). Philo substitutes the term ἐγχορεύω for εὐπαθέω (a verb he never uses). The former appears eight times (*Post.* 137; *Plant.* 38; *Ebr.* 138; *Congr.* 20; *Fug.* 187; *Mut.* 225, 229). Plutarch also uses the term on the lips of Alexander, who claims to imitate Heracles and Perseus by dancing in India (with reference to Bacchic celebrations) (*Alex. fort.* 332b).