Abstract: The Philonic allegory of Virtue and Pleasure has its origins in the Prodicus myth quoted at the beginning of Xenophon, Mem. 2. Philo depends on a rich scholastic reception of the text, and alters it to feature Jacob (rather than Heracles!) as the student choosing between the goods of Virtue and the ills of Pleasure. Highly rhetorical in nature, Philo's diatribal excursus on Deut 21:15–17 culminates in the longest vice list preserved from the ancient world. I shall provide a sample commentary on this text, drawing parallels to major themes located in the Allegorical Commentary.

Introduction

Philo’s De sacrificiis is an exegetical commentary on Gen 4:2–4a. The first half of the treatise (§§1–51) does not deal with sacrifices at all, but with Cain and Abel as types of souls (§2). In his usual fashion, Philo searches for scriptural parallels to substantiate his primary level of exegesis. Indeed, he locates Jacob and Esau who likewise represent types of souls (§4), leading to a series of examples of patriarchal “additions” (§§5–10). The second movement of the treatise turns us back to the biblical lemma (§11). Here Philo asks why Cain is born before Abel when in fact the profession of Abel is mentioned before that of Cain (§§11, 14–16). Philo never considers the probability of a biblical chiasm here, but instead builds an inter-Pentateuchal case that the
younger is always exalted above the older. How can this be? Returning to the “soul types” paradigm, Philo concludes that vice (e.g., Cain, Esau) is older than virtue (e.g., Abel, Jacob).

Thus far Philo has laid the groundwork for two exegetical insights, namely (1) there are two types of souls (or modes of behavior) in each individual, and (2) the one first realized is the worse.¹ Only by education, effort, and divine grace can the individual become disentangled from vice in order to choose virtue. These insights set the context for our passage.

The Text

Philo is drawn to the Deut 21:15–17 because: (1) He has been discussing the inheritance of Jacob and Esau (§§17–18); (2) the term “firstborn” has driven his exegesis since §14; and (3) the presence of two brothers in the lemma matches Philo’s focus on the Abel-Cain/Jacob-Esau comparison since §4. What follows, however, represents a temporary excursus from the focus of Sacr. thus far. Philo has apparently genericized the σοφίας ἐραστής and the φιλος (§18), and now considers the two wives, just as Abel and Cain and Jacob and Esau, to be competing forces within the soul. The entirety of §§19–45 represents the mental challenge to abandon vice and embrace virtue, with Jacob (not Hercules!) as the star pupil (§42 makes this clear).

Philo quotes the text of Deuteronomy 21:15–17 three times in his extant treatises, but we have chosen to omit Her. 49 from the chart below because it seems to be more of a paraphrase and, in any case, basically agrees with Sacr. and Sobr.

| LXX | Philo, Sacr. 19 | Philo, Sobr. 21 |

¹ This insight gives the appearance of some Philonic doctrine of “original sin” (see Laporte 1988). Of course, the Bible is consistent with such an idea (Gen 8:21; Prov 22:15), but the Greeks also recognized the misbehavior of youths.
The only place where Philo appears to have had a different text than the LXX is with the term κληροδοτή (UF have κατακληρονομη), which is found in both full quotations of the passage, instead of the LXX’s κατακληρονομη (see Wevers 2006, 245, who disagrees with the earlier text of Rahlfs). The majority of LXX mss have κατακληροδοτη, which is closer to Philo’s text, but in the Götttingen edition Wevers decided against it (for rationale, see Wevers 1995, 342). The Sacr. version, however, does reflect a little Philonic manipulation. He moves πρωτότοκος to the end of
the clause καὶ γένηται ὁ υἱὸς τῆς μισουμένης πρωτότοκος. Philo does not bother with the alteration in Sobr., indicating that he chose in Sacr. to alter his text for the sake of clarity. He wanted to make explicit a paradox he will go on to exploit: the preferred son is the son of the hated woman.

Translation

(§19) And concerning this doctrine Moses registers a law, putting it forth extremely well and profitably. And it proceeds as follows: “if a man has two wives, one loved and one hated, and both the loved and hated wives bear him children, and the son of the hated wife is the firstborn, it shall be on the day on which he divides his inheritance to his sons that he shall not be able to give the portion due to the firstborn to the son of the loved wife, overlooking the firstborn son of the hated wife, but he shall recognize the firstborn son of the hated wife by giving him a double portion of all things that are found to be his, because he is the beginning of his children and to him the right of the firstborn properly belongs.”

(§20) Recognize and understand, O my soul, who is the hated wife and who is the son of the hated wife, and you will instantly perceive that to this son alone, and to no other, rightfully belongs the rights of firstborn. For each of us has two wives living within us who are antagonistic and hostile to one another, who fill up the home of the soul with contentious jealousy. And of these we love the one who is submissive and deferential, and who we think is most beautiful and best suited to ourselves. This woman we call pleasure. But the other we hate, regarding her as unruly, untamable, uncivilized and most hostile. And her name is virtue.

(§21) So the first woman comes forward playing coy like a prostitute or courtesan, with a seductive sashay marked by an overwrought daintiness and charm. She batts her eyes, and using them as bait, hooks the souls of the young. She fixes her eyes on her mark with self-assured shamelessness, holding her neck high, raising herself up beyond what nature has assigned her. She grins and giggles, the hair of her head braided in excessively elaborate styles, her face smothered with make-up, her eyebrows engulfed in paint. She often makes use of warm baths, her flush artificial. She is completed covered with gaudy floral dresses, and bracelets and necklaces and all other types of feminine jewelry crafted from gold and precious stones hang around her. Her breath is laden with the sweetest perfumes. She thinks the entire marketplace her home, but she is nothing more than a common whore. Devoid of true beauty,
she pursues the false. (§22) And some of her best friends follow her: cunning, rashness, distrust, flattery, trickery, deception, lying, perjury, impiety, injustice, and intemperance. In the midst of them she stands as the leader of a chorus and says the following to the mind: “Listen, my friend, in my possession are coffers full of all good things, or at least, the ones accessible to people (divine goods exist in heaven), and you will find nothing outside of these. And if you wish to dwell with me, I will lay open these coffers and offer you the most generous use and enjoyment of their contents forever. (§23) But first I want to tell you about the many goods I have to share, so that, if you consent, you may indulge as you please, and if you turn away, ignorance will not be the reason you refuse. In my possession are rest, security, leisure, indifference toward labor, a diversity of colors, the most melodious modulations of voice, expensive food and drink, the most abundant varieties of the sweetest-smelling scents, passionate love constantly, unregulated escapades, careless intercourse, conversation without criticism, action without consequence, life without care, sleep soft and sweet, an abundance that never runs out. (§24) So if you are willing to live your life with me, I will furnish whatever suits you, once I have made preparations. I will join you in sampling whatever you enjoy eating or drinking, or what you delight in seeing with the eye, hearing with the ear, or smelling with the nostrils. And of all that entices you nothing will fail [to be offered], and you will find the items produced more than can be consumed. (§25) For in the treasuries I have mentioned are evergreen plants blooming and bearing fruit in constant succession, so that the peek maturity of the seasonal and fresh produce succeeds and replaces those already ripened. And no war, either domestic or foreign, has ever cut down these plants, but ever since the earth first took them in, she has been feeding them like a good nurse. She made their roots as strong as possible, driving them deep like foundations, while above the ground extending their trunks skyward. She generates branches — imitations analogous to the hands and feet of animals — and causes leaves to grow like hair, with shade and adornment at the same time. Then she provides the fruit, the very purpose of all these things. (§26) When she heard these things, the other woman, standing in a hidden place but within earshot, became afraid that the mind, unaware it was being taken in and enslaved, might be misled by such lofty gifts and promises, and that it might also yield to the visible face of her who was so well and variously dressed for deception (for by her charms and amulets she was pricking the mind, bewitching it, provoking titillations in it). So, coming forward all of a sudden, she makes her appearance, bringing forth all the marks of a free citizen: a steady gait, the most serene countenance, an authentic coloring both in her modesty and on her body, her character without deception, her life unadulterated, her intention straightforward, her speech without deceit, the truest representation of a sound mind. Her style is not artificial, her step without swagger, her clothing modest, her adornment of understanding and virtue — more precious than gold. (§27) And her companions are piety, holiness, truth, right, sanctification, oath-keeping, justice, equity, trustworthiness, congeniality, restraint, temperance, moderation, self-

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7 I have attempted to reflect the Greek alliteration with a more poetic translation: ἵνα καὶ συνείσεις ἐκῶν ἀσμενίζῃς, κἂν ἀποστρέφῃ μὴ ἔγνωδον ἔρνη.

8 Méasson translates θέμις rather loosely “respect for the divine law” (PAPM 4: 89). This appears to be the only place in Philo’s corpus where θέμις describes a virtue.

9 The term ἐὐορκία occurs only here in Philo, although it is used in the title to Spec. book 2.

10 Pap omits the six virtues from ἀλήθεια to ἰσότης, probably due to parablepsis: (ὁσιότης ... ἰσότης). PCW is wrong to follow Scheil’s edition here.

11 The term ἐυσυνθεσία occurs only here in Philo.

12 The term ἐχεθυμία occurs only here in Philo. Before him, the term ἐχέθυμος occurs only once, in Homer (Od. 8.320). Several manuscripts correct the term to ἐχεθυμία.
mastery, meekness, austerity, thriftiness, modesty, tranquility, courage, nobility, wise counsel, foresight, prudence, attentiveness, will to make right, cheerfulness, generosity, kindness, gentleness, humanity, liberality, happiness, and goodness. Daylight will fail me if I keep listing the names of all her specific virtues.

(§28) These were stationed on each side as her bodyguard, with Virtue herself standing in the middle. And she, assuming her usual demeanor, began speaking as follows: “I see Pleasure, that lewd wonderworker and storyteller, dressed in the pomp of a tragic actress, buttering you up with constant conversation, and really laying it on thick. And since it is my nature to hate evil, I was afraid that you might drop your guard, and once deceived, give consent to the worst of evils, mistaking them for the best of goods. I thought it best to forewarn you with full disclosure what that woman really possesses, in order that you might reject nothing in ignorance that is to your advantage, and in so rejecting, end up an unintended failure. (§29) Know then that her attire is a mere costume. For of what relates to genuine beauty, nothing is brought out that naturally belongs to her. For she has bound herself with a counterfeit and deceptive means of retaining her figure—nets and snares designed to ensnare you. But if you are wise, you will see these ahead of time, and thus escape her catch. For while the sight of her is sweet to the eyes, and her voice music to the ears, she is naturally disposed to desecrate the soul, your most precious possession, by these and many other means. And she has detailed the things that belong to her which are sure to entice you as a listener, but she has concealed in cowardice and left unspoken all the other things that make you uncomfortable, to which she expects no one to consent readily. (§30) But I will expose these things in full disclosure, and will not imitate the ways of Pleasure, so as to reveal only what is alluring about myself, and thus to obscure and cover up what is disagreeable. On the contrary, I will keep silent about the things that of themselves bring delight and joy, knowing the results will speak for themselves, but the things that are burdensome and hard to endure I will explain in detail, setting them before you in plain words, so as to reveal the nature of each thing clearly, even for those who see poorly. For the things in my possession that seem the worst evils will be proven by those who try them out to be beautiful and more honorable than the best goods of Pleasure. (§31) And before I start with my own items, I will mention as many things as possible that Pleasure passed over in silence. For when she spoke of the things she has stored away—the colors, sounds, scents, flavors, qualities and faculties activated by touch and every other sense—she sweetened these by the attraction of her lecture, but she did not make known other illnesses and plagues which you will necessarily experience if you choose her. She left these unspoken in the hopes that you would be induced by the thrill of some gain and be caught in her net. (§32) Know then, my friend, that if you fall in love with Pleasure, you will be all these things: cunning, insolent, discordant, asocial, intractable, abnormal, unpleasant.

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13 Philo uses the noun διόρθωσις only here, and never the verb διορθόω. Some translations seem to leave open the possibility of self-improvement (esp. PAMM 4:91), but Amir’s דקורות (the quality of settling disputes) seems more in line with the context (1997, 195).

14 The terms τερατουργός and µυθολόγος occur only here in Philo.

15 I believe the idiomatic American English translation best captures the Greek, which can more literally be rendered, “preparing and conversing with you, persistently and often” (ἐνεσκευασμένη καὶ λιπαρῶς συν προσμιλουσάναι).

16 Amir notes the term ἔθελοκακία refers to cowards who flee in battle (citing Herodotus 1.127.3; 1997, 196 n. 45).

17 Literally, “by some breeze of gain.”

18 The adjective εκθεσίαμος seems to carry the sense of acting outside the bounds of accepted behavior (θεσίαμος). We are tempted to translate the term “weird.”
irritable, obstinate, vulgar, incorrigible, rash, deceptive, impossible to get along with, unjust, inequitable, unsociable, irreconcilable, implacable, covetous, ill-governed, without friend, without home, without city, seditious, disorderly, impious, unholy, unsettled, unstable, irreligious, profane, polluted, falsely devoted, wretched, heinous, base, harsh, savage, slavish, cowardly, unbridled, indecent, shaming and being shamed, unblushing, immoderate, insatiable, a boaster, conceited, arrogant, crude, captious, contentious, slanderous, frivolous, fraudulent, swindling, aimless, ignorant, stupid, argumentative, faithless, disobedient, rebellious, a cheat, dissembling, mischievous, leery, ill-reputed, elusive, inaccessible, abominable, averse, unbalanced, prating, rambling, babbling, full of hot air, a flatterer, dimwitted, inconsiderate, unobservant, short-sighted, improvident, negligent, unprepared, tasteless, offensive, stumbling, utterly failing, disordered, unchaperoned, greedy, easily led, easily manipulated, easily yielding, most treacherous, double-minded, double-tongued, conniving, deceitful, unscrupulous, irremediable, dependent, always insecure, vagrant, fearful, subject to impulse, easily persuaded, mad, fickle, clinging to life, thirsting for fame, vindictive, ill-tempered, rascible, disconsolate, quick-tempered, skittish, dilatory, a procrastinator, suspicious, faithless, selfish, stubborn, paranoid, a pessimist, tearful, malicious, rabid, deranged, unshapen, baneful, avaricious, self-infatuated, willingly subject, willingly inimical, a rabble-rouser, mismanaging, stiff-necked, effeminate, degenerate, languid, a mocker, greedy, a fool, sodden with unmitigated misfortune. (§33) Such are the great mysteries belonging to that most beautiful and highly-prized Pleasure. And these things she purposely concealed for fear that you would avoid any association with her if you knew about them. But who could adequately describe the multitude and magnitude of goods stored up with me? Those who partake already know, as well as those who have a well-disposed nature, once they have been called to share in my banquet—not the kind where the pleasures of the filled stomach fatten the body, but where the mind rejoices and is glad at the nourishment it receives and the pleasure it takes in virtue.

Summary

The Philonic exegesis of the “two wives” passage borrows from the famous myth attributed to Prodicus of Ceos. In Xenophon’s retelling, Hercules stands at the crossroads forced

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19 Translating ἄνοργίαστος is difficult. LSJ gives the definition “initiated,” citing our passage (cf. Yonge). This definition is relevant for Ebr. 146 as well. Colson evidently attempts to understand the term in light of the homeless theme as “excommunicate.” The translation provided here takes its cue from the European language translations (cf. Leisegang’s “ohne Gottesdienst” [PHC 3:227], Méasson’s “sans religion” [PAPM 4:95]; and Mazzarelli’s “senza religione” [Radice-Reale 2005, 399]).

20 The term βωμολόχος normally refers to a joker, but Philo clearly uses it in a cultic sense (Cher. 94). Very difficult to translate, Colson simply eliminates the cultic associates by rendering “a baffoon.” The translation here follows the rationale of Harl (PAPM 4:94–95, n. 1).

21 These occur in Euripides and Xenophon as pairs.

22 The term ἦς σοφλάθης seems to be a Philonic coinage.

23 Colson translates less literally “that grand pageant,” acknowledging the non-technical use of μυστήριον. We retain it here in an attempt to reflect the tongue-in-cheek expression (see Commentary).
to choose between virtue and vice. This was a popular allegory in Philo’s day, especially in educational circles, and has remained an important cultural symbol. Therefore, Philo does not seem to depend exclusively on Xenophon for his information, but inherits the allegory through the scholastic tradition. Furthermore, it does not appear to me that Philo is significantly influenced by the biblical book of Proverbs, as has been argued.

Subtle movements in the text, such as the identification of the two women as “virtue” and “pleasure,” rather than “virtue” and “vice,” are indications that Philo is reflecting a retelling. However, Philo does not slavishly borrow from any one author or tradition. As Wendland long ago declared, “It would be a lost cause to search for a specific name as Philo’s source.” Indeed, our primarily philological investigation demonstrates Philo’s mind at its most creative, a variety of terms being borrowed from the caricatures of the theatre, from the technical terminology of botany, and from the usual suspects, Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics.

Nevertheless, it seems clear that §§20–33 feature a consistent anti-Epicurean tone, and this use of the Prodicus myth probably dates to Stoic sources. “Pleasure” is presented as the Epicurean system of ethics, which exalts the senses as true. Epicurean key words and images are sprinkled throughout, such as Pleasure as a prostitute, the terms γαργαλίσμος (§26), ἀπραγμοσύνη (§27), ῥαστώνη (§29), and the expression ἡδονή γαστρός (§33), just to name a

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24 Xenophon, Mem. 2.1.21–34.
25 E.g., Cicero, Off. 1.118; Quintilian 9.2.36; Philostratus 482–83; Athenaeus, Deipn. 12.2.
26 Many verbal parallels between Philo and Xenophon remain, however (e.g., κοσμάω, σύγμα, χράμα).
27 On the suggestion that the Prodicus myth was a common school text in Philo’s day see Rochette 1998, 107; Franchi 2015, 34. For our text see Boulluec 1998.
29 See notes in the commentary on §20 below.
30 “Nach einem bestimmten Namen für die Quelle Philos zu suchen wäre verlorene Mühe” (1891, 142).
31 Cf. Cicero, Off. 1.32.118 (Panaetius?); Fin. 2.14.44 (Chrysippus); 2.21.69 (Cleanthes).
few. “Virtue,” on the other hand, exalts the Stoic view of the morally good. The Stoic-Cynic diatribe provides the general style, and the concluding paragraph (§33) echoes the famous Phaedrus myth of the mind as charioteer, borrowed from Plato. In other words, Philo features wisdom from all the schools of philosophy in his anti-Epicurean attack.

In this fascinating little excursus, Philo seems to have forgotten that his discussion began with dispositions in the soul, one referring all things to God (Abel), and the other all things to self (Cain). It is difficult to force Philo to the point of consistency, and make the two women dispositions in the soul. Rather, Philo has eliminated any mention of the “crossroads,” allowing the two women to represent the two paths. The Stoic-Cynic-Platonic way of life leads the young man to take hold of Virtue, fully aware of the effort required to enjoy her. In fact, Philo will launch an additional sermonette on the importance of πόνος in §§35–42. The Epicurean path of Pleasure, by contrast, allows every indulgence, but will ultimately bring him to misery. As though Philo realizes he has gone far enough, he attempts to tie off the original thought by returning to Jacob who, though younger in age than Esau, proved himself superior in virtue (§42).

Commentary

§20. O my soul. Winston and Dillon suggest this routine Philonic exclamation is characteristic of the diatribe style (1983, 333; for ancient parallels see Leopold 1983, 153 n. 15), but Terian notes the specific expression ὦ ψυχή occurs only five times outside of Philo in post-Socratic writers before the fourth century CE (1995, 57). The exclamation and its synonymν, ὦ διάνοια, signal Philo’s originality of thought, according to Terian. For the expression elsewhere in Philo cf. Leg. 3.11; Post. 135; Gig. 44; Deus 114; Migr. 219; Somn. 1.149. For Philo and the diatribe, Wendland 1895 is still fundamental, although it needs updating (see the comments of Stowers 1981, 12–16, 68–69).

you will instantly perceive. The Greek εὖ θύς αἰσθάνομαι is used elsewhere in Philo of Noah’s recovery of his senses after a drunken haze (Sobr. 30). Once the sage focuses his sensory faculties, it will be obvious which of the two wives he ought to choose.

32 This theme is discussed more fully in §49.
two wives living within us. Instead of rival brothers within the soul, the dichotomy is expressed in terms of their respective sources. The Abel/Jacob conviction is born from the hated wife (virtue), and the Cain/Esau conviction is born from the beloved wife (pleasure).

antagonistic and hostile. Philo pairs the two adjectives ἐχθρός and δυσμενής rather frequently (e.g., Leg. 3.1; Ebr. 69; Spec. 3.113; Praem. 61).

Pleasure ... Virtue. Philo utilizes these nouns as the names of the two women. Baynes notes this is one of the rare cases in which feminine imagery is positive in Philo (2002, 46). In Xenophon’s version of the Prodicus myth the women are named Ὄρετη and Ἄρετη (Mem. 2.1.21), but Philo’s Ἡδονή seems to reflect a Stoic retelling, which Cicero sets in the context of Epicurean polemic (cf. Cicero Fin. 2.44, citing Chrysippus; 2.69 citing Cleanthes; Off. 1.88, perhaps with reference to Panaetius’ original). Philo’s pair is repeated in Roman-era authors, including Seneca (Virtus and Voluptas: Vit. beat. 11.2; 13.4–5), and Maximus of Tyre (Diss. 14.1–2 [Trapp]). This leads to the conclusion that the Prodicus myth was a common school text in Philo’s day (Rochette 1998, 107; Franchi 2015, 34). For use of the myth elsewhere, see Cicero, Off. 1.118; Quintilian 9.2.36; Philostratus 482–83; Athenaeus, Deipn. 12.2. For the Philonic context see Boulluec 1998.

§21. Earlier editions of Sacr. omit §§21–32 (Turnebus, Mangey), although Mangey included §§20–33, along with Spec. 1.280–84, in the otherwise spurious De mercede meretricis (Mangey 2.164–69; on the inauthentic nature of this treatise, see Wendland 1891, 125–45). Wendland was able to restore the paragraphs to their proper location on the basis of a superior manuscript tradition (PCW 1.lxxxvii–viii). The third century Sacr. codex, fragments of which contain part of §§31–32 (POxy IX.1173), would have originally included the entire section (see Royse 1980, 160). Pap also contains these paragraphs in mostly legible form, although PCW made the mistake of relying too heavily on Scheil’s edition of Pap, and therefore misrepresent the codex in their apparatus criticus. So the two most ancient Philo manuscripts agree with the text Ambrose had before him. There can now be no doubt that this section, as unusual and pedantic as it is, even for Philo, belongs to the original text of Sacr.

playing coy. This definition of the verb θρύπω is found of a young lover flirting with his pederast Lucius (brother of Titus Quinctius Flamininus; Plutarch, Flam. 18.2). Philo has a fondness for subtle vocabulary that renders translation difficult. The term here has the advantage of connoting debauchery while also suggesting a coquettish aloofness.

like a prostitute or courtesan. This pair of terms is used only two other times in Philo (Somn. 1.88; Ios. 43). Prostitutes generally represent falsehood with a surface attraction, just as the reasonable and convincing premises described in §12 (e.g., Leg. 3.61–62; Aet. 56; Prov. 2.31). Pentateuchal law, at least in Philo’s interpretation, requires they be put to death (Spec. 3.51; Ios. 43; cf. Deut 23:17–18). For a brief discussion of prostitution in Roman era Egypt, see Bagnall 1991. Pleasure as a prostitute seems to have been a traditional anti-Epicurean image (Lévy 2000, 132). Cicero uses the imagery as well (Fin. 2.12).

an overwrought daintiness and charm. Philo’s portrait of Pleasure is intended to acknowledge her allure, but to underscore the artificial. The term τρυφή is a double entendre, referring both to ease and luxury, and to a self-indulgent debauchery. “Charm” or “beauty” (χλιδή) is a synonym for an ornamented, contrived daintiness (e.g., of hair, Sophocles, El. 52, or jewelry, Euripides, Ion 26).
**batts her eyes.** The expression σαλαζώ το όφθαλμό is unusual. It could mean “roll the eyes” (cf. Colson, Amir), but I opt for a translation that better suits a modern context. In any case, Galen uses the expression in reference to a condition causing the eyelids to quiver uncontrollably (known as nystagmus, in *Hippocratis prognosticum commentaria* 3.18b.67-68 [Kühn]), and thus my translation seems justifiable.

**hooks the souls of the young.** Philo borrows the language of the angler in pursuit of a catch, using her eyes as the bait. Philo elsewhere presents the prostitute as “hooking” (ἀγκιστρεώ) her lovers (*Opif.* 166; *Mos.* 1.296; *Virt.* 40; *Prov.* 2.31).

Philo’s metaphor of the two women is taken from the scholastic tradition of educating the young (see notes to §20). Such an association is present already in Xenophon, who introduces the Prodicus myth in the context of educating young men for rule (*Mem.* 2.1.1). Heracles was passing from youth to maturity (ηῆβη, one’s middle teen years) when forced to choose between Virtue and Vice (*Mem.* 2.1.21). The “two women” motif also has a social connection. Philo informs us that “among others” (i.e., non-Jews) young men over fourteen years of age are permitted to engage prostitutes (*Ios.* 43). Since rationality is complete at age fourteen according to the Stoics (see notes to §14), the young man is tested sexually and educationally at the same time (cf. *Mut.* 172).

**self-assured shamelessness.** The audacity (θράσος) of the prostitute leads her to gaze at her mark, defying the customary discretion implicit in illicit sexual encounters. The pair ἀναγυντια and θράσος occur elsewhere in reference to Sophists engaged in εἰκότα and πιθανά (*Opif.* 45) and to sense-perception (*Leg.* 2.67). For the pair cf. also (*Migr.* 224; *Abr.* 213; *Mos.* 1.302; *Spec.* 1.270; 3.66; 4.2, 127; *Legat.* 56, 132).

**raising herself up beyond what nature has assigned her.** The text is difficult here (PCW has ἐνορθάξωσα, a hapax legomenon in ancient Greek), but PCW’s alternative conjectures involve “straightening herself” or “evelating herself” (ἐξορθάζουσα, ἐπορθάζουσα). While this could be merely metaphorical (cf. Colson’s translation), or could simply indicate good posture, artificial “heightening” is attested among ancient Greek women. We have evidence of such in the fragments of the Alexandrian poet Alexis, describing courtesans (*apud* Athenaeus, *Deipn.* 568b), and even earlier in Xenophon (*Oec.* 10.2).

**hair ... braided.** Having described the prostitute’s manner of behavior, Philo turns to the manner of her dress and ornamentation. Hair is routinely associated with sexual attraction (e.g., Horace, *Carm.* 1.5.1–4; *Epod.* 11.28. Ovid, *Ars* 3.133–55; Juvenal *Sat.* 6.501–506), although not necessarily with prostitution (but see Philo, *Spec.* 3.37). The early empire witnessed a significant shift in the elaborate hairstyles fashionable among women (Bartman 2001), and may have provoked moralists such as Philo to intensify the polemic (cf. Lucian, *Nigr.* 6). Societal emphasis on head coverings, particularly for married women, should be understood in this light (Myerowitz Levine 1995). Philo never directly recommends head coverings for women (although Paul does, see 1 Cor 11:3–15). In general, Philo negatively associates veiling with concealment (e.g., *Gig.* 53; *Congr.* 124–25; *Fug.* 34; *Spec.* 3.156).

**face smothered with make-up.** Philo elsewhere describes prostitutes as “painting the face” (*Leg.* 3.62; *Fug.* 153; *Prov.* 2.31; and *Spec.* 3.37 of male prostitutes). The verb ὑπογράφω is also used specifically of make-up applied under the eyes (Josephus, *B.J.* 4.561; Lucian, *Bis acc.* 31; Pollux 5.102). Colson in fact translates “under her eyes are pencil lines.” This translation is probably too restrictive, however, since Philo never uses ὑπογράφω with reference to the eyes. Instead, Philo seems to mean all her natural features were “traced” and “highlighted” with excessive make-up (cf. the Prodicus myth, Xenophon, *Mem.* 2.1.22).
The wealthiest women of the Imperial age often used *purpurissum* (Plint, *Hist. nat.* 35.30; Greek: πορφυρίζον) and white lead (*cerussa*; Greek: ψιθυθίον) to color the face (Plautus, *Mos.* 258–61; *Truc.* 290; Martial 1.72.6). But excessive cosmetics could be viewed negatively, as in the case of older women trying to regain the false appearance of youth (cf. Aristophanes, *Eccl.* 178, 929, 1072). And, although modern scholars often assume the aristocracy set the stylistic tone for all classes, sources also suggest aristocratic women copied the dress and cosmetics of prostitutes (Olson 2006, 197; cf. Seneca, *Helv.* 16.3). On cosmetics in general see Olson 2008, 58–79; 2009.

**her eyebrows engulfed in paint.** The verb ἐγκαλάτπω carries the meaning of “wrap up” or “conceal.” Roman ladies used an antimony mixture (*stibium*) to color the eyelashes and eyebrows (Pliny, *Hist. nat.* 11.154; Juvenal 2.93). See Olson 2009, 298–99.

**flush artificial.** The term ἔρευθος (“blush, flush”) occurs only here in Philo. It could refer to the steam from the bath coloring the woman’s cheeks, or more probably refers to a cosmetic mixture to color the face (Xenophon, *Oec.* 10.7; Alexis apud Athenaeus, *Deip.* 568; Olson 2009, 296–97). A natural blush was viewed positively in ancient Roman society (Barton 1999), but Alicia Batten writes,

> Covering up the face with creams and colours could hide the involuntary act of blushing, which was a manifestation of shame that the Romans apparently found endearing and forgivable. If someone blushed, the community might likely find it charming and could readily restore that person’s honour. Thus one of the reasons why thick make-up was viewed suspiciously is that its wearer indicated an unwillingness to expose her shame in the form of a blush, and in turn, enable the onlookers to redeem her honour (2009, 489).

Philo’s vocabulary subtly suggests an attempt to cover the true self with artificial ornamentation. Such a sentiment is consistent with the moralistic literature (cf. Xenophon, *Oec.* 10.2–9; Dio Chrysostom 7.117). However, Ovid’s mockery is a testament to the popularity of excessive cosmetics in Philo’s time (Johnson 2016), and male invective against such is typical (Richlin 1995; Batten 2009, 489). Richlin states, “Roman sources consistently link women’s use of makeup with deception, covering a body often described by men as inherently repugnant; moreover, free women who use makeup are said to align their bodies with the open bodies of slaves and prostitutes” (1995, 186).

**gaudy.** Expensive clothing (the adjective πολυτελής means expensive or gaudy) is a regular object of scorn among the moralists (Seneca, *Contr.* 2.7.3; 1 Tim 2:9; Tertullian, *Pall.* 4.9; *Cult. fem.* 2.12.3). The reason is because a “blatant and purposeful display of the self, however clothed, led to a dwindling of female modesty .... Women supposedly became sexually excited when they put themselves on display: chastity was eroded by being seen” (Olson 2006, 199, citing Propertius 3.21.3; Ovid, *Am.* 2.2.3–4; 2.19.19; 3.2.34). A number of sources report the colors of female clothing (Plautus, *Epid.* 229–35; Ovid, *Ars* 3.169–92). “Escorts” (ἐταύραι) of Greek texts are generally presented as being fully and extravagantly clothed, but “whores” (πόρναι) generally wear transparent clothing or are topless (Dalby 2002, 112–13, 118–19). On female dress in general see Olson 2008.

**floral dresses.** Floral dresses were so much associated with prostitution that some cultures allowed only prostitutes to wear them (Lucian, *Dial. meretr.* 6.2; Athenaeus, *Deipn.* 521b; Clement, *Paed.* 2.11). In others, they were disallowed during festivals (see LSJ s.v. ἀνθίζω). In general, flowery dress seems to be standard courtesan clothing (Dalby 2002, 119). For similar language elsewhere in Philo, cf. *Somn.* 1.1224; 2.53.
bracelets ... necklaces ... jewelry. The moralists often find ostentation so objectionable that they recommend wearing no gold or jewelry at all (Seneca, Helv. 16.3–5; 1 Pet 3:3; Plutarch, Mor. 141e, 144a–146a). Prostitutes were also quite aware of the attractive nature of jewelry (Plautus, Most. 248–92; Lucian, Dial. meretr. 6), and some cultures allowed only prostitutes to wear gold (Diodorus Siculus 12.21.1; Athenaeus, Deipn. 521b).

Perfumes. Perfumes came in all different varieties, and were fashionable (cf. Pliny, Hist. nat. 13.2), but were in general eschewed by the moralists (Plutarch, Mor. 693c–d; Athenaeus 686e; Clement, Paed. 2.8).

a common whore. The term τρισδιάς σοβάς occurs only in Philo (here and in Fug. 153). LSJ gives the definition “streetwalker,” but literally the term means something like “a strutter at the crossroads,” once again reminding us of the Prodicus myth.

Devoid of true beauty, she pursues the false. Philo is generally opposed to ornamentation intended to deceive (associated with κενή δόξα, Somn. 2.57; πρός ἀπάτην τῶν ὀρώντων, Praem. 24), and concealing true beauty (Gig. 17, 44; cf. Det. 20, Migr. 97, 105). The basis for such a position may be located in the Bible (e.g., Isa 3:18–24), or in Greco-Roman ethics (cf. Cicero, Att. 2.1.1–2; Ovid, Ars 3.159–60, 206–208, 257–58; Tertullian, Cult. fem. 2.5.4). The Testament of Reuben is strikingly similar to Philo: “They [women] contrive in their hearts against men, then by decking themselves out they lead men’s minds astray, by a look they implant their poison, and finally in the act itself they take them captive. For a woman is not able to coerce a man overtly, but by a harlot’s manner she accomplishes her villainy” (T.Reu 5:3–4). New Testament moralists also object to jewelry and expensive clothing (1 Tim 2:9–10; 1 Pet 3:3–4).

§22. cunning, rashness, distrust. The alliterative trio πανουργία, προπέτεια, and ἀπιστία serve as an introduction to Pleasure’s associates. The term πανουργία is later defined as “a voluntary disease of the soul” (ἑκούσιον ψυχῆς ἄρρωστημα), which cannot be cured by education alone (Sacr. 48). Pleasure (ἡδονή) is elsewhere associated with πανουργία (Leg. 2.107), as is sophistry (Post. 101). Rashness (προπέτεια) is elsewhere associated with shamelessness (ἀνασχυντία) and recklessness (θράσος) (Conf. 117; Spec. 3.66; Legat. 262; QG 4.52). Distrust (ἀπιστία) can be associated with opinion (δόξα) (Ebr. 40; Conf. 57; cf. Plato, Resp. 7.533e; 6.511e). Aristotle and the Stoics defined πίστις similarly as a “strong assumption” (Aristotle, Top. 4.5 [126b]), and regarded ἀπιστία as inappropriate for the sage (SVF 3.548). On Philo’s use of πίστις in general see Hay 1989.

flattery, trickery, deception, lying, perjury. These traits of Pleasure fit under the rubric of falsity, scaled toward the more grievous. Flattery (κολακεία) is a “disease to friendship” (Leg. 3.182 discussing pleasure; cf. Conf. 48), and is associated with insincerity (Abr. 126). Trickery (φενοκασμός) is also an instrument of pleasure, associated elsewhere with prostitution (Opif. 165–66) and sophistry (Agr. 164). Deception (ἀπάτη) is “most akin to pleasure” (Leg. 3.64) and the “worst enticement and menace of the soul” (Agr. 16; cf. Congr. 18). The term is associated with art (Gig. 59) and rhetoric (Agr. 13, of sophistry in general; cf. Agr. 96; Sobr. 15), as well as prostitution (Plant. 104; cf. Jos. 56). Lying (ψευδολογία) and perjury (ψευδορκία) are connected elsewhere in Philo (Conf. 117; Virt. 182).

impiety, injustice, and intemperance. This alliterative triplet opposes the cardinal virtues (cf. Opif. 73; Conf. 90; Heres 245; Mut. 197; see § 15 and notes). For this triplet elsewhere see Det. 72; Post. 52; Deus 112. Although the traditional four virtues are φρόνησις, σωφροσύνη, ἀνδρεία, and δικαιοσύνη, Philo and others had added εὐσέβεια as the “queen of the virtues” (see Sterling
decisively negative in Philo, excepting athletic contests (e.g., more literally rendered “unsu

Expensive food and wine were condemned by the moralists in general (Philo, in instruments (Harmonious sounds can describe the voices of birds (associated with temptation in Philo (five senses: sight, hearing, taste, smell, and [sexual] touch. Colors and scents are frequently “indifference” (ἐκεχειρία: Congr. 158; Ἰος 85; Dec. 50; Spec. 2.42, 109; Prob. 148; Flacc. 40, 67; ἄνεσις with ἐκεχειρία: Spec. 1.192; Legat. 12). Philo uses the term ἀμελησθησία consistently to mean “indifference” (Sacr. 86; Ἱερεῖς 213; Fug. 14, 121). The portrait is of a carefree retirement.

colors ... voice ... food and drink ... scents ... love. With these descriptions Philo covers the five senses: sight, hearing, taste, smell, and [sexual] touch. Colors and scents are frequently associated with temptation in Philo (Opif. 165; Leg. 3.235; Det. 157; Ebr. 190–191; Abr. 148). Harmonious sounds can describe the voices of birds (Leg. 2.75; Post. 105–106), or musical instruments (Deus 24–25), but human voices should not draw on the emotions (e.g., Plant. 159). Expensive food and wine were condemned by the moralists in general (Philo, Post. 142; Ebr. 211; Contempl. 35; Seneca, Epist. 8.5; Dio Chrysostom 6.12–13). See Winston 2008, 219 n. 39. The term ἐρως is usually positive in Philo, and is rarely to be taken sexually as it is here (e.g., Opif. 70; Agr. 84; Plant. 144; Congr. 112). On the theme in general see Nissen 1974, 429–45.

unregulated escapades. Philo hints here at the original context of the allegory with this phrase, more literally rendered “unsupervised games” (ἄπαιδογόγητοι παιδία). “Games” (παιδίαί) are decisively negative in Philo, excepting athletic contests (e.g., Mos. 1.20; 2.211).
careless intercourse. Philo uses the adjective ἀνεξέταστος more than any other ancient writer, but its most famous appearance is in Socrates’ quip, “the unexamined life is not worth living” (οὐ δὲ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτός ἀνθρώπων; Apol. 34a).

§24. whatever suits you. Plutarch quotes Chrysippus as asserting “the bad man [ὁ φαύλος] needs nothing, uses nothing, nothing is useful to him, nothing is appropriate, nothing is suitable” [οὐδὲν ἀρμόττον] (SVF 3.674 = Comm. not. 20 1068a).

preparations. The term εὐτρεπίζω is associated with preparations for a sumptuous feast (Agr. 66; Somn. 2.181), and by extension, for the satisfaction of pleasure (Opif. 158; Det. 26).

join in sampling. The verb συνεπισκοπέω is used only one other time in Philo with the meaning “pay attention” (Mos. 2.5). Here, Pleasure promises to “join in experimentation” with the mind as it samples the products she makes available. Philo repeats four of the five senses, claiming each of them “is delighted by pleasure” (ἥδοιαι).

§25. evergreen plants. Philo is the first to use the adjective ἀειθαλής (Geljon and Runia 2013, 256), which occurs six times in his preserved works (Opif. 153; Sacr. 25; Agr. 171; Mut. 140; Spec. 4.181; Prob. 69).

seasonal and fresh produce. Fruits were distinguished as ripening in early summer, summer, and autumn. The expression “seasonal fruits” (οἱ ὀραίοι καρποί) specifically refers to those that (1) ripen for a period of only forty days in the summer, and that (2) cannot be stored (Galen, Alim. fac. 2.2). Consequently, they were suitable only for local markets (cf. the forensis grape, Pliny, Hist. nat. 14.42). Pleasure’s vines, by contrast, produce every fruit in all seasons.

no war ... has ever cut down. Military campaigns often brought large-scale deforestation (cf. Philo, Spec. 4.23; Josephus, B.J. 6.6). Deut 20:19–20 forbids the cutting of fruit trees, and Plato also limits soldiers to taking one years’ produce (Resp. 470a–e). That Philo is thinking specifically of the Plato text is supported by his reference to the earth as a “nurse and mother” (cf. Resp. 470d). Hellenistic Jews in general emphasize this humanitarian law (Pseudo-Phocylides 38; 4 Macc 2:14; Josephus, Ap. 2.212). For the affect of the military on deforestation, see Meiggs 1982, 154–87.

good nurse. Philo portrays the earth as a nurse (τροφός) cultivating the soil. The image is borrowed from Plato (Tim. 40b; Menex. 237ε–238α; Resp. 414e, 470d). For the language elsewhere in Philo see Opif. 38, 133; Plant. 15; QG 2.7; cf. Aet. 57–66.

roots ... foundations. The architectural metaphor is first found in Theophrastus, Caus. plant. 1.12.4, although with slightly different language (see also Opif. 41; Virt. 158 with the comments of Wilson PACS 3:336).

branches ... hands and feet ... leaves ... hair. Personification of trees is biblical (cf. Isa 55:12 LXX). The term κόµη with reference to foliage is Homeric (Od. 23.195, of the olive tree; cf. also Theophrastus, Hist. plant. 2.6.4; 3.12.9; 4.4.4).

provides the fruit. Fruit trees must have a fully established root system before they can bear fruit (Theophrastus, Caus. plant. 1.12.1–10).
§26. the other woman. Virtue waits patiently as Pleasure speaks, as in the Prodicus myth preserved in Xenophon (Mem. 2.1.27).

taken in and enslaved. Both of the terms ἀνδραπόδιζω and αἰχμάλωτος are borrowed from a military context, and refer to prisoners of war (the latter term) to be sold as slaves (the former term) (for the terms together, e.g., Xenophon, Anab. 4.1.12; Diodorus Siculus 33.14.1). See Philo, Mos. 1.36.
dressed for deception. See §21 and notes.

charms and amulets. Aristotle uses the term charm (περίαπτος) to refer to the lifestyle of the virtuous “which needs nothing from pleasure as a mere ornament [περίαπτος], but has pleasure in itself” (Eth. nic. 1.8.12 [1099a]). The second term (μαγγανεία) is rarer, occurring only here in the Philonic corpus. Galen makes clear that μαγγανεία is the more generic of these two terms (De simplicium medicamentorum temperamentis ac facultatibus [Kühn 11:792]). Philo may have picked up the term from Plato, who uses it with reference to the deception of Sophistry (Leg. 908d).

bewitching. The term κηλέω occurs regularly in Plato, and refers to being enchanted, as by music (Plato, Prot. 315a) or by oratory (Plato, Euthyd. 289e–290a). Consequently, it can describe being “won over” in an argument (e.g., Resp. 358b). Closer to our context, Aeschines describes pleasure [ηδονή] as a charmer, driving men to do foolish and dangerous things (1.191). In the only two other contexts in which the term appears in Philo, it is closely associated with the deception of pleasure (Post. 106, 155). Little has been published regarding Philo’s views on magic, enchantment, and the like (in general, see Berchman 1998; Seland 2006).

provoking titillations. Philo uses the term γαργαλισμός four times (Leg. 3.160; Det. 110; Spec. 3.110). Ranocchia calls the term a “terminus technicus in Epicurus for the solicitation exercised on the senses by the kinetic pleasures” (2008, 98). See LS 21Q–R. In fact, Leisegang believes this language (and this entire section) to be indicative of an anti-Epicurean polemic (based on Athenaeus, Deipn. 12.67 = fr. 413 [Usener]; PCH 3:224). On Philo and Epicureanism in general, see Lévy 2000; Ranocchia 2008.

marks of a free citizen. Although dress could be viewed negatively, as we have seen above, Roman matronae were distinguished by the quality of their appearance. Lucius, for example, encounters a woman in the market whose dress “distinguished her as matrona indeed” (Apuleius, Metam. 2.2). Late Republican ladies complained that dressing down destroyed their ability to mark status (e.g., Livy 34.4.12–14).

steady gait. In §21 Philo describes the courtesan coming with a broken gait (κεκλασμῷ τῷ βαδίσματι; in the Greek fragment of QG 4.99 the courtesan has a “stuttering step,” βάδισμα σεποβημένον), as opposed to the free woman’s steady step (σταθερὸν βάδισμα). These are the only three uses of the term βάδισμα in Philo.

most serene countenance. Whereas the courtesan’s face is smothered in makeup (ὑπογεγραμμένη τὴν ὄψιν, §21), the free woman’s is calm and gentle. We are tempted to translate ἡρεμιοῖται “of the smoothest quality” (for this definition cf. Theophrastus, Lap. 62 [of paint]) because a smooth face is considered ideal (e.g., Pliny, Hist. nat. 28.183, 32.65; for recipes of concoctions to smooth the face see Olson 2009, 300–301). But the more traditional definition fits the context as well.

an authentic coloring. Some ancient sources tend to assume women adorn themselves only for men (e.g., Terence, Haut. 287–91; Plautus, Most. 166–69; Ovid, Her. 15.77–78). On ancient praise for the woman who is content to remain unadorned, see Olson 2008, 89–92.
**Her style is not artificial, her step without swagger.** Philo again uses terms with a double meaning. The term “nature” (σχέσις) can also mean “style” of hair (Xenophon, Symp. 4.57), and ἀπλαστός the “formation” of an elaborate hairstyle. These terms also indicate a person of high character. Likewise, the verb σοβήσω recalls an artificial wig of horse’s hair (σόβη), as in the later author Synesius, Opusc. 5.80d. For a similar context, cf. Virt. 40, 173.

Philo is also fond of pairing the nouns σχέσις and κίνησις (Opif. 117; Leg. 3.206; Heres 119). Philo writes, “We can observe vice both in posture [σχέσις] and in movement [κίνησις]. Vice that is set into motion [κινεῖοθα] tends to satisfy the full measure of its potential, and is thus worse than vice that merely remains a posture” (Leg. 3.34; cf. Sobr. 34–37). Philo may be taking aim against the Epicureans who identified pleasure as a “calm” (see Lévy 2000, 131, citing Philo, Leg. 3.160).

**her adornment of understanding and virtue.** The legend of Philo’s wife printed in some editions of Philo, and obviously spurious (see Royse 1991, 80–82), bears some relevance here (cf. Méasson, PAPM 4:88–89). It states that “Philo’s wife ... did not wear gold jewelry [κόσμος], claiming that the virtue of the husband is sufficient adornment [κόσμος] for the wife.” Such is well in line with what Philo says about the nature of adornment, and such a mistaken attribution would not have immediately alerted Byzantine readers.

§27. In this paragraph Philo lists some thirty-four generic virtues in no obvious order. Stoic lists class virtues under the “first four,” φρόνησις, σωφροσύνη, ἀνδρεία, and δικαιοσύνη (e.g., SVF 3.264), but popular forms of the lists do not typically follow the Stoic scheme (e.g., Cicero, Tusc. 4.6–14; Plutarch, Tranq. an. 468b). Philo has the four cardinal virtues scattered in the list, but they do not seem to be organized as headings.

**piety ... sanctification.** Méasson suggests the first five qualities relate to one’s relationship with God, although she must regard θέμις as distinctively religious in order to do so (PAPM 4:196). Pap omits six of the virtues from ἕλθεια to ἱσότης. PCW is wrong to follow Scheil here, claiming the virtues from αἰδῶς to προσοχή are omitted. They, in fact, are present in Pap.

**piety.** At the head of Philo’s list of virtues is εὐσέβεια. This “queen” (Spec. 4.135; Praem. 53) of the virtues for Philo encompasses the others (Sterling 2006). Philo apparently wrote a work Περὶ εὐσέβεια which is now lost (see Royse 2006). The point is significant since Judaism was labeled a superstition (δεισιδαιμονία) (Josephus, Ant. 12.5; see Amir 1987). Thus Judaism’s εὐσέβεια (i.e., the proper balance of religiosity) needed to be defended.

**holiness.** Philo pairs εὐσέβεια with ὁσίωτας 28 times, as it is here (Opif. 155, 172; Sacr. 37; Plant. 35; Ebr. 91; Migr. 194; Mos. 2.142), labeling it also “queen” of the virtues (Spec. 4.135; Decal. 119). Plato can refer to ὁσίωτας as a fifth cardinal virtue (Prot. 329C), and both Plato and the Stoics understood the term as proper service to God (Plato, Euth. 12E; SVF 2.1017; 3.660).

**right.** Philo uses θέμις in most cases with the infinitive (“it is right to ...”). Only here does he use the term as an independent virtue. The term might broadly relate to the religious terms preceding it (cf. Plato, Symp. 188d where the term occurs with εὐσέβεια). This is Méasson’s suggestion (PAPM 4:89). Or it might relate to the theme of “law and order” that follows (cf. Somm. 1.94).

**oath-keeping.** The noun εὐορκία is a hapax legomenon in Philo, although the verb εὐορκέω occurs four times (Plant. 82; Dec. 84; Spec. 2.13, 14). Oath-keeping was a Classical Greek virtue (e.g., Hesiod, Op. 285; Euripides, Med. 495).

**truthworthiness.** The noun εὐσωθεσία is also a Philonic hapax, although the verb εὐσωθετέω is perhaps a Stoic coinage in the sense of “loyalty to agreements” (SVF 2.197).
restraint. The term ἐχθρημία is exceedingly rare, occurring only once before Philo, in Homer (Od. 8.320). Some manuscripts substitute the more common synonym ἐχθροθωσία, a Pythagorean word for silence (e.g., Plutarch, Num. 8.6; Curios. 519c). See notes on §60 below.

moderation. Philo uses the noun κοσμίμης eight times, all but two (Fug. 50; Flacc. 99) in conjunction with σωφροσύνη, indicating a close connection between the two (here; Fug. 33, 50, 154; Somn. 1.124; Ios. 40; Spec. 3.51; Flacc. 99).

austerity, thriftiness. The term ὀλγοδέξια is rare before Philo, being used in this sense before him only in Posidonius, who describes a more austere life being in accord with old Roman custom (see EK T6, fr. 267). Philo, however, uses the noun 21 times. Philo pairs the far more common term εὐκολία with ὀλγοδέξια five times in his extant corpus (here; Spec. 1.173; 4.101; Virt. 8; Prob. 77, 84).

tranquility. The term ἀπροϊμοσύνη generally refers to a withdrawal from politics (so LSJ), but sometimes for the purpose of devoting oneself to study (e.g., Plutarch, Tranq. an. 13). The term also carries an anti-Epicurean tenor in Plutarch, Tranq. an. 2–3, which fits our context well.

courage. One of the four cardinal virtues, ἀνδρεία is the Aristotelian mean between cowardice (δελία) and recklessness (θράσος) (Eth. nic. 2.8.6), a scheme Philo repeats (Deus 164). Philo uses the term 55 times, usually in opposition to cowardice (e.g., Opif. 73; Leg. 1.68; Det. 51; Deus 164).

nobility. Philo uses the noun γενναιότης only three times (here; Mos. 1.309; Virt. 5). Following ἀνδρεία, the term ought to imply courage in keeping with the status of one’s family (e.g., Virt. 17, 167; cf. Mos. 2.274; Spec. 4.45). Philo here uses the term as a synonym with the more common εὐγένεια, on which he writes an entire treatise (Virt. 187–227). Perhaps the rarer word occurs here because Greek authors of Philo’s era more closely associate γενναιότης with noble character than ancestry (e.g., Plutarch, Brut. 49.9; Epictetus, Diatr. 4.1.109). This is precisely how Philo defines εὐγένεια (Virt. 189–191).

wise counsel, foresight. The term εὐβουλία for Philo captures the first in a three-step process of thinking, speaking, and acting (e.g., Mut. 237; Somn. 2.180; Praem. 107). The noun προμήθεια is among Philo’s stock of terms associated with “providence” (πρόνοια; Opif. 171; Deus 29; see §121 and notes below).

attentiveness. Attentiveness (προσοχή) is a post-Classical term, often associated with silence, or ἡσυχία (Philo, Heres 10–13; Congr. 66; Somn. 1.193; 2.37; Spec. 2.62; and outside of Philo, e.g., Dionysius of Halicarnassus 6.85.3). Chrysippus associates attention with silence as “relative goods” (SVF 3.111).

will to make right. Philo uses the noun διόρθωσις only here, and never the verb διορθάω. The term normally indicates “setting straight” what is broken (e.g., of “setting” a bone, Hippocrates, Fract. 16), and implies a person or object for correction. The term does not seem to refer to self-improvement, as Méasson’s “la volonté de devenir meilleur” implies (PAPM 4:91).

cheerfulness. The Stoics classed εὐθυμία as one of the three forms of joy (χαρά), defining it as “joy in everyday life, or lack of desire for anything” (SVF 3.431–32). This latter definition reminds us of Democritus, the contemporary of Socrates, who proposes εὐθυμία as the telos of life, defining it as “a state in which the soul continues calm and strong, undisturbed by fear or superstition or any other emotion” (Diogenes Laertius 9.45; trans. Hicks, LCL). This sounds much like the Stoic ἀπάθεια, and indeed Panaetius wrote a book Περὶ εὐθυμίας (Diogenes Laertius 9.20).

generosity, kindness, gentleness. These three terms, each ending in -της, are grouped euphonically and semantically. Generosity (χρηστότης) is a key term for doing good to others
Philo, Mos. 1.249; Virt. 84), especially exalted among the Stoics (SVF 3.264, 273, 291), and classified under δικαιοσύνη (SVF 3.264). Philo uses the term as a special description of God’s character (Leg. 3.73; Migr. 122; Praem. 166). Kindness (ἡμερότης) is used to refer to the tameness of animals (Aristotle, Hist. an. 588a21; 610b21; 631a9), and is cited as an attribute of God (e.g., Philo, Cher. 29, 99; Fug. 99). It is often paired with φιλανθρωπία (e.g., Spec. 2.79; 4.18; Virt. 121, 188), as here and in Josephus (Ap. 2.213). Gentleness (ἡπιότης) is much rarer synonym, occurring in Philo only here and in Decal. 167. Hecataeus of Abdera (apud Josephus, Ap. 1.186) uses the term, along with φιλανθρωπία, in reference to Ptolemy.

**humanity.** Closely related to kindness in Philo is φιλανθρωπία. Jews in antiquity were accused of μυσανθρωπία (e.g., Diodorus Siculus 34/35.1.1–5; Apolonius Molon apud Josephus, Ap. 2.148; cf. of Christians in Tacitus, Ann. 15.44.4). Thus, the opposite virtue was regularly emphasized in Hellenistic Jewish apologetics (see Berthelot 2003). In Virt. 51 Philo considers φιλανθρωπία “most closely related to piety [εὐσέβεια], its sister and twin” (trans. Wilson 2011, 55). This reference marks the opening of a separate treatise Περὶ φιλανθρωπίας (Virt. 51–174).

**liberality.** Philo uses this term (μεγαλοφροσύνη) only four times, three times (counting the present passage) in reference to generosity (Spec. 2.72, 88; cf. the adjective μεγαλόφρων in Virt. 90), and once in reference to greatness of reputation (Mos. 2.29, of Ptolemy II Philadelphius). The adjective also occurs in a virtue list similar to the one under consideration here (Virt. 182). Like Philo, Josephus uses the term to describe the Jewish nation and law (e.g., Ant. 2.141; 8.175; 12.224).

**happiness and goodness.** Happiness (μακαρίότης) is a synonym of εὐδαιμονία in Philo, the pair occurring some 67 times (e.g., Opif. 235; Det. 86; Spec. 1.209; Virt. 205). The pairing of these terms betrays Philo’s Jewish and Greek philosophical backgrounds, since the term εὐδαιμονία never occurs in the Greek Bible, while the μακαρία word group occurs over 100 times. Goodness (ἀγαθότης) appropriately rounds out Philo’s list since he terms it “the most generic virtue ... from which the particular virtues derive” (Leg. 1.59). God is closely associated with goodness (Leg. 3.73), as it is one of his two Powers (Cher. 27), through which he creates the world (Leg. 3.73; Deus 108).

**Daylight will fail me.** This rhetorical device is found elsewhere in Philo (Somn. 2.63; Spec. 4.238), and is quite common in Greek authors (Isocrates, Demon. 11; Demosthenes, Cor. 296; Heb 11:32; Atheneaus, Deipn. 5.63).

**specific virtues.** Philo routinely distinguishes between generic and specific virtue (e.g., Deus 95; Ebr. 138; Fug. 176). See further Jastram 1991 and the comments on §84 below. Philo also seems to speak of generic and specific virtue in two different senses, one expressing an ontological difference, appearing to be of Platonic origin, and the other expressing an ethical and logical distinction, appearing to be of Stoic origin (Radice 1994, 443).

§28. bodyguard. Philo utilizes the image of the body-guard (δορυφόρος) more than forty times. Here he depicts generic Virtue surrounded by the particular virtues (cf. Leg. 1.59; Migr. 37; Spec. 1.137). On the term δορυφόρεω in general see §59 below.

**Virtue.** Following the Stoics, Philo regards Virtue (singular) as a unitary concept, with the specific virtues (plural) deriving from generic Virtue (e.g., Leg. 1.64; Sacr. 84; Mut. 77–78). In general see SVF 3.262–94. SVF 3.199 is clear: “The person who has general virtue also has specific virtue, and the person who has specific virtue also has generic virtue.”

**dressed in the pomp of a tragic actress.** The adjective τραγικός can refer to a pompous style of dress in general, but Philo’s fondness of the theater should lead us to read his language here more
literally, as though he is presenting a dramatic scene on the stage (cf. Leg. 3.202; Ios. 78). Prob. and Aet. especially abound in Tragic quotations (e.g., Prob. 116; 134; 152; Aet. 5, 30, 49). On Philo and Greek dramatic literature in general, see Koskenniemi 2006.

**it is my nature to hate evil.** Philo is fond of the expression μισοπόνηρος φύσει, although he is the first Greek author to use it (Conf. 46; Mut. 108; Mos. 1.149; Decal. 87, 177; Legat. 193).

**drop your guard ... deceived.** Neglect (λανθάνω) is often associated with deception (ἀπατάω) in Philo (Conf. 54; Spec. 4.188; Legat. 40, 62, 80).

**once deceived, give consent.** The Epicureans themselves debated the reliability of sense-perception to determine good and bad (Cicero, Fin. 1.31), although Epicurus himself identified αἴσθησις, πρόληψις, and πάθος as the criteria of truth (Diogenes Laertius 10.31). Deception was always a theoretical problem, since the other schools believed the senses could be easily tricked.

**worst of evils ... best of goods.** For similar language, cf. Mos. 2.200.

**an unintended failure.** Philo uses the language of a failed business venture (ἀπωσάμενος ἀβούλητον ἐμπορεύσῃ κακοπραγίαν). The student who fails to evaluate properly might invest a fortune in a proposition destined to fail.

§29. **costume.** Literally, “other, foreign” (ἄλλοτρια). In Spec. 4.185 Philo uses similar language to refer to stage costumes, a meaning that fits the context here (see §28 and notes).

**nets and snares.** Méasson notes that Philo applies this metaphor in three ways: (1) to pleasure as a trap (cf. Agr. 103; Virt. 39), (2) to sense-perception as an intermediary through which pleasure works (cf. Ebr. 70), and (3) to objects that appear good to the senses (cf. Deus 153; Praem. 20) (PAPM 4:90 n. 2).

**to desecrate the soul.** Leisegang draws attention to Cicero, Fin. 1.55, “The pleasures and pains of the soul are born from the pleasures and pains of the body,” also noting the anti-Epicurean context of Cicero’s remarks (PCH 3:225 n. 3). Cf. also Plutarch, Frat. amor. 491C. For the anti-Epicurean tone of this section see notes to §§20, 26 above.

**sweet to the eyes ... music to the ears.** The senses of sight and hearing are usually listed first among the five, and thus stand as the most reliable (e.g., Opif. 62; Leg. 3.44; Sacr. 73; Abr. 236). However, the inability of the senses to offer accurate judgments is a common ancient theme, dating back to the Presocratics (e.g., Anaxagoras, Fr. 21; Democritus, Fr. 9, 125). See further notes on §34.

**the soul, your most precious possession.** The language is inspired by Plato’s Laws 728c: “No possession (κτῆμα) is better suited by nature to the human being than the soul” (cf. 726a; 727e; 731c).

**entice ... uncomfortable.** Leisegang believes the words προσηνής and ρᾷστωνη are taken from Epicurean doctrine of the Good (PCH 3:226 n. 1). Plutarch, for example, writes, “For without a teacher, these good, smooth, gratifying [προσηνής] movements of the soul ... will suck in even those who refuse to admit or acknowledge being bowed and softened by them” (Adv. Col. 27 [1122e]). Plutarch elsewhere also refers to “the ease [σχολή] and leisure [ρᾷστωνη] of Epicurus” (Quaest. conv. 655C).

§30. **In full disclosure.** In the Allegorical Commentary, Philo frequently uses the verb “stripping” (ἀπαμφαίαξα) with reference to the soul’s vulnerability (Leg. 2.53–54; Cher. 17; Gig. 53; Deus 56, 103; Somn. 2.170). In contrast to the deceptive ornamentation of Pleasure, Virtue will expose herself free of clothing, makeup, and jewelry.
**to obscure and cover up what is disagreeable.** Pleasure always aims to deceive by concealing her less desirable traits (e.g., *Opif.* 165–166; *Leg.* 3.61–64). Pleasure is for Philo, as it was for Plato, a mere illusion (on Plato, see Moss 2006). By contrast, Epicurus trusted pleasure as the telos of human action (Cicero, *Tusc.* 5.96).

**burdensome and hard to endure.** The term ἐπαχθής elsewhere in Philo refers to the life of the wicked (*Leg.* 3.251; *Migr.* 145), and both terms are used to describe slavery (*Deus* 114; *Spec.* 2.90). This is the only context in which either term is associated with virtue.

**in plain words.** Philo is the first author to use the expression ὀνομα γαμνόν (*Opif.* 24; *Spec.* 2.131).

**things that seem the worst evils.** Ancient dogmatic philosophy holds that humans desire what is good. The problem comes with their inability to judge correctly the good from the bad. Seneca, for example, writes:

> Badness sometimes takes the appearance of rectitude, and excellence shines forth from its opposite. Virtues and vices, as you know, border on one another, and a likeness of what is right pertains to those who are also depraved and base .... The similarity between these forces us to take thought and to distinguish things which are related in appearance but are immensely different in fact” (*Epist.* 120.5–6; trans. LS 60E).

§31. **stored away.** The noun θησαυρός has been used above (§§22, 25), the verb here and in §33. The term is regularly found in Theophrastus of “preserving” fruits and vegetables (*Hist. plant.* 3.12.5; 6.4.10; 8.11.6).

**sweetened.** Although Philo uses the noun ἡδονή 422 times, the verb ἡδύνω occurs only six times, twice in reference to hearing (*Leg.* 2.75; *Post.* 106), twice in reference to seeing (*Sacr.* 29; *Contempl.* 50), and twice in reference to taste (*Ebr.* 219; *Contempl.* 53), 53). The verb used here (ἐφηδύνω) occurs only twice in Philo (*Fug.* 139), and, according to the TLG, only once before him (in an Aeschylus fragment).

**colors ... flavors.** Athenaeus quotes Epicurus as saying, “I cannot recognize the good if you take away the pleasures I get from flavors [χυλός]... sexual dalliances [ἀφροδισίος] ... pleasant sounds [ἀκρόασμα] and the sweet movements [ἡδεία κίνησις] of the visual form” (Athenaeus, *Deipn.* 12.67 = Usener fr. 67).

**illnesses and plagues.** The routine pairing of νόσος and κήρ seems to be more characteristic of Philo than of other ancient authors (e.g., *Det.* 44, 98; *Sobr.* 38; *Somn.* 1.222; *Spec.* 4.200), but the terms fit well within the ethical context of Hellenistic psychology (see Nussbaum 1994). Soul sickness is a special concern of the Stoics, so much so that Chrysippus authors an entire treatise on the subject (see Cicero, *Tusc.* 3.1–21), and considers the philosopher a “physician of the soul” (Galen, *PHP* 5.2.22–24).

**induced by the thrill.** Literally, “lifted up by some breeze” (ἀὔρα τινός ... ἐπαρθείς), the term αὔρα can metaphorically apply to any fleeting “thrill” brought on by poor judgment (Euripides, *Hipp.* 166; cf. *El.* 1202; *Orest.* 1427).

§32. We have already observed Virtue’s itemization of 34 traits the young soul should find desirable (§27). To balance, here we have the longest vice list to survive from the ancient world. Philo enumerates some 147 undesirable traits that Pleasure has left concealed.

Vice lists are standard in the diatribe, and are readily taken up in philosophical works (e.g., Diogenes Laertius 7.92–93; Epictetus, *Diatr.* 4.9.16–17). They are often balanced with
virtue lists as well (e.g., Seneca, Epist. 95.65–67; Dio Chrysostom, 4 Regn. 83–96). Although Greco-Roman examples are abundant, Jewish literature is not without parallels as well (e.g., Jer 7:9; Hos 4:2; 1QS 4.9–11; Wis 14:25–26; 4 Macc 1:26–27). Of course, much has been written on the virtue and vice lists in the New Testament, including their original Sitz(e) im Leben (e.g., Vögtle 1936; Ribbing 1959; Charles 1997). Here, it is sufficient to note simply that ancient moralistic literature in general uses lists of desirable and undesirable traits as a teaching mechanism, and such fits well the immediate context of Sacr., as well as with a hypothesized scholastic setting for the Allegorical Commentary in general (see, e.g., Sterling 1999; 2017). For other Philonic vice lists see, e.g., Post. 52; Conf. 117; Abr. 135–36; Virt. 180–83.

It is difficult to decipher any structure in the vice list here, but a number of common features stand out. Grammatically, Philo prefers strings of alpha-privatives (e.g., ἀδύναμος—ἀσκονός, ἀτακτός—ἀνοργίαστός, ἀμαθής—ἀπαιθής), and strong compounds, such as δυσ- (e.g., δυσσυνόνητος—δυσεξικτός) or βαρυ- terms (βαρύμνης—βαρυπενθής). Philo’s preference for adjectives beginning with letters early in the alphabet may reflect an alphabetic list of vices, or at least an Alexandrian tendency to alphabetize (see Daly 1967). Thematically, Méasson isolates five general categories: (1) Solitude (πανοὐργός—ἀτακτός); (2) Religion (ἀσεβής—παλαμανάος); (3) Sensuality (ἀνελεύθερος—ἀπλήστος); (4) Attitude toward others (ἀλαζών—κόλαξ); (5) The effects of vice on the body and spirit (from νοθής on) (PAPM 4:197).

**O friend.** See §22 and notes.

**in love with Pleasure.** Philo uses the noun φιλήδονος 23 times (all except three in the Allegorical Commentary), far more than any ancient author. Polybius says of a certain Aulus Postumius that he was “both fond of pleasure and averse to toil” (καὶ γὰρ φιλήδονος ἦ καὶ φυγόπονος) (39.1.10), a description with resonances in our context (see §§35ff on the nature of toil). Posidonius indeed regards the love of toil (φιλόπονος) as the opposite of the love of pleasure (φιλήδονος) (EK 168F). The serpent is Philo’s paradigmatic symbol of the “pleasure lover” (Opif. 157–60), who receives an Epicurean presentation (see Booth 1994). The Stoics define φιλήδονία simply as ἐπιθυμία ἣδονῶν [ἐμετρος] (SVF 3.395, 397).

**Antisocial Behavior**

**cunning.** The opening section of the list deals with anti-social behavior, according to Harl. Philo uses the adjective πανοὐργός twelve times and the noun πανουργία 24 times. The reason why the term leads his vice list can be explained by Philo’s definition of πανουργία as “an intentional sickness of the soul” (Sacr. 48), and by his remark that “we do wrong because of pleasure, and wrongdoing cannot occur without extreme cunning” (Leg. 2.107). Through cunning, the senses are aroused to pursue wickedness (cf. Opif. 156).

**insolent.** The adjective ὑφαντρομαχής is characteristic of sense-perception gone wild (Leg. 2.67). It can describe “rashness” born from excessive courage (Det. 18, 24), and is the result of arrogance (Det. 44; Heres 21). It is the latter association that best fits here.

**discordant.** The adjective ἀνάρμοστος, refers to disharmony in music (LSJ), and is “a Platonic word associated with vice in the soul” (Winston and Dillon 1983, 276, citing Gorg. 482b; Phaed. 93c).

**asocial.** The adjective ἀμαθής is used of inhospitable places (Euripides, Iph. taur. 403), or of creatures, such as the Cyclops (Euripides, Cyc. 429). Anti-social behavior was also an accusation against Jews (Virt. 141; Josephus, Ant. 11.212). For the meaning here, see Fug. 35; Spec. 2.16. The term is often paired with ἀκοινώνητος (see below).
**intractable.** The adjective δόσχρηστος, a *hapax* in Philo, can indicate stubborn animals elsewhere (Xenophon, *Cyn.* 3.11; Plutarch, *Alex.* 6.1). Philo probably intends it as a synonym for the more common and previously mentioned ἄμυκτος, which has a similar range (*Spec.* 4.204; *Praem.* 92).

**abnormal.** The adjective ἕκθεσμος is used in Philo more than in any other ancient author (14 times), with the exception of Eusebius. The term is paired in Philo with ἕκφυλος, or anomalous behavior (*Det.* 61; *Abr.* 137), and is associated with impiety (*Det.* 72; cf. *Aet.* 85).

**irritable.** The term ἀκρόχολος occurs three times in Philo, and is the product of senselessness (ἀφροσύνη) (*Somm.* 2.192). Ps-Aristotle refers to the term, along with πικρία and βαρωσωμία (also in Philo’s list), as “the three types of irritability” (ὀργιλότης) (*Virt. vit.* 1251a). Chrysippus likewise associated the term with those who have “a proclivity toward passion or some other unnatural quality, such as pain (ἐπιλυπία), irritability (ὀργιλότης), envy (φθονερία), and incorrigibility” (ἀκροχολία) (*SVF* 3.421).

**obstinate.** See notes to §121.

**vulgar.** The term φορτικός occurs only one other time in Philo in a quotation of Plato, *Theat.* 176c (*Fug.* 82).

**incorrigible.** The term ἄνοιθέτητας is found only in *Sacr.* in the works of Philo (§§23, 32), and before him only in Isocrates (*Nic.* 2.4), Demosthenes (*Epist.* 3.11), and possibly Menander (Meineke line 49).

**rash.** The term εὐχερής indicates thoughtlessness and carelessness, especially in speech (e.g., Plato, *Theaet.* 154b). While the term can be positive, Philo uses it six times, always in a negative sense (cf. *Heres* 81, 97; *Somm.* 1.13).

**deceptive.** The word κακοτέχνος refers to fraudulent activity with the intention to deceive. Thus the term can indicate “seductive” dancing (Philodemus apud *Anthologia Palatina* 5.129.1) or rhetorical affectation (Ps-Demosthenes, *Lacr.* 56; *Macart.* 2). The Wisdom of Solomon states, “Wisdom does not enter into a deceptive soul” (1:4).

**impossible to get along with.** The term ἀδιάγωγος from all appearances is a Philonic coinage, and is found only twice in extant Greek literature (*Leg.* 3.156 and here).

**unjust.** With this term Philo launches into a series of adjectives with natural opposites. The Stoics regard ἄδικα as a cardinal vice opposed to δικαιοσύνη (Diogenes Laertius 7.92), and Philo follows suit (e.g., *Post.* 93; *Heres* 243; *Mut.* 197). Interestingly, Paul uses the same term at the head of his vice list in 1 Cor 6:9–10.

**inequitable.** Whereas ἄδικα opposes δικαιοσύνη, ἄνισος is the opposite of ἴσος (Conf. 48; *Spec.* 1.121; 2.21; cf. Plato, *Phaed.* 74c; *Parm.* 140b; *Resp.* 558c).

**unsociable.** Philo uses this term twenty times (eight with ἄμυκτος, on which see above), sometimes in a positive sense of abstaining from contacts bad for the soul (*Cher.* 86; *Dec.* 123), but usually in a negative sense (e.g., *Spec.* 2.16; *Virt.* 141). The term is the opposite of κοινωνία (*Dec.* 171; *Spec.* 2.75; 4.187).

**irreconcilable.** The word ἁπάνθρωπος indicates the impossibility of reconciliation, such as the natural friction between good and evil (*Abr.* 14), virtue and vice (*Abr.* 105), enemies in war (*Spec.* 1.313; 3.16), criminals (*Ios.* 156), or former friends (*Mos.* 1.242).

**implacable.** The term ἀσπονδοῦς is a synonym for the previous adjective, referring to those who are unwilling to entertain a truce. Thus the term is frequently paired with ἔχθρος (*Post.* 165; Conf. 45; *Spec.* 3.195).

**covetous.** Philo uses the adjective πλεονέκτης only three times (here; *Mos.* 1.56; *QG* 4.172). The term appears in three New Testament vice lists (1 Cor 5:10–11; 6:10; Eph 5:5; cf. Rom
Both Philo and the New Testament associate covetousness with idolatry (Spec. 1.23, 25; Eph 5:5; Col 3:5).

**ill-governed.** The adjective κακόνοµος is a hapax in Philo, and occurs only once before him in Herodotus 1.65.2. The noun κακονοµία is the opposite of εὐνοµία (cf. Ps-Xenophon Ath. resp. 1.8; Ps-Ocellus 4.8). We thus surmise the term refers to those whose bad behavior reflects a poor ethical system.

**without friend, without home, without city.** These adjectives seem to have originally derived from Tragedy ( Euripides, Iph. taur. 220; Hipp. 1029; Sophocles, Phil. 1018), but are taken up into Stoic thought by Zeno. In his Respublica Zeno states only good people (σποιδάιοι) could be “citizens (πολίτες), friends (φίλοι), kin (οικείοι) and free (ἐλεύθεροι)” (Diogenes Laertius 7.33). Epictetus likewise adopts the theme in addressing the Cynic life (Diatr. 3.22.45, 47 in a vice list!). Philo is especially fond of the same pair (ἀοικος, ἄπολις), found six times in his writings (Leg. 3.2–3; Sacr. 32; Gig. 67; Congr. 58; Virt. 190), each time as a characteristic of the bad man (φαύλος).

**seditious.** The political origins of στασιώδης are obvious, and Josephus uses the term in precisely this sense (στάσις 165 times and the adjective 16 times; see Price 2003). Chrysippus, by contrast, uses the term in a moral sense to refer to the havoc passion wreaks on the soul (SVF 3.563), and this usage is more in line with Philo’s application. In the Philonic corpus, the adjective στασιώδης is found only here and Spec. 4.89. In the latter passage it describes the force of ἐπιθυµία on the human intellect.

**disorderly.** See notes to §§45, 85.

**Impious Behavior**

**impious.** Just as “cunning” (πανουργία) is a fountain head for social misbehavior (see above), so also “impiety” (ἀσέβεια) is the source of spiritual error (see §15 and notes).

**unholy.** Philo uses the term ἀνίερος 30 times—more than any ancient author. Although the cultic associations are relevant here, Philo also connects the term with pleasure (Congr. 169; Spec. 1.292). The ceremonial and the moral are connected in Sacr. 138: “what is disgraceful is profane, and what is profane is entirely unholy.”

**unsettled, unstable.** The term ἀνιδρυτος would seem to relate better to the adjectives άοικος and άπολις just above, but Philo elsewhere employs the collocation ἀνιδρυτος...ἀστατος as a metaphor for mental instability (e.g., Det. 12; Post. 22; Deus 4; Somn. 1.156). Philo is in fact the first author to use the term ἀνιδρυτος in a metaphorical sense (Winston and Dillon 1983, 277). Virt. 39–40 is especially noteworthy since Philo there portrays the wily woman adorning herself with the intent of luring a young man: “And drawing near with lewd glances and beguiling words and licentious postures and movements they enticed the weak-minded part of the youth, whose disposition was unstable and unsettled [ἀνερμάτιστα καὶ ἀνιδρυτα]” (trans. Wilson, PACS 3:51). Additionally, Winston and Dillon highlight the potential Epicurean background of the term ἀστατος (1983, 277), where the text refers to the vicissitudes of chance (τύχη; Epist. ad Menoeceum 133 [Arrighetti]).

**irreligious.** The adjective ἀνοργίαστος is found five times in Philo (Cher. 94; Sacr. 32; Ebr. 146; QG 1.2, 14), and is obviously borrowed from the language of the mysteries (cf. Yonge’s translation “unitiated”). Based on QG 1.2 (Paramelle) it appears the term carries the associations of reckless indifference in cultic affairs (cf. Cher. 94). See §33 for Philo’s own tongue-in-cheek acknowledgment of his mystery terminology.
**profane.** Like the previous term, βέβηλος also derives from the mysteries (Plato, *Symp.* 218b), but Philo probably uses it in the biblical sense (Lev 10:10; cf. *Spec.* 1.100–104). See §138 and notes.

**polluted.** The term may describe divinely “cursed” people, such as Cain (*Det.* 96; *Fug.* 60; *Praem.* 68), but here probably has the cultic meaning of polluted (*Mos.* 2.196; *Spec.* 1.89; 3.93).

**falsely devoted.** The term βωμολόχος is usually associated with jokes and pranks in Greek literature, but Philo used it in a cultic sense (*Cher.* 94), especially of the absurd rituals of the mystery cults opposed to pious worship (*Deus* 102; cf. *Spec.* 1.319). Cf. Plutarch, *Pyth.* *orac.* 407c.

**wretched, heinous.** The terms ἀλάστωρ and παλλαμναῖος refers either to (divine) avengers or to those who deserve vengeance. Philo uses ἀλάστωρ only three times, but he uses it in both senses (*Congr.* 57; *Flacc.* 175). Plutarch defines it, “Ἀι ἀλάστωρ is someone who has done unforgettable things (ἀληστα) that will be remembered for a long time” (*Quaest.* *rom.* 297a). Chrysippus also associates the term with an etymology, this time from ἀλάομα (SVF 2.156–58). The term παλλαμναῖος occurs only four times in Philo (*Mos.* 2.203; *Legat.* 89), once more with ἀλάστωρ (*Congr.* 57), and the pair appears in Cornutus (*Nat.* d. 10) and in Plutarch (*Def.* *orac.* 418b; *Quaest.* *rom.* 297a).

**Sensual Behavior**

**base.** The term ἀνεξέδοθερος refers to an ignobility or coarseness; that is, not being servile, but acting servile. Plato gives the term as a mark of wickedness (τὸ κακοήθης) (*Resp.* 401b), and associates it with the body rather than the mind (*Gorg.* 518a; cf. Xenophon, *Symp.* 8.23). It is the opposite of self-abasement (Xenophon, *Mem.* 3.10.5). The term is also used of the deceitfulness of appearance (Plato, *Gorg.* 465b) and of youths who reject philosophy (*Gorg.* 485c).

**harsh.** Philo uses the word ἀπότομος only here, and the noun ἀποτομία only twice (*Spec.* 2.94; *Flacc.* 95). Again, we seem to find the influence of theatrical language in this section, as the metaphorical application belongs exclusively to that tradition in the Classical period (e.g., Euripides, *Alc.* 118, 982; Sophocles, *Oed.* *tyr.* 877). However, Wis uses the term five times (5:20; 6:5; 11:10; 12:9; 18:15), and Josephus uses the adjective to describe Herod (*Ant.* 19.329).

**savage, slavish.** θηριώδης καὶ ἀνδραποδώδης is a Platonic collocation (*Resp.* 430b; cf. Aristotle, *Nic.* *eth.* 1118a). The term θηριώδης is connected with passion (*Abr.* 32) controlling the mind (*Agr.* 46). Philo uses the term ἀνδραποδώδης five times, each in connection with sense perception, especially the sense of taste (*Abr.* 149; *Spec.* 1.174; 4.100; *Contempl.* 45).

**cowardly.** The term δειλία is the opposite of θραυσμένος, both of which oppose άνδρεία on either side of the Aristotelian mean (see §27 and notes; see *Deus* 162–65). Plato defines δειλία “the strongest shackles of the soul,” basing himself on an etymology from δέω (“to bind”) and λίαν (“excessively”) (*Crat.* 415c; cf. *Soph.* 228e). The Stoics

**unbridled.** The term ἀκολαιασία describes the prostitute in §22 above.

§33. **the great mysteries.** Philo refers to τὰ μεγάλα μυστήρια four times (*Leg.* 3.100; *Cher.* 49; *Sacr.* 33, 62). In contrast to the “little mysteries” (τὰ μικρὰ μυστήρια), which can liberate the soul from the passions, the great mysteries liberate the soul from the senses (*Sacr.* 62; *Mos.* 1.62; *QG* 4.110; Lévy 2018). See §62 and notes. Here, Philo uses the phrase fecitiously, the 147 vices just listed representing the apex of a vicious life.
purposely concealed. Philo once again exposes the disingenuous nature of Pleasure (cf. §§21–25 and comments).

avoid any association. The term σύνοδος is used in Philo to refer to sexual unions that result in pleasure (Opif. 161; Congr. 12; Ios. 43; cf. Cher. 50; Abr. 101). Of course the Greek title of Congr. adopts the metaphorical application of the term (Περὶ τῆς πρὸς τὰ προπαιδεύματα συνόδου).

multitude and magnitude of goods stored up with me. Here, Virtue mockingly refers to pleasure’s claim to have “coffers full of all good things” (§22). Philo is fond of the πλῆθος-μέγεθος pair, which may derive from a Platonist tradition (cf. Leg. 733b; 860b; Alc. maj. 134b; Diogenes Laertius 3.12).

well-disposed nature. A φύσις ἔλεος is mentioned twelve times in Philo, nine times describing God (e.g., Opif. 168; Mos. 2.61; Spec. 1.310). Here and in Fug. 154; Mos. 1.160 alone the expression refers to humans. Philo is the first author to use the expression, but Plato, Leg. 792e uses vocabulary reminiscent of this paragraph.

my banquet. The term θοίνη indicates a sumptuous feast, and is usually paired in Philo with εὔωχία (Agr. 66; Mos. 1.187; Legat. 356). The banquet here, however, aims not to please the body, but the mind—the only time Philo uses the term in a positive sense. The scene Philo paints here is obviously borrowed from the charioteer myth of Plato’s Phaedr. 247, which is also described as a θοίνη (247a).

pleasures of the filled stomach fatten the body. The expression ἡδονή γαστρός is apparently of Epicurean origin, and Philo uses the phrase more than 25 times (e.g., Leg. 1.86; Sacr. 49; Ios. 61). Leisegang cites the famous Epicurean fragment: “Pleasing the stomach is the beginning and root of all good, and all wisdom’s excessive pursuits find their reference point in it” (Athenaeus, Deipn. 12.546f = fr. 409 [Usener]). On the Epicurean origin further, see Plutarch, Suav. viv. 1087d; 1098d). The moralists rage against food and drink merely to please the body (e.g., Seneca, Marc. 22.2; Epictetus, Diss. 1.9.8; 3.3.17; 4.8.34; Musonius Rufus, Diss. 18a–b), and Wendland regards this sort of discussion as a chief characteristic of the diatribe (1895, 8–15).

the nourished mind happily devoted to the virtues. Philo’s language of the nourished mind reminds us of Plato’s charioteer (Phaedr. 247d). This mind at least temporarily beholds pure essence (τὸ ὅν) and “the true” (τἀληθῆ), and thereby is “nourished and receives enjoyment” (τρέφεται καὶ εὐπαθεῖ). Philo substitutes the term ἔγχορεύω for εὐπαθέω (a verb he never uses). The former appears eight times (Post. 137; Plant. 38; Ebr. 138; Congr. 20; Fug. 187; Mut. 225, 229). Plutarch also uses the term on the lips of Alexander, who claims to imitate Heracles and Perseus by dancing in India (with reference to Bacchic celebrations) (Alex. fort. 332b).